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
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
PRESENTED BY
JOHN A. ROEBLING
OF BERNARDSVILLE, NEW JERSEY

JUNE 11, 1932











From an Original by Macquart

N. BONAPARTE.

London Published for Tegg & Castlemain No 17863.

Bonaparte

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THE
REVOLUTIONARY PLUTARCH:

EXHIBITING THE MOST
DISTINGUISHED CHARACTERS,
LITERARY, MILITARY, AND POLITICAL,
IN THE RECENT ANNALS OF THE
FRENCH REPUBLIC;

THE GREATER PART
FROM THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION
OF
A GENTLEMAN RESIDENT AT PARIS.

TO WHICH, AS
AN APPENDIX,
IS REPRINTED ENTIRE, THE CELEBRATED
PAMPHLET OF "KILLING NO MURDER."

VOL. I.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR JOHN MURRAY, 32, FLEET-STREET.

1804.

Fr 1397.7.89

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PREFACE.

La honte suit toujours le parti des rebelles,
Leurs grandes actions sont les plus criminelles;
Ils signalent leur crime, en signalant leur bras,
Et la gloire n'est point, ou les rois ne sont pas.

LA THÉBAÏDE.

THE fluctuating state of affairs in France since the Revolution, the various changes that have taken place, both of men and measures, and the real worthlessness, guilt and infamy, of the Public Characters now enjoying a temporary usurpation, rendered a Sketch of their Lives a task unworthy detail, did not the present situation of Politics, the degrading submission of some, the weakness of others, and the apathy of most Continental Nations, and the daring menaces of France, subjugated by its relentless Tyrant, render it necessary to

VOL. I.

a

exhibit

Printed by B. M'Millan, }
Bow-Street, Covent-Garden. }

exhibit in their true colours those revolutionary murderers and robbers, who now aim at the conquest and dominion of this Country, either by their projects against our Finances, or threats against our Independence.

On a review of those atrocious and debased characters which have hitherto been held up by anarchists and demagogues as examples of virtue and valour, the mind recoils at the hideous prospect which they present; and after an always painful, and often disgusting, investigation of incontrovertible truths and positive facts, turns with horror from a picture, strikingly, yet so faithfully descriptive of the temporary triumph of vice, infamy and ferocity.

The present volumes contain the particulars of no person, who is not either a relative, a courtier, a favourite, a tool, an accomplice or a rival, of the too fortunate Corsican Upstart, now the oppressor and plunderer of the European Continent.

The

The Author has quoted many works from which he has learned some of the interesting anecdotes concerning the Revolutionary Characters now offered to the Public, with many of whom he has been personally acquainted, either during his travels, residence or imprisonments in France. Should, however, some material errors have crept in, the Author claims the indulgence of the Reader, and demands information, that he may correct faults, not wilful misrepresentations.

Some of these Sketches, the liberality and loyalty of the Publisher have permitted to appear in the British Press and the Globe, but they have been revised, corrected or augmented, before they were collected together in the present publication.

The Author particularly apologizes for an uniformity of style, often, perhaps, incorrect and tedious : he is but a literary recruit, though an officer of ancient date, and it is not prosperity that has forced

him to exchange the sword for the pen ;
to exhibit to public animadversion from
his study, those regicides and rebels,
whom he should have preferred to have
combated in the field, rather than to be
a biographer of persons, many of whom
he has known in the rank, commanded,
or seen confounded in a nameless crowd,
and in a well-deserved obscurity.

ERRATUM.

In page 296, of Vol. II. the following lines
should be read thus :

Mella jubes Hyblaea tibi vel Hymettia nasci,
Et thymo cecropia Corsica ponis apes.

MART.

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TO THE
VIRTUOUS SHADES
OF
TWO DEPARTED PATRIOTS,
LOUIS XVI. AND EDMUND BURKE,
THE FOLLOWING
PAGES ARE DEDICATED :

OF WHOM,
THE ONE DECORATED A THRONE,
WITH ALL THE RARE AND ESTIMABLE QUALITIES OF
PRIVATE LIFE;
WHILST
THE OTHER, IN A PRIVATE STATION,
POSSESSED THOSE TALENTS AND VIRTUES CAPABLE OF ADDING
LUSTRE TO A THRONE.



GENERAL MOREAU.

REVOLUTIONS bring forward men of genius and of talents, who under orderly governments and in quiet times, would have remained disregarded, unnoticed, and unknown. It is however too true, that the services of those who owe their notoriety to revolutions, let them be ever so great, do not recompense, or prove even an equivalent, for the unavoidable and consequential crimes of troublesome times, and for the sufferings of mankind, from continual alarms, disturbances, anarchy, uncertainty, disquiet, and agitation.

According to the annals of the ancients, a million of Roman citizens were sacrificed before Cæsar reigned, and another million of them were

the victims of those who pretended to be his successors, until Octavius Augustus, after the destruction of his rivals, had assumed the reins of government over the Roman republic.

Amongst historians, Father D'Orleans and Voltaire calculated the number of Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Irishmen, who perished during the civil wars which seated Cromwell on the throne of the Stuarts, to amount to upwards of nine hundred thousand. Des Oudouard, Chenier, and other French revolutionary writers, acknowledge that, since 1792, more than three millions of Frenchmen have been butchered by rival factions, or killed in civil and foreign wars, as if it were on purpose to enable Bonaparte to usurp the throne of the Bourbons.

For the honour of human nature, it is to be hoped that it would be a calumny, even against the wildest French republican enthusiasts, and the most enthusiastic admirers of republics, to suppose that they would have consented to see a change of government, however desirable, if any one in 1789 had proved to them, that before France could be a commonwealth, a Corsican its first consul, and an obscure Britton one of its first generals, it was necessary that three millions of their countrymen should perish upon the scaffold,

fold, in prisons, in exile, by famine, by poison, or in the field of battle.

Réforms, innovations, and revolutions, are easily planned, and frequently as easily brought about; but few foresee, however many may foresee, that thousands who have witnessed, and perhaps applauded, the beginnings, will, by violent deaths, be prevented from seeing the ends; and *that those who are the first plotters against the government of their country, are often the first victims of their own plots*; and with the loss of their lives, only prepare the way to power for some nameless and unknown intriguer, who, confounded in the crowd, was disregarded or despised, when they were popular and extolled. Thus, six years before unnoted subaltern Bonaparte reigned over a republic, Brissot and Roland, Petion and Condorcet, Manuel and Gaudet, the founders of it in 1792, had all perished before the end of 1793. This is the short, but true history of all the revolutions of all countries and of all times.

General Moreau is the son and grandson of two able advocates at Morlaix, in Lower Brittany, and was born in 1761. His father possessed the confidence of his superiors, the esteem of his equals, and the respect of his inferiors. His virtues, which a king would have rewarded, were

crimes with a revolutionary government, which proscribed every one who was merely suspected to be good, virtuous, and humane. In August, 1794, when the son, a republican general, added Sluys to his other conquests for the French republic, the French republican Prieur, and the jacobins at Brest, sent the father to the scaffold, with other members of the department of Finisterre, *as an aristocrat, or a friend of aristocrats*, because he had faithfully and honourably managed the affairs of several noble emigrants, entrusted to his care before they left France to join the Bourbons and to save their lives from a threatened proscription. His untimely end was lamented by all who knew his worth; bewailed by the people, but unregarded, as well by them as by his son.

Young Moreau had already, before the Revolution, shewed his ambition to be distinguished for talents, of whose possession he was conscious. In May, 1788, when the scheming minister of Louis XVI. Cardinal De Brienne, intended a reform, or rather an innovation, in the magistracy, Moreau, who then was Prevot de Droit, or, at the head of the students in law at Rennes, over whom he had a marked and known influence, commanded them and other young men who rose in its defence, and was therefore called the general

of

of the parliament. Moreau has an agreeable air of frankness, and a pleasing and benevolent physiognomy, which, with his strong natural parts, a good education, and some military experience, acquired at an early age in some regiments of the line, where he had twice enlisted, contrary to the will of his father, were the principal causes of his superiority over his friends, and of the regard he met with, even from his opponents. During the five months of the duration of this petty parliamentary war, he displayed valour and achievements, which did not exclude either wisdom, or that sort of prudence compatible and consistent with an insurrection against the legitimate authority. Count Theard De Bissy, the respectable commander for the King, had been ordered to carry into execution the changes proposed by De Brienne. His moderation and humanity saved the lives of many of the insurgents. He had given strict orders, if possible, to capture Moreau, but not to hurt him; but Moreau was so much upon his guard, and shewed so great an intrepidity, that the troops of the line could never arrest him, although he walked out every day in all the public places at Rennes, and often very weakly escorted. Many, however, ascribe young Moreau's safety at this period,

more to the good opinion and respect that every body had for the father, than to the capacity of the son; and all impartial men must agree, that nothing can better prove the lenity and clemency of Louis XVI. than that neither Moreau, nor the insurgents under his command, were persecuted, or punished.

In May, 1788, Moreau had been in arms for the parliament, and for the states of Brittany, against the minister. In October, the same year, he commanded the troops of Nantes and Rennes, armed against the same parliament, and against the same states of Brittany, with intent to force them to execute the orders of the King's ministers for a convocation of the states-general of the whole kingdom. This change of conduct and character has been observed more than once in Moreau during his public and military career; but it is only justice to mention, that the minister whom Moreau opposed was the unpopular and impolitic Cardinal De Brienne, and the minister whom he defended, the then favourite with the people, M. Neckar, the successor to De Brienne, who was obliged to resign in August, 1788.

During the winter 1788, Moreau every day evinced greater military talents. He was indefatigable in the cause which he had undertaken to defend;

defend ; when, therefore, the weakness and irresolution of the parliament and the states of Brittany had promised to admit three deputies from the insurgents to inspect the registers of their deliberations, and to be convinced of their sincerity, to put an end to all troubles and differences, Moreau was one of the three persons elected, and acted on this occasion with as much moderation and politeness as he had done before with vigilance and activity. When the registers were offered for inspection, Moreau in a short, but acute speech, said, *that he and his friends were certain they had to do with gentlemen, and therefore trusted to their word of honour, which he hoped would convince their enemies and calumniators, that his young friends in arms were all loyal men and not rebels ; that they had armed for a good and just cause, and not against the government of their country, or the privileges of their countrymen ; that they were friends to liberty, but lovers of order ; and as they now had the hope and assurance of being free, quiet and order should be immediately restored, by their dispersing, and returning to their former and usual occupations.* Moreau's conduct on this occasion gained him the approbation of his enemies more than that of his hot-headed and enthusiastic friends, whom it required all his influence to persuade to be satisfied with humiliating

liating the privileged orders, without dishonouring them*.

When, in 1789, the national guards were formed, Moreau was elected the commander of one of the battalions from his department. Hitherto Moreau's lively genius had only, in obedience to his good father's desire, although with much difficulty, and, as he often says, *even with disgust*, submitted to the dull and dry study of the law. Whilst, therefore, the constitution of his country had sanctioned the place he occupied, and the military rank he had obtained from the free choice and confidence of his fellow-citizens, and made the permanency of his continuance in a military line a probability, if not a certainty, neither the entreaties of his parents, nor the prospect of pecuniary advantages †, could dissuade or tempt him from employing his whole time otherwise than to improve his military tactics, and to gain more military information and knowledge. Even when his health suffered from an application and exercise, that wasted his strength in the day, and deprived him of rest at night, he could not be per-

* See *La conduite des insurgés, Bretons en 1788*, page 36.

† *La jeunesse de General Moreau*; imprimé à Rennes, an iii. It is said his father offered him half a share in his business, which he declined.

suaded for some time to remit his labours. *His friends say, that he devoured in four months more military works, treatises, and memoirs, than had been composed in four centuries; and went through in three months, more military manœuvres and evolutions than many officers have gone through in thirty years*.*

At the first review of his battalion, in May, 1790, the old General Count Theard De Bissy told him *how highly satisfied he was with the regularity, discipline, and evolutions of this corps, and assured Colonel Moreau, that few of the colonels of the regiments of the line, with their old corps, would afford him the same pleasure and gratification he had experienced in reviewing his battalion of national guards.* These are the very words, extracted from the official report of Count Theard De Bissy, addressed to the King's minister of the war department. And when it is considered, that at this very period the greatest jealousy subsisted between the regiments of the line and the national guards, and that the latter were held in much contempt by the former, this praise does Moreau more honour than many later eulogies, presented as often to the fortunate and successful as to the meritorious

* See the last-mentioned pamphlet, p. 24. •

and deserving. It was upon his return from this review that Moreau said, *the Count Theard De Bissy has done me a great deal of honour ; but if he lives some years longer, he shall see me command not only the national guards, but the army of the line**. Moreau's prediction was fulfilled. This unfortunate nobleman lived until the 27th July, 1794, when, at the age of seventy-two, he was sent to the guillotine by Robespierre's tribunal, and at that time Moreau commanded a detached part of Pichegru's army in Flanders.

Too well informed, and too humane, to like a revolutionary government, he was far from approving the constitutional anarchy of the constitution of 1793 ; and the battalion under his command was one of the last in the republican army that sanctioned it with its acceptance. This was so much the more courageous and generous in an ardent and aspiring young officer, as, during the reign of terror, even an hesitation to obey the dictates of ignorant cruelty, and to admit implicitly the regulations of cruel ignorance, not only annihilated all hope of promotion, but endangered the life of him who resisted them. His courage, his zeal, and his talents, were, however, such,

* See *La jeunesse de General Moreau*, page 30.

that they soon silenced base envy, gross ignorance, and revolutionary fanaticism; and he commanded promotion from men by whom he was detested, and whose detestation he retorted by a known abhorrence. In July, 1793, he was, by Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety, promoted to the rank of a general of brigade; and if success did not crown his first attempts as a general, he had the consolation to know, that he deserved victory when he met with a defeat. His first engagement as a commander, took place on the 14th September, 1793. Having with a division of the army of the Moselle attacked the Prussian army, under the orders of the Duke of Brunswick, he was completely routed; but the official report published by the enemy, did every justice both to Moreau's disposition for his attack and for his retreat, which latter is particularly praised: it is said in this report, *that his able plan for the attack was only surpassed by his yet abler one for a retreat; that the French army under his command was defeated, but neither dispersed nor dishonoured**. The approbation of such a general as the Duke of Brunswick, nobody can deny, is that of a competent judge as to military merit, and is honourable

* See the Report of the Duke of Brunswick to the King of Prussia, dated before Landau, Sept. 15th, 1793.

at all times to all generals ; but it was particularly so during the campaign of 1793, when most of the French republican generals evinced such a want of capacity, that they were looked upon with a well-deserved contempt, both by the Austrians and by the Prussians, and which the cruelties of those regicides, whose cause they espoused in fighting their battles, did certainly neither diminish nor extenuate.

In the autumn, 1793, Moreau made the acquaintance of General Pichegru, who was then commander in chief of the army of the Rhine. Moreau belonged to the army of the Moselle, but during the winter campaign these armies often acted and fought together, and Pichegru had an opportunity of observing his judgment, talents, and courage, which wanted only the guidance of a friend, as able as willing, to make them noticed, rewarded, and illustrious. This friend Moreau found in Pichegru, who, when he, in February, 1794, was appointed to the command of the army of the North, caused Moreau to be nominated a general of one of the divisions in that army. Moreau, before he had gained Pichegru's friendship, was certainly a very clever and good officer, but no general ; he might command a battalion or a division, but he could not pretend,
with

with any prospect of advantage, or any hope of honour, to be a commander in chief of an army. The friendship of Pichegrue, which no mean jealousy or base envy could alter or lessen, made Moreau in three months what he is—one of the first generals in Europe.

Moreau distinguished himself highly on the 26th and 30th April, 1794, when he blockaded and took Menin; in June, before Ypres, which he forced to surrender on the 17th; and before Bruges, where he entered the 29th. On July 1st, he took Ostend; and on the 18th Nieuport, which was garrisoned by Hanoverians and by emigrants.

On the 26th of May, 1794, the National Convention passed a decree, assimilating Englishmen and Hanoverians with the proscribed French emigrants, to whom no quarter should be given. On the 31st May, the cruel Barrere, *at present one of Bonaparte's favourites*, proposed to the Convention, that this decree should be accompanied by an address to the armies, alike impolitic, illiberal, and barbarous*. Disobedience to the decrees of the

* On the 31st May, 1793, Barrere proposed to the Convention, that the decree of the 26th May, prohibiting quarter being given to the English or Hanoverians, should be accompanied by the following address to the armies:

the convential tyrants was death ; but Moreau braved death, was disobedient, and, like a manly and generous soldier, had the virtue to risk his life, rather than to tarnish his fame, by putting

“ England is capable of every outrage on humanity, and of every crime towards the republic. She attacks the rights of all nations, and threatens to annihilate liberty. How long will you suffer to continue on your frontiers the slaves of George—the soldiers of the most atrocious of tyrants ? He formed the Congress of Pilnitz, and brought about the scandalous surrender of Toulon ; he massacred your brethren at Genoa, and burned our magazines in the maritime towns ; he corrupted our cities, and endeavoured to destroy the national representation ; he starved your plains, and purchased treasons on the frontiers.

“ When the events of battle shall put in your power either English or Hanoverians, bring to your remembrance the vast tracts of country English slaves have laid waste. Carry your views to La Vendée, Toulon, Lyons, Landrecies, Martinico, and St. Domingo—places still reeking with the blood which the atrocious policy of the English has shed. Do not trust to their artful language, which is an additional crime, worthy of their perfidious character and Machiavelian government. Those who boast that they abhor the tyranny of George, say, can they fight for him ?

“ No, no, republican soldiers ! You ought, therefore, when victory shall put in your power Englishmen or Hanoverians, to strike : not one of them ought to return to the traitorous territory of England, or to be brought into France. Let the British slaves perish, and Europe be free !”

It is necessary to observe, that about this time Robespierre did no longer share in the measures of the committees, but absented himself ; Barrere, Bonaparte's favourite ; Jeanbon St. André, his prefect at Mayence ; Jean De Bry, his prefect at Besançon ; Carnot, his tribune ; Fouché, his senator, with other his associates, were the principal authors of this and other inhuman and infamous acts.

into

into execution this savage decree. All the Hanoverians were saved. He had not, however, courage or generosity enough to extend the same humanity to several hundred French emigrants, who being found in the garrison, were all inhumanly butchered.

On the 28th of July, General Moreau executed one of the boldest enterprizes which distinguished the campaign. Having resolved to besiege Sluys, it became necessary to gain possession of the island of Cadsand, at which there was no way of arriving but by a causeway, inundated on both sides, and commanded by fourteen pieces of cannon, or by throwing a bridge over the strait of Coschische, which he could not effect for want of pontoons. He had no resource but a few boats, in which some of the troops passed, while others swam across; and forming in the face of a superior force, and of numerous batteries, captured the island, with ninety pieces of cannon, a great quantity of ammunition and provisions, and two hundred prisoners.

Sluys was forced to capitulate on the 26th of August, after enduring a vigorous siege, in which General Moreau and his army were subjected to the greatest hardships and inconveniencies; besides, a great mortality carried away numbers of

his men. The country round Sluys, and in Zealand, is at all times unhealthy; and in the summer months particularly, it is liable to periodical and dangerous fevers, the effect of which the French felt so much the more, as they were exposed to the damps of the night and to the heat of the day, without tents, covering, provisions, or medicines. Moreau's tender care of his soldiers during this siege, and the wants, fatigues, and privations which he shared with them, endeared him to men, who by their republican rulers were sent to death and destruction, with an apathy, neglect, and indifference, unknown to and incompatible with lawful governments and civilized states.

When, in October 1794, General Pichegrue was forced, from illness, to resign the command for some time, he recommended Moreau to be his successor. This is the first command Moreau had, as a general in chief; and although Pichegrue's absence was but of short duration, the army of the North under Moreau, captured Nimeguen and Arnheim, and made such preparations for future victories and progress, that Pichegrue, in re-assuming the command, paid Moreau in his orders, and in his report to the National Convention, the highest compliments. During the famous winter campaign that followed, and which subjected

subjected Holland to France, Moreau commanded the right wing of Pichegrue's army, and contributed greatly to its rapid and astonishing success. He partook with Pichegrue the honour of victory and the glory of conquest; and with him declined the plunder of the vanquished, and the contributions of the conquered.

After the conquest of Holland had been completed, and a peace concluded with Prussia, Pichegrue was appointed the commander in chief of the armies on the Rhine and on the Moselle. Moreau had several enemies amongst the leading members of the Convention and in the Committee of Public Safety, who had acted as accomplices with the assassins of his father, and therefore hated the son, whose vengeance they feared, and because they had murdered the father, wished to disgrace and humiliate the son; but Pichegrue, whose friendship for Moreau was as great as his love for his country, forced the conventional regicides to give a respite both to their hatred and fear, and to nominate Moreau his successor in the command of the army of the North.

In December, 1795, Moreau ordered the blockade of Luxemburgh; and after consulting with Pichegrue, he sent a plan of defence for Holland to the Dutch generals Daendels and Du-

monceaux, and to the Batavian Committee, with orders to put it into execution within eight days. This is the same plan which, during these last seven years, has been followed by all the French commanders in Holland, and to which the ignorant General Brune owed the advantages he gained there in the winter 1799.

Disgusted with the tyrannical and impolitic conduct of the Directory, Pichegrue, early in the spring 1796, resigned the command of the army of the Rhine and of the Moselle, and he again persuaded Carnot to nominate Moreau in his place. This general was not a much greater favourite with the Directory than he had been with the National Convention and its Committee of Public Safety, because the directorial as well as the conventional jacobins never forgave a man whom they had offended. Pichegrue had therefore great difficulty to convince Carnot and Barras, that in serving his friend, he only served his country, and in serving his country he served the Directory.

After different marches and counter-marches, Moreau, in June, 1796, opened a campaign—the undisputed foundation and basis of his military reputation and glory. He was before known to be an able general and an experienced chief; to be as vigorous in his attacks as vigilant in his retreats;

treats; to add to the activity of youth the prudence of age: but during this celebrated campaign, and more celebrated retreat, he not only surprised his friends, but astonished his enemies, and commanded victory and admiration where defeat and destruction were to be expected.

After forcing General Wurmser in his camp under Franckenthal, Moreau repulsed him under the cannon of Mannheim, and soon after, in the night between the 23d and 24th June, effected the passage of the Rhine near Strasburgh. The opposite fort, Kehl, was occupied by the weak and ill-conducted troops of the Empire, whose resistance was feeble, and therefore ineffectual: those who were not killed or made prisoners, were easily dispersed.

After several engagements between a division of the French army commanded by General Ferrino, and the army commanded by the Prince De Condé, and when another column of French troops had passed the Rhine at Huninguen, the Austrians were obliged to evacuate Brisgau, it was then that Moreau, on the 6th July, attacked the Archduke Charles by Rastadt, and on the 9th by Etlingen, and forced him to retreat. In those two actions Moreau shewed the greatest courage and talents, particularly in the last, which was
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not decided before it was night: he manœuvred with a vivacity and boldness almost incredible, and was perfectly well assisted by General Desaix, and his other generals of division, who rather wearied out the Austrians by their enthusiasm than overcame them by their valour. On the 15th he again attacked the enemy at Pfortzheim, and compelled him to quit his strong position. If the Austrian army retreated, it was only step by step: they contested every inch of ground; and several hard-fought engagements took place on the 18th, 21st, and 22d, at Stuttgart, Caustadt, Berg, and Esslingen, all to the advantage of the French, and entirely owing to Moreau's exceedingly brilliant manœuvres; and as Jourdan had hitherto been as successful as General Moreau, their joint successes made them master of the Necker, a river commanding both many and strong positions, and useful and advantageous to lay the neighbouring countries under contributions, and to transport the French artillery and army equipage.

The armies of the Rhine and of the Moselle, of the Sambre and of the Meuse, were now enabled to co-operate; the different princes of Franconia and Suabia were obliged to sue for peace; and Moreau's orders were obeyed
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from the banks of the Rhine nearly to the gates of Munich.

On the 8th and 10th of August, two of his divisions met with some checks; and on the 11th the Archduke Charles resolved to try once more the fate of a battle; attacked Moreau on his whole line; and, defeating his advanced guard, forced his right wing to retreat to Heydenheim; but Desaix, who commanded the left wing, with his usual courage and talents, overcame the enemy every where; whilst Moreau at the same time retrieved with the reserve the losses of the right wing. At last, after a battle of seventeen hours, both armies remained in presence of each other, both believing themselves defeated. The Archduke finding, however, that whether he conquered or was defeated, he should be obliged to fall back to the banks of the Danube and the town of Donauwert, began his retreat by ordering his army to descend the Danube; and Moreau took a victorious attitude, although he had obtained no victory.

This well-fought battle disconcerted the projects of Moreau; for his reserve of artillery and stores having been obliged to fly to a considerable distance, he could not harass the retreat of the Austrians towards Donauwert; and this check first interrupted the grand project which had been founded

founded on the success attending the armies in Germany and Italy, for effecting a junction of both, and pouring with irresistible force into the hereditary states of the Emperor.

The Archduke receiving daily reinforcements, which diminished the disparity between him and his opponents, conceived the bold project of leaving a small number to keep Moreau in check, while with the remainder he fell on Jourdan, and overwhelmed him with superior numbers. Such a plan was certainly replete with danger; and has by Moreau, even in his dispatches, been mentioned with the highest applause, *as worthy the genius of the young Austrian general to conceive, and his valour to execute.*

On the departure of the Archduke, General La Tour had taken a defensive station behind the river Lech, covering the town of Augsburgh, while Generals Froelich and Wolf were at Wangen and Kempten, protecting the left of the army, and keeping up a communication with the Tyrol; Moreau's army was partly on the left and partly on the right bank of the Danube, between the rivers Iller and Lech. When Moreau learned that the Austrian prince had concentrated his forces at Donauwert, he crossed the Danube at Dettingen, Hoechstet, and
Lan-

Laningen. In this he unwittingly completed the views of the Archduke, and for some time after shewed himself utterly unapprized of his real plan. When better informed on that point, he passed the Lech, for the purpose of penetrating into Bavaria and approaching Munich, hoping by these means to make the Archduke abandon his projects against Jourdan, and return to his former station; but that judicious young general prudently contented himself with detaching ten thousand men, under General Nauendorf, to the assistance of La Tour; a force which was found sufficient to hinder Moreau from penetrating beyond the Iser; and thus prevented his intended diversion.

The French under Moreau gaining ground for four successive days, the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th August, upon the Austrians under La Tour, both found themselves under the walls of Munich; but neither army took possession of the town. La Tour posted himself in a judicious manner, while Moreau selected a situation, at once daring, singular, and dangerous. While Moreau, in order to meliorate his situation, meditated an assault on the TETE DE PONT at Ingolstadt, Generals Nauendorf and Mercantin, on the first of September attacked his left wing, and pursued

pursued him as far as Langenbruck, and the chapel of St. Gast. Moreau, however, soon revenged this loss, by sending General St. Cyr, on the 3d, to dislodge the Austrians from Freysingen and its bridge, in which he completely succeeded.

For several days, slight affairs of posts only took place; but in this interval the Elector Palatine, terrified by the approach of the republicans, obtained from Moreau a treaty of peace, by which, in consideration of large sacrifices in money, cloathing, and provisions, for the French army, he sold to the Elector a neutrality for his dominions in Bavaria, Franconia, and Westphalia. As this defection from the general cause of the empire followed within a month the pacification of the republic with Saxony, it was expected, that from the consequent diminution of the Imperial army, and the supplies which the French acquired, they would have derived great advantages; but, in fact, the pursuit of this easy, though apparently profitable triumph, insulated Moreau, prevented his receiving due intelligence, and in the end brought upon him many difficulties.

The Austrian light troops displayed the most successful vigilance in intercepting all couriers; and at length Moreau, very ill informed of Jourdan's situation, sent, on the 10th September, a
large

large corps of cavalry, drawn from his left wing, across the Danube, and, on the ensuing day, quitted his own position on the Iser, for the purpose of supporting or following this column. While executing this bold manœuvre, he was attacked near Munich, by Prince Furstenberg and General Froelich, who defeated his rear-guard. The division which had passed the river on the preceding day, reached Aichstedt, where it levied contributions, and threw Franconia into great alarm for the fate of the Archduke ; but General La Tour instantly commenced a pursuit of Moreau, while General Nauendorf, passing the Danube below Neuburg, overtook Desaix, whom Moreau had recalled, and defeated his rear-guard.

General Jourdan had about this time been so completely routed by the Archduke, that his army was in the most confused and irregular retreat ; and the disorderly conduct of the army of the Sambre and Meuse placed that of the Rhine and the Moselle in a very critical position ; for all the conquests of Moreau were now become useless in consequence of the defeat of Jourdan. The former, after conducting his victorious troops from the banks of the Rhine to those of the Danube and Iser, and proving successful in no less

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than five pitched battles, as well as a multitude of skirmishes, was now obliged to commence his justly celebrated retreat.

French generals have more difficulty to keep their troops in spirits and order, in a retreat, than to lead them on with alacrity, even to the most dangerous attack. On the offensive, the French act at all times with courage and vigour; but on the defensive, oftentimes with dread, inquietude, and cowardice; and it demands, therefore, more real judgment, talents, and patience, to make an orderly retreat with a French army, than to defeat with it the bravest enemy, or to storm the strongest positions, and the best fortified camps and places. With the exception of Marshal Belleisle, in his famous retreat from Prague, no other French general had before Moreau been able to keep order, obedience, and regularity in, and to defeat a pursuing enemy by a retreating French army.

After every arrangement was made to ensure a safe and honourable retreat, Moreau ordered a proclamation to be read at the head of every battalion, in which it was stated, *“that the commander in chief expected every thing from his soldiers, and was conscious that the momentary success of the enemy in another quarter, and the measures he was obliged*

obliged to pursue in consequence of that event, would not diminish any of the energy and valour so often displayed by this army." He added, "*that the moment would soon arrive when they should have an opportunity of earning new laurels; and, in the mean time, he hoped that the signal for combat, would also be the signal for victory."*

After Moreau had, on the 11th September, crossed the Lech, he gave orders to cut down all the bridges behind him; he then ascended along the banks of the Danube, and stationed his head-quarters at Ulm. Finding himself closely pursued, he suddenly, on the 1st October, attacked General La Tour in his camp between Biberach and Buchau, and after a long and bloody action, not only forced him to retire in confusion, but would have entirely destroyed his army, had it not been for the gallant resistance on the part of the few emigrants under the Prince of Condé, who covered the retreat of the Austrians, and saved their baggage.

Moreau now divided his army into two bodies, and marched suddenly through Munderkingen, Neudlingen, and Palengen, to attack the Generals Nauendorf and Petrasch, who were forced to abandon their respective positions: so terrible was this commander, even in the moment of re-

treat, that he took no less than seven thousand prisoners in these different actions.

Having at length opened a communication with the forest towns, forced the passes of the Black Forest, and penetrated through the *Val Dender* with his centre, he employed his two wings against the numerous detachments, led on by the Generals La Tour, Nauendorf, and Petrasch.

The French army having, on the 12th October, resumed its march, the main body encamped in the neighbourhood of Fribourg, and waited for the arrival of the rest of the troops. The moment a junction had been effected, the Archduke Charles assaulted, and, on the 18th October, with some difficulty, carried the village of Kendringen. Next day he attacked part of the enemy stationed at Nymbourg, but after an action that lasted from ten o'clock in the morning until dark, he was obliged to desist from his enterprize, having experienced considerable loss in consequence of the spirited resistance of General Desaix.

Moreau now abandoned the Brisgau, and at the head of an army fatigued by the length of its march, destitute of shoes, and rendered sickly by continual rains, proceeded towards the banks of the Rhine ; and dividing his army into two bodies, Desaix re-
passed

passed that river at Brisach, while he himself directed his course towards Hupinguen, continually followed and harassed by the enemy.

On Moreau's arrival at Schliengen he assumed an excellent position, and notwithstanding the superior numbers of the Austrians, determined to wait the event of a battle. He was accordingly on the 24th October, attacked along the whole of his line, but the enemy were repulsed on every side. However, Moreau moved his camp on the night of the engagement, and having passed the Rhine at Hupinguen without any molestation on the part of the enemy, returned to Strasburgh on the 26th October, the point from which he had set out four months before, after one of the most memorable expeditions recorded in history.

This noble retreat of Moreau, in 1796, was of more radical use and advantage to France, than all Bonaparte's victories in Italy the same year; because, had Moreau not shewed a greater military genius, and a genius more fertile in resources and expedients than Jourdan, the army of the Rhine and the Moselle must have been in the same disbanded state as the army of the Sambre and the Meuse; and instead of its being able to send reinforcements to Bonaparte in Italy, the Austrians would probably have been in a situation to

assist General Wurmser blockaded at Mantua, and Italy might as easily have been conquered in 1797, as lost in 1796.

German and French writers have compared Moreau's retreat to that of Xenophon amongst the ancients, and of Belleisle amongst the moderns ; but it undoubtedly surpassed the latter, and more than equalled the former. Belleisle owed the lustre of his retreat to some marches which he stole upon the enemy, and Xenophon retreated with his Greeks through the territories of a cowardly and effeminate people ; while Moreau traversed a country inhabited by one of the most warlike nations in the universe ; and neither Xenophon nor Belleisle blended the laurels of victory with the cypress of retreat.

According to Carnot's memoirs, Moreau and Desaix made the victories of the Archduke Charles of little service to Austria, by amusing him in a petty warfare before Kehl, wasting there those precious moments which ought to have been dedicated to the relief of Mantua. But this was not the only reproach made against the Austrian commander ; when his army, by the incessant attacks during the rigours of winter, suffered considerably and diminished daily, the army of the Sambre and the Meuse was again organized by Moreau, who
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was, besides, enabled, and generous enough to spare 20,000 of his best troops for Bonaparte, and thereby put him in a situation to command the peace of Leoben, in 1797.

After the capitulation of Kehl on the 22d December, and the surrender of the bridge head of Huninguen, the 5th February, 1797, and after the army of the Sambre and the Meuse had received Hoche for its commander, Moreau returned to head the army of the Rhine and the Moselle. With this army he again, on the 20th April, 1797, crossed the Rhine, and after a long and vigorous resistance, forced the enemy to abandon its borders. During the eight following days he pursued the Austrians nearly to the Danube, when he received a courier from Bonaparte, announcing the peace of Leoben.

Moreau had never participated in the crimes or approved the principles of the jacobins; on the contrary, he had shewn himself humane and liberal towards many proscribed persons who, during the campaigns in Germany, had fallen into his hands*. He was, besides, the friend of Piche-

* It is true that, in 1794, at Nieuport, Moreau caused several emigrants to be shot; but, during the campaigns of 1796 and 1797, all emigrants who fell into his hands, he ordered, in the presence of the army, to be shot; but he secretly procured them an opportunity to escape.

gru, then a deputy in the Council of Five Hundred, and the avowed enemy of the jacobin faction in the Directory. All these reasons made him no doubt suspected by the directorial jacobins, Barras, La Reveiliere, and Rewbel.

On the 18th Fructidor, or 4th September, 1797, these three directors effected a revolution; and Pichegru, with many other deputies, was, without a trial, condemned to be transported to Cayenne. It is difficult to say how far the pretended correspondence of Pichegru, in which there was not a letter in his own hand-writing, could compromise Moreau: every one has judged this correspondence as passion or interest directed him; and while one party accuses Pichegru, another acquits him. This correspondence was taken in a packet belonging to the Austrian General Klinglin, when Moreau crossed the Rhine, and had therefore been a long time in his hands before he made any use of it: either he judged it insignificant, or withheld it from attachment to his friend and benefactor; Moreau having been indebted to Pichegru, both for instruction and promotion.

Moreau was still the commander in chief of the army of the Rhine and the Moselle, and his headquarters were at Strasburgh, when the revolution

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at Paris, of the 4th September, that proscribed Pichegru, took place. Strasburgh is upwards of 300 miles from Paris; but, in three or four hours, any thing may be communicated by the telegraph between these two cities. It is therefore to be supposed, that when Moreau, on the 5th September, wrote a long letter against Pichegru, and *denounced* him to the Director Barthelemy, whom he, no doubt, did not imagine had shared the same fate, he had already received a short telegraphic information, that the jacobin faction had been victorious, and therefore entirely changed sides. This is so much the more probable, as, during the spring and summer 1797, when addresses poured in from Bonaparte's army in Italy, in favour of the jacobins, and against the Council of Five Hundred, neither the threats of the Directory, nor the intrigues of its emissaries, could procure one single address from the army of the Rhine and the Moselle under Moreau's command*.

Moreau

* Extract from a letter written by General Moreau, to the Director Barthelemy, dated head-quarters, Strasburgh, 19th Fructidor, year v, or 5th September, 1797.

"CITIZEN DIRECTOR,

"You will no doubt remember, that during my last journey to Basle,

Moreau possessed hitherto the esteem of all loyal men; but by this incomprehensible conduct he lost the good opinion of the royalists, without obtaining the confidence of the republicans. Even his friends and admirers have been unable to make any acceptable apology for him; and have acknowledged, that one of the bravest and greatest of modern warriors has shewn himself the weakest of men, and that, however he loved and desired what was honest and just, when he met with any unforeseen obstacle, he had not character enough to defy vice in power, or to back or defend virtue in exile and distress*. Others

Basle, I informed you, that after our passage of the Rhine, we had taken a packet belonging to General Klinglin, containing two or three hundred letters of his correspondents. Many of these were in cyphers, &c. &c.

"I was at first determined not to publish this correspondence; but observing at the head of parties who at present trouble our country, a man enjoying, in a high situation, the greatest confidence; a man deeply involved in this correspondence, and destined to perform an important part in the recall of the Pretender, the object to which it was directed; I thought it my duty to inform you of this circumstance, &c. &c."

"I confess, Citizen Director, that it is extremely painful to inform you of this treachery, more especially as he whom I now denounce to you was once my friend, &c. I allude to the representative of the people, Picbigrü. And again, the proofs are as clear as day; I doubt, however, whether they are judicial," &c. &c."

* Apologie de General Moreau par un de ses Admirateurs, page 4.

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have said, that he became the denouncer, not of a friend, but of a person from whom he had withdrawn his esteem, because he did not approve of his conduct ; that he believed this inculpation could do no harm to Pichegru in his actual situation, but might save himself from the hatred and persecution of the victorious party. It cannot, however, be denied, that this transaction, in whatever manner it is explained, must hurt General Moreau, with people even the most indulgent, without his gaining from it the benefit he expected. In vain did he again write to the Directory, on the 10th September, against the great man the directorial satellites were then with cruelty conducting to Cayenne ; in vain did he affirm and protest his devotion—no regard was had to this tardy denunciation ; and Moreau, after being for some time under arrest, was forced to resign his command. If the Directory employed him afterwards, it was not because it trusted to his sincerity, but that it wanted his talents ; and it always calculated more upon his submission and fidelity from his weakness, than from his attachment. Had a man of Moreau's great abilities been the general of a legitimate king, he would never have found himself in a situation, either to stain his reputation or to dishonour his character

character; because he would have known that, under regular and moral governments, any ~~mean~~ ^{action} is as much a certain ruin, as it is, under a revolutionary usurpation, a duty, and often a recommendation to preferment.

During the greatest part of 1798, Moreau lived retired, and in disgrace. His active mind was, however, not without employment: he partly occupied himself with writing the particulars of his own campaigns, and partly in reading the memoirs of other great generals. Bonaparte was at this time the favourite with the Directory, the army, and the people; but such were his base jealousy and shameful ingratitude towards General Moreau, to whose reinforcements, sent to Italy in the winter 1796, he owed all his late success, that he neither once spoke in his favour to Barras, as Moreau desired him, nor returned the visit Moreau paid him before his departure to Egypt.

General Moreau revenged himself nobly for this insolent neglect; for after the victory of Lord Nelson, on the 1st of August, 1798, when Bonaparte was unable to return as soon as he had intended, Madame Bonaparte was reduced to such great distress, as even to pawn her jewels. Her situation was reported to Moreau, who sent her

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100,000 livres by a stranger, upon her bond only ; and Bonaparte had been the First Consul for upwards of twelve months, before he knew to whom he was indebted for this act of generosity, and it was then only discovered by the indiscretion of Moreau's friend.

In the winter of 1798, when the Directory apprehended that hostilities would recommence with Austria, Moreau was sent as inspector-general to the army of Italy, under the command of General Scherer : an inferior station for a person of Moreau's merit and rank ; but he has more than once proved himself, both before and since, to be above punctilios, when his country was in danger, and he could serve or save it.

Under the command of a general who had prepared the ruin of the army of Germany by his dilapidation as a minister, and that of Italy by his incapacity as a commander, Moreau submitted, for his country's sake, to the protection of a plunderer, and to instruction from an idiot, who was the darling of jacobin directors, as rapacious and ignorant as himself. Moreau often mentions this period of his military career as the most disgusting and tormenting, because he despised General Scherer, and foresaw the destruction of the army under his command.

Early in March 1799, the war with Austria was renewed under the most unfavourable auspices; every thing seemed now to demonstrate that the councils of France were no longer directed with the same energy, and that her armies would not be led with the same ability and success. At the battle of Verona, commenced in the neighbourhood of Castel Nuovo, between the lake of Garda and the Adige, on the 26th March, and which continued from sun-rising until night, before it was possible to determine to which side victory inclined, Moreau served only as a volunteer, but was prevailed upon to assume the direction of the right wing of the army: he took from fourteen to fifteen hundred prisoners, and six pieces of cannon; but Scherer, who had taken post on the left wing, being routed, Moreau found himself obliged to relinquish all his advantages.

After the victories of Championet and Macdonald over the Neapolitans, in December 1798, Tuscany and Naples had been occupied by the French: Scherer having failed in his attempt to pierce the enemy's line, it was proposed by Moreau to evacuate for a time these countries and Rome, where the French had continued to remain since 1797, on purpose to concentrate all their

their forces in Italy, with a view of recovering the ascendancy, and forcing the Austrians to retire.

Instead of following this judicious advice, Scherer determined to draw fresh supplies from the garrisons in Piedmont, and to try once more the fortune of arms. He accordingly sent a large detachment to turn Verona, and to take that place by storm. But by this time General Kray had arrived with a large body of troops, and resolved to drive the enemy behind the Mincio, after which he would be at liberty to besiege Peschiera and Mantua. On the 30th March, the action commenced by an attack on the right wing of the French, while a large body of Imperialists advanced against the left, where Moreau was posted with the divisions of Hatry, Montrichard, and Serrurier. Aware of the approach of the Imperialists, Moreau immediately marched out to meet, and at length forced them to retire; but Scherer having been again beaten, he was obliged to halt in the midst of the pursuit, for the purpose of covering the retreat of the main body of the army. The corps that had advanced against Verona was also surrounded, and, after some resistance, made prisoners.

On the 18th April, the Russian auxiliaries,

commanded by Field-marshal Suwarow, joined the Austrians at Verona. Suwarow had risen from the ranks, through all the intermediate gradations, to that of general in chief, and brought with him a reputation established by more than fifty victorious campaigns. A short time before his arrival in Italy, the French had again been defeated by General Kray near Maguan, and by Count De Bellegarde in the Tyrol. It was at this period that Scherer, overwhelmed with the curses of the Allies, and of the troops of France, resigned the command, and Moreau, whose reputation had not been diminished by the late events, was appointed his successor.

This dangerous, but honourable appointment, Moreau accepted, not with any hope to repair the disasters of the beginning of this campaign, because the French Directory furnished him with no means to do it, but, if possible, to stop, prevent, or diminish, the fatal consequences of so many defeats, of so many wants, and of so great a discontent in the ruined army of which he assumed the command.

All military men, Frenchmen, Austrians, and Russians, acknowledge that he here displayed a genius and talents worthy the greatest Captain of any age; and it is indeed impossible to refuse him

him a well deserved admiration, when one considers with what art, ability, and courage, he disputed, at the head of the feeble remnants of an army without pay, without clothing, without magazines, and without hope of reinforcements, a country of some few leagues, which all Europe expected would only cost the victorious armies of the combined powers some days marches.

To the united forces of Austria and Russia, Moreau had to oppose only thirty-five thousand men, harassed by continual and severe marches, discouraged and intimidated by recent defeats and disasters, disaffected, discontented, and mistrustful. A retreat, therefore, became absolutely necessary: Isola Della Scala and Villa Franca were abandoned in succession; the Mincio was crossed; and the strong fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua being left to their fate, Generals Kray and Klenau formed the blockade of both with a body of twenty-five thousand men.

Suwarow now took the field in order to pursue the French, and having crossed the Oglio, and advanced to the Udda in three columns, he found them strongly posted on the other side, having fortified Cassano, and made all the necessary preparations for an obstinate resistance.

The Russians, however, determined to effect the passage, and General Vickassowich found means to cross the river, during the night between the 26th and 27th April, on a flying bridge, after which he immediately took post on the right bank, near Brevio. In the course of the succeeding morning, one Austrian column, under General Otto, also passed over near the castle of Trezzo, and falling in with Grenier's division, which was advancing against Vickassowich, at length forced it to give way. After this, the village of Pezzo was carried sword in hand. General Melas also marched with artillery against Cassano, and obtained possession of the bridge, while a division of French at Bertero was beaten after an obstinate engagement, and forced to capitulate.

During the long and hard fought battle of Cassano, Moreau was every where encouraging his troops with his presence, and inspiring confidence by his example: on that memorable day he rather courted than shunned danger, in hope to restore if not victory to France, at least to lessen the effects of the victory of a too powerful enemy. Moreau had three aides-de-camp killed by his side, two horses wounded and one horse killed under him, and was slightly wounded himself. This battle decided the fate of the Cisalpine republic.

public, and the next day the Allies entered Milan.

The aspect of affairs throughout Italy was at this moment peculiarly inauspicious for France. The people of Piedmont were discontented, and many of them in arms; in the Ligurian commonwealth great commotions had also taken place; many of the Neapolitans, driven to despair by the exactions of the French pro-consuls, wished for the return of royalty; while the Tuscans, who had been tranquil and happy under the Grand Dukes of the House of Austria, murmured aloud, and were about to commence hostilities against their conquerors. In the mountainous regions of the Engadine, in the Grison country, in Switzerland, in the Valais, and in the Valtelline, the French had either been defeated, or the inhabitants were in open insurrection against them. Brescia and Peschiera had surrendered to the enemy; Mantua was closely pressed, and the capital of Piedmont was threatened by a large column of the Allies. Thus situated, Moreau, yielding to superior numbers, was obliged to abandon his strong position between the Po and the Tenaro, after defeating General Vickassowich on the banks of the Bormida.

Hitherto Suwarow appeared to have justified
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the high opinion entertained by all Europe of his talents; but by a loose and injudicious partition of the army under his command, it soon became evident that he was unacquainted with war on a grand scale, and equally ignorant of the nation and the general with whom he had now to contend. His conduct presented an excellent chance for Moreau to retrieve the losses lately sustained by him in Italy, and he seized the occasion with a promptitude peculiar to his character. Accordingly, although he had now retreated in succession from the plains of Lombardy and Piedmont, within the rugged frontier of the Ligurian republic, and was left with only twenty-eight thousand men, he detached General Victor with a whole division, to strengthen the army of Naples, while measures were adopted on his own part to form a junction with it, hoping, in that case, to be able to overcome superior forces, rendered weak by extension, and incapable of succouring each other, in consequence of their want of connexion.

No sooner had General Macdonald received instructions for that purpose from Moreau, than he immediately evacuated Naples and Rome, after leaving strong garrisons in St. Elmo, Capua, and Gaeta, and marched towards Florence, with a view

view of uniting with Generals Gauthier and Miolis, who commanded the French troops in Tuscany, and of receiving the succours now advancing to his relief from the head-quarters of General Moreau.

After several partial and victorious engagements with the enemy, General Macdonald lost at last the hard-fought battles of the 17th, 18th, and 19th June, on the Trebbia; but while the Austro-Russian commander was combating Macdonald, Moreau, taking advantage of his absence, left Genoa, at the head of an army of twenty-nine thousand men, and marching by Bochetta, Gavi, and Novi, descended into the plain, where he, on the 20th of June, attacked and beat Field-marshal Bellegarde, who had been left to superintend the blockade of Alexandria. The Austrians, unable to resist the superior numbers and impetuosity of the enemy, were driven from all their positions, and not only obliged to raise the siege of Tortona, but to retreat across the Bormida.

No sooner did Suwarow receive intelligence of these sinister events, than he abandoned the pursuit of Macdonald, whom he might have come up with before he had passed the mountains, and endeavoured, by a rapid counter-march, to overtake
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the victorious Moreau, who, after boldly fighting another battle, retreated within the precincts of the Ligurian republic, and bid defiance to his disappointed foe.

After the surrender of Turin, Alexandria, and Mantua, and since the retreat of Macdonald into the Ligurian territory, Suwarow, having now conquered the greater part of Italy, began to menace the southern departments of France; but he was kept in check by the army of Moreau, which still occupied its formidable position in the neighbourhood of Genoa; and although inferior in point of numbers, prevented the advance of his antagonist, by threatening to fall upon his rear.

Whilst Moreau in such an honourable manner was fighting for his country, the directors at the head of its government were plotting and intriguing against each other. Sieyes and Barras had already forced Treillard, Merlin, and La Reveillere, to resign. Sieyes meditated a new revolution; but having, or pretending to have, more capacity to write a constitution than courage to defend it, he looked out for some young military man of talents to back him and realize his metaphysical reveries, and he fixed his choice upon General Joubert. To engage Joubert so much the more in his interest, Sieyes married

ried him to Mademoiselle De Semonville, the daughter of his friend Mons. De Semonville, whom he at the same time nominated ambassador in Holland. Joubert was therefore sent to Italy as a general in chief; and Moreau, without resistance, resigned his command to a young man, who in 1796, when he excited the admiration of Europe by his victories and retreat, was only a colonel under Bonaparte, who in 1798, before he left France, strongly recommended Joubert to the Directory, as a young officer whom it might trust as a patriot or employ as a commander.

Before Joubert's arrival in Italy, numerous supplies had been sent there, and the French troops were not much inferior in number to those of the allies: he carried therefore orders with him to act on the offensive, and to relieve Tortona, closely besieged by the Russians. Moreau had no longer any command, but, with his usual patriotism and generosity, he consented not only to remain with the army a few days longer, but even to accept of an inferior situation, in case of a battle. On the 14th of August, while Moreau and Joubert were busy in reconnoitring and observing a distant part of the enemy's lines, they received intelligence that the left wing of the French was attacked; for Suwarow, conscious of his strength, had

had determined to anticipate the designs of the French, whom he knew to be always most formidable when the assailants. On the return of Joubert and Moreau, they found the action had become general. Desirous of encouraging his troops, Joubert immediately advanced at the head of his staff, and received a mortal wound.

The loss of a commander has frequently caused the loss of many battles; but from the presence and courage of Moreau, the death of Joubert produced neither confusion nor dismay, nor repressed the ardour of the French soldiers. The enemy were received every where with intrepidity, and would have been obliged perhaps to abandon the field, but for the indiscreet valour of the right wing, which had advanced towards the plain in pursuit of the Allies. Advantage was immediately taken of this error by General Melas, who found means with the Austrian cavalry to turn the flank of the division under General St. Cyr; on which Moreau, who had re-assumed the command, was under the necessity of giving orders for a retreat, after having had two horses shot under him. This measure was effected with his usual ability; and Suwarow, instead of attempting to follow him through the Bochetta, allowed him to occupy his former position near Genoa, whence he issued

soon

soon after, to defeat General Kleinau, who, from Tuscany, had advanced within four miles of the capital of Liguria; which proved that the army of Moreau, although frequently defeated by a superior force, was never effectually overcome, were its opposers ever so numerous.

Moreau, in return for the many and brilliant services which he had rendered his country, received nothing but insults, ingratitude, and neglect, from the French directors, who were as odious for their tyranny as contemptible for their meanness. It was therefore not surprizing that he joined Bonaparte to overthrow the directorial government, although he did not quite approve either the manner in which the Corsican usurped power, or the use he made of it after its usurpation. Moreau passed the winter of 1799 at Paris, and was often heard to say, that until an honourable peace had restored the tranquillity and happiness of his countrymen, he would serve any person who should assume or usurp the executive government—either a Robespierre or a Bourbon; a Barras or a Bonaparte; but peace and order once returned, he would oppose all ambitious intriguers, sansculottes or princes, directors or consuls, who abused their power to enslave Frenchmen, and were infamous enough to deprive them of a liberty for

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which

which they had been fighting so many years, and for which they had made such numerous sacrifices. Moreau repeated this language in all the societies he frequented; there is little doubt but that it came to the knowledge of Bonaparte, and therefore explains a part of his late conduct towards this general.

In the beginning of 1800, Moreau took the command of the French army called the army of the Danube. The forces under Moreau were as much superior to those under his opposer, the Austrian General Kray, as his talents surpassed those of all the Imperial generals acting against him. By occupying the Austrians in Germany, he prevented them from detaching any more forces into Lombardy; and he prepared successes in Italy, whilst he gained victories in Germany. The manner in which he led, and induced General Kray to employ himself in the vallies descending towards Brigaw, at a time that he effected his real passage over the Rhine at Stein; the art with which he forced him, only by able manœuvres, to forsake the Lech, and afterwards the environs of Ulm; and at last, the boldness of his passage over the Danube—do Moreau, in the opinion of military men, more honour than his victories over the same general at the same time.

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The plan of the campaign for 1800 was drawn entirely by Moreau. In its outline it did not differ greatly from that of the two preceding campaigns, but the means were more proportionate to the end: it was intended to act with large masses against inferior numbers, and by means of a combined movement with the armies of Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, to end the contest with the capture of Vienna.

After the passage of the Rhine by the French, and the junction of General Lecourbe with the division of Moreau's army under Generals St. Suzanne and Richepanse, the Austrian Commander, who had been completely deceived respecting the intentions as well as the force of the enemy, was under the necessity of recurring to defensive operations. He accordingly retired to a formidable position on the heights of Pfullendorf, which being strongly fortified, and defended by no less than sixty thousand men, was considered as impregnable. The action during the first day, May 3, when the centre and the right only of the French participated in the attack, proved long and obstinate; and as the enemy did not succeed in their attempt, the Imperialists were entitled to the claim of victory.

The combat was renewed next morning by

sen-rise, and the centre of the Austrians obtained some advantage over the assailants; but part of their right wing, commanded by Prince Joseph of Lorraine, was chased from Stockach, and their magazines there were abandoned to the enemy.

On the 9th of May, all the French having been brought into action, the combat was once more renewed with an extraordinary degree of obstinacy: at length the Austrians, and the subsidiary troops in the pay of England, after exhibiting prodigies of valour, finding their entrenchments forced on all sides, notwithstanding the incessant fire of a numerous artillery, and the junction of Archduke Ferdinand, deemed it proper to withdraw. But even their retreat was unaccompanied with disorder; for they retired leisurely, fighting and disputing every inch of territory, first to Biberach, and then under the cannon of Ulm.

The whole circle of Suabia was now subject to French dominion; the magazines collected by the Imperialists on the banks of the Danube fell into their possession: the Duke of Wirtemberg was obliged to abandon his residence at Stutgard; while Augsburg, Kempten, and Memingen, were occupied by the invaders.

Thus

Thus Moreau, after overcoming all opposition, had already penetrated into the heart of Germany, where he was employed in levying contributions, and exacting supplies of corn and provisions. In the mean time the Cabinet of Vienna, kept in constant alarm by his movements, and as yet uncertain of the final intentions of such an enterprising chief, was prevented from sending supplies to Italy, now become the scene of that contest which was to decide the future fate of Europe.

For the second time, therefore, Moreau enabled Bonaparte to be victorious in Italy; and it was to his victories, and to his unparalleled manœuvres, that Bonaparte owes the important consequences of the battle of Marengo, because, had the 25,000 Austrians destined to reinforce their army in Italy arrived there, it was absolutely impossible that the Imperial General Melas would have signed the armistice of the 16th June 1799; but as these 25,000 men had been detained in Germany, and had already shared in the defeats by Moreau, of the army under General Kray, Melas could expect no succour, and was therefore, after the loss of the battle of Marengo, which he ought to have gained, under the necessity either of laying down his arms, or, what was worse, of seeking his safety in an armistice as humiliating as impolitic.

When, on the 19th of June, Moreau was apprized of the event of the battle of Marengo, he prepared to pass the Danube between Ulm and Donauwert. This he effected, after an obstinate resistance from General Sztaray, who, being advantageously posted on the celebrated plain of Hochstet, or Blenheim, disputed his ground with vigour and ability, though without success. The French were highly elated with this victory, which, by compelling Kray to retreat, and leave Ulm to its own strength, gained them possession of part of the Circle of Franconia, and that of the Lower Rhine from Suabia, to the line of neutrality of the North of Germany, protected by the King of Prussia.

Indefatigable in his exertions, Moreau immediately marched in pursuit of the retreating enemy, and having come up with them at Neubourg, a new action and a new defeat ensued. After this victory, Moreau entered Bavaria, established on the 8th of July his head-quarters at Munich, and was preparing for new exploits, when the armistice that had taken place in Italy was extended to Germany, and the Continent once more experienced a short respite from war.

While the Imperialists withdrew their detachments from the country of the Grisons on the
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one hand, so as to strengthen their position in Italy, and extended their front on the other, with an intention to cover the Hereditary States, the French army formed one grand uninterrupted line from the borders of the Rhine near Frankfort, to the shores of the Mediterranean, in the neighbourhood of Lucca.

On the 28th of July, the Austrian General Count de St. Julien had, without any powers of the Emperor, but seduced by the intrigues of Talleyrand, signed at Paris the preliminaries of peace between France and Austria, founded on the treaty of Campo Formio; but, faithful to his engagements with Great Britain, the Emperor disavowed this transaction. During these and other discussions, the armistice on the Continent had been suffered to expire, and the Cabinet of Vienna, totally unprepared for a renewal of the contest, was under the necessity of soliciting a new truce. After some negotiations between General Moreau on the one part, and the Count de Lehrbach on the other, a further suspension of arms was on the 20th September, by the Convention of Hohenlinden, agreed to for forty-five days, on terms that indicated the critical situation of the Austrian affairs; for the cities of Philipsburgh, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, were presented

presented as a boon for this short respite by the Emperor, who, with the Archduke John, had repaired to the head-quarters of his army.

Before Moreau left Paris, in the spring 1800, to take the command of the army, he had obtained permission to pay his addresses to a young, beautiful, rich, and accomplished lady; he declined, however, to celebrate the nuptials, until his victories had procured his country a safe and honourable peace, fearful, as he said, that Mars, *jealous of Venus, should treat him à la Joubert*. After the Convention of Hohenlinden, and when the Austrian and French Ministers were negotiating a definitive peace at Luneville, which Moreau, from the known weakness of Austria, believed certain, he went to Paris, and, as an elegant historian has said, he entwined the roses of Hymen with the laurels of Mars.

Proud and vain, from the successes he had met with in all his undertakings, the Bonaparte of the autumn 1800 was become very different from the Bonaparte whom Moreau left in the spring, agitated by absurd schemes, and tormented by an ambition which he had but little prospect of gratifying; he, however, received Moreau as he ought to receive a general to whom he owed every thing. In the presence of all the foreign ambassadors, and
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of many French generals, he said:—*General Moreau, you have made the campaign of a consummate and great Captain, while I have only made the campaign of a young and fortunate man.* The truth and justness of this remark, no military man, either of the present or of any future age, can deny.

Moreau had not been married a fortnight before he was obliged to repair to his head-quarters, because; precisely three weeks after the Austrian and French Plenipotentiaries had met at Luneville, for the express purpose of renewing the negotiations for peace, a rupture of the armistice took place, and hostilities were once more resorted to. The French, unable to force Austria to a separate treaty, and relying on the ascendancy which they had obtained, determined to recommence the war.

Moreau, therefore, instantly repaired to his head-quarters, and published an address to the soldiers, in which he requested them “*to exhibit the same gallantry, and the same disregard to the rigours of the season, which they had before displayed, when employed in the defence of Fort Kehl, and the conquest of Holland.*”

While Augereau, after defeating the raw levies of the Elector of Mentz, was penetrating through Franconia, to communicate with the commander in chief General Moreau, the latter, put

put himself at the head of the most numerous army that France had ever sent into Germany, and proceeded in quest of the enemy. Their advanced guards encountered each other at Haag, and the Austrians obtained the superiority. The French were beaten at the same time at Rosenheim; an event to be attributed chiefly to the bravery of the troops of the Prince De Condé, in the pay of Great Britain.

The Archduke John, now at the head of the Imperial army, being flushed with these unexpected advantages, collected all his forces, and immediately marched in search of the republicans, whom he attacked in three columns with an unusual degree of vigour. The rival armies encountered each other on the 3d December, at seven o'clock in the morning, between the rivers Iser and Inn, on the heights which extend from Bierkrain to Neumark, and near to the very spot where the armistice had been concluded but a short time before.

A variety of circumstances contributed to render this action fatal to the Austrians; and it ought not to be omitted, that a severe fall of snow early in the morning, prevented that regularity in point of operation which ought always to accompany a combined movement. But although this event de-
ranged,

anged the original plan, it in no degree diminished the ardour of the combatants, who seemed insensible to the fury of the elements, so that victory appeared for a long time uncertain on which side she should declare.

But Moreau, who had anticipated the intentions of the Archduke, having ordered General Richepanse to assail the centre column in flank at the moment it commenced an attack, this unexpected evolution produced great confusion; and the left one being pierced nearly at the same time, while that on the right encountered unexpected obstacles, the Imperialists were forced to retire at three o'clock in the afternoon. Moreau, equally dreadful in attack as in retreat, annoyed their march, and hung upon their rear with such perseverance and effect, that they were saved by the approach of night alone, from total destruction.

The battle of Hohenlinden appears to have been one of those calculated to decide the fate of an empire; for the greater part of the baggage, more than eighteen thousand prisoners, and near one hundred pieces of cannon, constituted the trophies of victory; while the enemy fled in disorder beyond the Inn, and carried with them terror and dismay.

As the French were no less fortunate in Italy,
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the situation of the Austrian Monarchy was never so critical, even in the early part of the reign of Maria Theresa, as at this moment ; for although the Archduke Charles had been recalled, and new subsidies, granted under the name of a loan by Great Britain, had enabled the Emperor to recruit the Imperial armies, his fate appeared inevitable. The French, after the splendid victory of Hohenlinden, had, on the 25th December, crossed the Inn and the Ips, and arriving at Steyer, in Upper Austria, were within seventeen leagues of Vienna, now menaced by no less than four different generals. The Gallo-Batavian troops, under Augereau, at the same time approached the hereditary states, by coasting along the Danube ; Macdonald, in possession of the mountains of the Tyrol, had the option of either descending into Italy or Germany ; while Brune blockaded Mantua, and was ready to penetrate into the mountains of Carinthia, with a view to form a junction with Moreau.

Under these circumstances, the Imperial cabinet proposed an armistice, which was, on the 25th December, executed between the Archduke Charles and General Moreau at Steyer, and which, according to Moreau's expression, "*put it out of the power of the House of Austria to resume hostilities.*" To procure a suspension of arms of
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only forty-five days, it was agreed that the Tyrol should be wholly evacuated, and the fortresses of Bruneau and Wurtzburg delivered up to the French. These conditions were certainly very hard, but they were the forerunners of a general pacification on the Continent.

In this short sketch of Moreau's life, a more minute or detailed relation of all his brilliant military operations cannot be expected: what requires volumes to describe, cannot be contained in a few pages.

On the 9th February, 1801, a Definitive Treaty of Peace was signed at Luneville, between Austria and France; and in a short time after, General Moreau resigned the command of an army, which had reduced Austria more in one campaign than it had been before in three centuries, and procured to France a peace, which the ambition of French rulers, the negotiations of French ministers, and the plans of French politicians, had in vain desired, plotted, and intrigued for, these last two centuries.

Between the Convention of Luneville of the 26th January, 1801, and the Definitive Treaty of the 9th of the following February, Moreau had openly declared his opinion, "that by the humiliating and dishonourable terms imposed upon Aus-

tria by France, Bonaparte, with all his political hypocrisy and revolutionary Machiavelism ; with all his pretended wish for peace, and affected endeavours to procure it, never sincerely desired, nor could expect but suspensions of arms, because a peace dictated by the power of the bayonet, could only be preserved by bayonets, and might as easily be annulled by the power of the bayonets of foreigners, as commanded by the bayonets of France."

Bonaparte had always spies in the different republican armies, but particularly in the army commanded by Moreau ; there is, therefore, little doubt but that all Moreau's actions, transactions, and conversations, had been reported to him. After the battle of Hohenlinden, and when Moreau approached Vienna, he had several secret conferences, both with the Archduke Charles and the Archduke John, and one audience even with the Emperor. On these occasions, it is said *Moreau promised that Tuscany should continue to belong to the Austrian Grand Duke*, and that one of his aides-de-camps was therefore sent to Paris with a remonstrance to Bonaparte, on the necessity and policy of not driving Austria to despair by any degrading sacrifices. " *That by consenting to restore Tuscany to its former Sovereign, France was certain to gain the friendship*

friendship and gratitude of Austria, without violating any engagements with Spain; but by giving up Tuscany to a Spanish prince, France made Austria irreconcilable, without gaining any thing by its impolitic liberality to Spain."*

The same aid-de-camp who carried this remonstrance to Bonaparte, had a letter from Moreau to Talleyrand, nearly of the same contents. That the minister might be prepared to second Moreau's views when consulted, he had orders to deliver this letter before he spoke with the Consul. Talleyrand had at all times tried to obtain Moreau's friendship, or at least to wheedle himself into his good opinion. Before Moreau left Paris in the spring, for his last campaign, at an entertainment Talleyrand gave him, he insinuated plainly enough, "*that if merit and services were the only successful pretensions to the supreme power in a republic, General Moreau would have no rival to oppose his governing the French Commonwealth;*" but since Moreau's victories had consolidated Bonaparte's consulate, and Talleyrand's place depended upon his good grace, he thought this would be a fit opportunity to ensure it, and to please the Corsican Consul, by humiliating the

* La Vie Politique du General Moreau, pag. 24.

French general with foreign sovereigns.* Had Moreau been as good a politician as a general, he might have foreseen and prevented this affront, by knowing the real value of protestations of attachment and friendship from a man of Talleyrand's immoral character. This crafty intriguer, therefore, easily dissuaded General Moreau's aid-de-camp from mentioning any thing, or delivering his dispatch concerning this business, *"until it had been well considered what was to be done, because he could not answer for what otherwise might be the consequence, knowing, as he did, how intent the First Consul was to create a Bourbon a king in Tuscany †."*

This aid-de-camp arrived at Paris on the 24th of January at night, and on the 25th in the morning orders were sent by the telegraph to Joseph Bonaparte, at Luneville, to sign immediately the Preliminaries of Peace, by which Austria renounced Tuscany. During that day Moreau's aid-de-camp went several times in vain to confer with Talleyrand, who was not visible, although he remained at the Foreign Office till near twelve o'clock at night; but the next day, in the fore-

* Les Intrigues du Ch. M. Talleyrand, Neuchatel, 1801, pag. 60.

† Les Intrigues du Ch. M. Talleyrand, Neuchatel, 1801, pag. 62.

noon, M. de Hauterive, one of Talleyrand's confidential secretaries, called upon him with the information, that government had just learned, by a telegraphic dispatch, that the Preliminaries between France and Austria had been signed at Luneville; that Talleyrand, therefore, advised him to go back to General Moreau as soon as possible, and to represent to him the necessity of dropping his interference for Austria for the present. He assured the aid-de-camp at the same time, that Talleyrand had not communicated a word to Bonaparte as to the contents of Moreau's letter, and that this general would of course, at his return to Paris, be received, as though nothing had occurred to alter the friendship between the First Consul and his first general, so indispensably necessary and useful for both parties, for their common cause, and for their *common country* *.

Ever since 1796 great jealousy existed between the officers and privates of the two armies of Germany and Italy, or that of Moreau and Bonaparte: General Moreau was beloved and esteem-

* Les Intrigues du Ch. M. Talleyrand, Neuchatel, 1801, pag. 64, 65, and 66, in which it is said "to be a known fact, that Spain paid to the Corsican family no less than 20 millions of dollars for Tuscany, besides what Talleyrand obtained from Chevalier D'Azara, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, which was no less than 500,000 dollars."

ed; Bonaparte feared and hated, because he was always very severe, and often inhuman. After the peace of Campo Formio, and when the expedition to Egypt was determined upon, Bonaparte cajoled and seduced Generals Kleber and Desaix, with other great captains, from the army of Moreau: Moreau he desired to insulate as much as possible from all men of military renown or capacity. These mean and underhand manœuvres Bonaparte continued with more success, when the Treaty of Luneville had pacified the Continent, dissatisfied Moreau, and confirmed the consular power. Some of Moreau's generals were then nominated senators, others counsellors of state, prefects, or tribunes. The young Richepanse, who, from being Moreau's aid-de-camp, had become, and distinguished himself, as one of his best and most faithful generals, Bonaparte bribed over, and sent to die in the West Indies, as a Captain-general over Guadaloupe. Even Moreau's confidential secretaries and aides-de-camps he bought over to his interest, either by advancement or by pensions; so much so, that within six months after the Peace of Luneville, Moreau had not a general who had combated with him, and with him shared the glory of victory, whom Bonaparte's emissaries had not tempted or debauched by their great offers.

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The officers and men of Moreau's victorious army he dispersed all over France, Holland, and Italy; and those incorruptible men and brigades, reported by his spies as most attached to their former general, Bonaparte sent to be butchered by the negroes in St. Domingo, or to perish by the pestilence of that unhealthy climate.

But notwithstanding Bonaparte's ingratitude, intrigues, jealousy, and schemes against Moreau, he is yet the most admired General in France both by the army and people; and the kind of disgrace and neglect in which Bonaparte suffers him to remain, augments the uncommon interest which his extraordinarily great and military performances have created; his modesty also, when compared with the insolence and pretensions of Bonaparte, excites an enthusiasm, of which the Corsican must sooner or later be the victim, should Moreau have ambition, or rather character enough, to give any encouragement to his admirers and adherents*.

* After the conspiracies discovered, of the jacobins and royalists, against the Corsican in the latter part of 1800, particularly that of the infernal machine, the soldiers at Paris were heard to say, that *Dauphin* Moreau would soon be a Consul. The officers of two regiments were on this account all broken, and the soldiers ordered to the colonies. Still, however, Moreau is called both by the soldiers and by the common people, the *Dauphin*, or heir of the throne.

General Moreau's younger brother is a tribune, and the only person of his family employed under the consular government. As reward for all his eminent services, General Moreau enjoys no more than the half-pay of other general officers, 12,000 livres, or 500l. sterling; and had he not married a lady with a large fortune, he would be another Cincinnatus, obliged to cultivate his own lands; because, during his many campaigns and numerous victories, although he sometimes was forced to see and suffer the plunder of some of his generals and officers, he was never accused, nor even suspected to share it with them. On the contrary, he more than once punished with rigour, or degraded with *eclat*, those guilty of committing excesses or vexations, either by arbitrary requisitions, by forced loans, or illegal contributions. In the summer, 1801, he degraded General Vandamme, and sent him to the rear of his army*; and the Chief Commissary Pommier, who, with Vandamme, had been

* This Vandamme is now one of Bonaparte's favourite generals, and his governor at Lille: he is the son of a barber, and was, before the Revolution, condemned to the gallows for house-breaking, and was marked on his shoulders with a hot iron. In 1794, he sent to the guillotine the judge whose humanity had, in 1788, saved his life.

guilty of exactions and extortions in Suabia, he ordered to be tried before a council of war, which condemned him to be shot.

This upright and generous conduct was a direct reproach to Bonaparte, who not only partook of the plunder with his generals, but distributed amongst them provinces and cities to procure plunder*; and neither in Italy nor in Egypt were any of his generals punished on this account, although any one of his soldiers who took by force the value of a sixpence, was shot on the spot without a trial.

Moreau was therefore as much respected by

* In 1797, Augereau complained to Bonaparte, that by all his campaigns he had not yet made 100,000 crowns: soon after, when the Venetians rose against the French, during Bonaparte's march towards Leoben, Bonaparte sent for Augereau, and told him to bring him his 100,000 crowns, and he would procure him means to gain a million or two. Augereau obeyed, and was made the President over the Military Tribunal erected at Verona to try the insurgents; and of five hundred Venetian Nobles accused, *only five* perished, and of as many Clergymen, *only eight* were shot: the former sold or pawned their estates to save their lives, and the latter sacrificed the treasures of their churches and saints, to avoid martyrdom by French atheists. One of Augereau's mistresses at Paris, Madame Chauvin, wears a diamond cross worth ten thousand Louis d'ors, which formerly belonged to a Madona at Padua.

In three months time Augereau pocketed six millions, of which Bonaparte borrowed one million, which sum, Augereau says, he has forgot to repay.—*Les Nouvelles à la main Ventose*, an xi. No. 5.

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his officers as dear to his soldiers; whilst Bonaparte was despised by his officers and detested by his soldiers; and any one who, since the Revolution, has studied the contemptible character of modern Frenchmen, by turns elevating vicious and worthless men into power, and sending worth and virtue to the scaffold, finds no contradiction or surprize in seeing an abhorred Corsican upon the throne, and a beloved general and Frenchman in obscurity and disgrace.

When Moreau was a general commanding in Flanders, and his father suffering under the axe of the guillotine of terrorism, Bonaparte was only a colonel, sharing in the crimes of terrorism, and a terrorist himself. Moreau owed his promotion to his military talents, improved and guided by the counsel of his friend Pichegru: the first advancement of Bonaparte he owed to the massacre of the Toulonese in 1793, and to the recommendation of his accomplices, Barras, Freron, and Robespierre the younger. Merit made Moreau, in 1795, a commander in chief; the crimes committed by Bonaparte in another massacre of the Parisians, in October 1795, procured him the command of the army in Italy. Moreau often retarded victory, by sparing the lives of his soldiers; Bonaparte obtained victory by always, and
often,

often without necessity, sacrificing thousands of his soldiers. During the retreat of Moreau from Bavaria, in the autumn of 1796, he was more careful of the preservation of his soldiers than of himself; and he more than once exposed his own life, to prevent his sick and wounded soldiers from falling into the hands of the enemy: before the retreat from Syria, in the spring 1799, Bonaparte caused all his sick and wounded soldiers to be poisoned, and all those taken ill or wounded during his retreat, he left to be butchered by the Turks and Arabs. Moreau studied only the preservation and honour of his army; Bonaparte, his own advantage and preservation at their expence. Moreau was courageous and vigorous during the attack, but humane and generous after victory: Bonaparte was cruel and outrageous in battle; fierce and unfeeling after victory.— In 1794 Moreau, at the risk of his life, saved several hundred Hanoverian prisoners at Nieuport: in 1799, Bonaparte murdered, in cold blood, several thousand Turks at Jaffa, who had for some days been his prisoners of war. In the winter 1796, Moreau sent Bonaparte considerable supplies of his best troops, with which the Corsican commanded the Peace of Leoben, and of Campo Formio: in the winter 1797, Bona-
parte

parte treated Moreau with contempt, after having by his plots undermined his reputation, and caused his disgrace. An intriguer at the head of armies, and a tyrant at the head of government, Bonaparte's only study was to usurp power, and tyrannize over France with his armies; whilst Moreau, as modest as unassuming, as liberal as un-aspiring, commanded armies, and served the cause of his country, for the liberty and welfare of his countrymen, without any ambition for rank, or any intrigues to obtain dominion.

When, in 1801, Barras was sent into exile at Brussels by Bonaparte, Moreau bought his estate, Grosbois, belonging formerly to Louis XVIII. and there he chiefly passes his time with his amiable wife, in the company of some few, but chosen friends. Report says, his principal occupation is the continuance of the history of his campaigns; and as he is as accomplished a writer as an illustrious warrior, when he favours the world with this publication, it must be both highly valuable and greatly interesting.

Moreau does not approve of the changes Bonaparte has made in the government, more than of the peace he concluded with Austria and England: he predicted the short duration of the latter, and he insists on the uncertainty of the former.

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He has often expressed himself, that despot for despot, he prefers a Bourbon to a Bonaparte, a Frenchman to a Corsican. He has exposed Bonaparte's insolence towards foreign nations, and his tyranny and oppression over Frenchmen ; he has condemned the impudence of his consulate for life, the shamelessness of his nominating a successor, the hypocrisy of his religious concordat, and the affectation of his ridiculous legion of honour *. The immorality of Bonaparte's republican government, the extravagance and profusion of his family, the prodigality of his courtiers, the lavishness of his generals, and the wasteful and destructive expences and irregularities of his ministers, senators, prefects, tribunes, and other placemen, are often held out by Moreau to his countrymen as a proof of the corruption, and as an evidence of the unfitness of the present consular constitution, forced upon Frenchmen by this Corsican adventurer : last spring, at a ball at Madame Recamier's, where many of Bonaparte's favourites were present, he loudly said, "*that it is, and must be, an eternal indelible shame and reproach to*

* In the summer 1802, shortly after the institution of Bonaparte's legion of honour, Moreau said, in the presence of several foreigners who dined with him, that as they approved of the sauces of his cook, *he should decree him a SAUCEPAN OF HONOUR.*

thirty millions of Frenchmen, not to find amongst themselves one individual with talents enough to govern them, and to suffer the despotism of a despicable and cruel foreigner, who has waded through floods of French blood, to usurp the throne of France."*

Since that time, he has never been invited by Madame Recamier to any of her routs or parties.

This language is very different from that contained in Bonaparte's commanded or bought addresses, and if known to him, which it probably is, must excite his jealousy, hatred, and vengeance. He has, however, hitherto been obliged not only to dissemble, but to treat his rival and enemy with more regard than he shews to emperors or kings. Before Bonaparte left Paris, on his journey to Brabant, he exiled every general not in employment at Paris: as Moreau's estate is only twelve miles from that city, he comes there several times in the week, either to visit his friends or to frequent the theatres; the Corsican dared not, however, insult Moreau with such a proceeding, he, therefore, invited him to an interview at Berthier's house. Bonaparte began the conversation by mentioning some complaints, although he at the same time insinuated his respect

* Les Nouvelles à la maine, Germinal, an xi. No. 31.

for Moreau as a general, and his esteem for him as a citizen. He told him that he might command any place in his disposal, except that of a consul. He offered to make him a duke, or hereditary sovereign of Parma and Plaisança, and in return he only demanded his friendship. Moreau's answer united to the frankness of the soldier the generosity of the patriot: he said, "*he was the personal enemy of no man, but the irreconcilable foe of all men, either princes or sans culottes, who tyrannized over his countrymen; that in serving his country he had only done his duty, without any ambition for power or expectation of reward; and should foreigners again attack it, and he were certain that his endeavours should procure his countrymen that freedom, for which they have fought so many and bloody battles, he would again offer his services; but he would never draw his sword, until he was convinced that his military talents would be of other use to his fellow citizens, than solely to leave them the choice of tyrants;*" and without waiting for an answer, he retired*.

The

* Bonaparte often ridicules Moreau's military conversation; he told somebody who reported it to Moreau, that he looked upon him to be a true military pedant. Some time after Moreau invited to dinner, General Le Fevre, formerly a private in the guards, at present.

The writer of this has been Moreau's prisoner and guest ; has associated with him in Germany and in France, at Munich and Stutgard, at Paris and Grosbois ; has been at his military parade when attended by all his generals, aides-de-camps, and officers ; and at his table when surrounded by elegance, beauty, and fashion : he has seen him in his camps on the Rhine and the Danube, and at his balls and routs at Strasburgh and Paris ; and he has always found him the same amiable, agreeable, modest, and unassuming man ; although, at all times, in all places and in all companies, a military enthusiast, whether in the society of ladies or in a circle of officers, at the head of his table, or at the head of his army, leading his soldiers to battle, or handing a lady to dance ; but so lively, amusing, and intermixed with anecdotes is his conversation, that even French coquets have listened to it in preference to the flattery of their gallants.

It is impossible for any person of education to be in Moreau's company half an hour without considering him a great military character, whose

present Bonaparte's favourite and senator ; when at table he said, I am called a military pedant—it may be true enough ; *but you and I know a man who is both a military hypocrite and a political impostor.*

thoughts.

thoughts and words are those of an officer of eminent talents, and much experience, and whose only passion is military glory.

To an open and pleasing countenance, he unites soft and insinuating manners; and to the frankness of the soldier, he joins the becoming ease of the courtier, without the licentiousness of the one, or the vices of the other. Frenchmen allow him the liberal good nature of a Turenne, to whom he is compared for his able tactics; and the vigour and patriotism of Henry IV. whom he resembles as a skilful warrior.— They say that in his attacks he is a Gustavus Adolphus and a Conde, and in his retreats a Xenophon and a Belleisle.

All the reproach made against Moreau even by his enemies, is, that he continued to serve the assassins of a father whom he dearly loved, and his ingratitude towards his friend Pichegru, whom he could not but greatly esteem; but it may be said without fear of contradiction, or charge of partiality, that, with the *single* exception of Pichegru, Moreau is the first, the ablest, and the *purest*, of all the French republican generals, and the one to whom France is the most indebted, be-

cause Melas lost the battle of Marengo, whereas Moreau gained the battle of Hohenlinden*.

* It is the opinion of all French generals, that Melas lost the battle of Marengo, but that Bonaparte did not gain it; that Melas was defeated by his own faults, but that Bonaparte was not victorious by his own talents or valour; and that he swindled Italy from Austria by the political incapacity of its commander, as much as by his military ignorance.

When the Austrian general, Count De-St. Julien, carried the dishonourable armistice of the 16th June, 1800, accepted by Melas, to Bonaparte, the present French ambassador in Portugal, Lasnes, with other French generals, shewed Count De-St. Julien the French camp; and in passing by two six-pounders, he said to his companions, "*Citizens! let us bow to these cannons; they were the only two not in the power of our enemy when the late victory declared itself in our favour.*" The feelings of the Austrian on this occasion must have been stronger than even the indelicate impudence of the Frenchman. *Histoire secrète de la Bataille de Marengo, par un Cbouan, page 12.*

EMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES,

ONE OF BONAPARTE'S SENATORS.

E. J. SIEYES, commonly called the Abbé Sieyes, was born at Frejus, in Provence, in 1748, and before the Revolution, was *vicaire general* to the Bishop of Chartres, a canon, and chancellor of the church of Chartres.

A christian priest and a preacher of atheism, a subject to a king and an apostle of equality, Sieyes was received as governor and instructor to the young Baron Matthew Montmorency, a nobleman of one of the first families in France, nephew to a cardinal and to a bishop, and grandson to a prince; but, as might be expected, the sophistry of Sieyes soon perverted the loyalty of his pupil: his lessons caused young Montmorency to forget what he owed to his God, to his king, to his country, to his family, and to himself, and at an early age to become an associate of La Fayette and of his accomplices.

In most noble families in France, some years before the Revolution, it was the fashion to trust the education and the conduct of their children to persons as loyal and religious as Abbé Sieyes.

For

For his promotion in the church, and for his nomination as a deputy to the States-General, Sieyes was indebted to the Montmorency family: he had, however, already caused himself to be noticed by his philosophical connexions with D'Alembert, Diderot, Condorcet, and their associates.

Sieyes did not wait for the Revolution, to publish and profess his dangerous and anti-social ideas. In 1787 he circulated several of his writings, full of metaphysical subtilty and anarchic precepts, but in a dull and heavy style; more fit to tire the curious or the studious, than to instruct or to persuade the ignorant or the inquisitive. These writings were little read, and less praised. The vanity of Sieyes was therefore hurt; and he determined, if possible, to revenge upon mankind at large, the neglect which his imaginary merit met with from men of letters in France; unfortunately for France and Europe, Sieyes has since been in situations that have enabled him to adhere to his determination.

A member of the Tiers Etat, Abbé Sieyes became one of the first opposers of the distinctions between the clergy and the nobility; and he was one of the principal movers and promoters of the union of the three orders in a National Assembly.

On

On the 10th and 15th June 1789, he strongly urged this *first* revolutionary measure towards equality, which at last was decreed.

From the benevolence of Louis XVI. Sieyes had received several ecclesiastical livings, and having an opportunity, in the family of Montmorency, to mix with many of the King's courtiers and ministers, he must have known his sovereign's patriotic and humane disposition; nevertheless, when the King had some troops collected near his residence, for the protection of himself, his throne, and his family, Sieyes, on the 8th July 1789, was ungenerous enough to throw out in the tribune of the National Assembly, the most illiberal suspicions of the intentions of his King, and the most infamous calumny against his patriotism.

Sieyes had not been three months a deputy, before he announced himself as a traitor and a rebel, and enlisted under the colours of the Orleans faction; a revolutionary charnel-house, the receptacle of every thing that was corrupt, ambitious, vicious, and vile.

When any questions were debated, or any plans proposed for the improvement of his country, or for the relief of his countrymen, from which his personal interest or fortune might suffer,

fer, Sieyes laid aside the character of the partisan and the innovator for that of the priest. On the 10th of August, 1789, he vehemently opposed the suppression of clerical tythes. He then used an expression, always applicable to himself and to his accomplices, exclaiming, in the middle of the discussion on this subject, "*You wish to be free, and you do not know how to be just.*" On the 7th of September following, when Sieyes opposed the question for giving the royal prerogative of the *veto* to the King, he forgot, however, himself to be just, though he said he desired to be free.

Sieyes was deeply implicated in the cruel and unfortunate insurrection of the 5th and 6th October 1789. The Count De La Chartre deposed upon oath before the tribunal of the Chatelet, that he had heard Sieyes say to a person who reported that there were movements at Paris, "*I knew there were movements, but I do not understand any thing about THESE ; they proceed in a contrary sense.*" When he was himself called upon to declare upon oath what he knew on this subject, he affirmed *that he knew nothing*, but, with all other good citizens, was indignant at the scenes that took place. In these four lines are three different persons—the plotter, the perjurer, and the priest.

priest, united in one individual—the conspirator.

The King had been prevailed upon to give Sieyes some vacant and rich abbeys, and from this period he became a strenuous defender of the church-lands, against Talleyrand, and other revolutionary spoilers. He wrote a work, called, *Observations on the Property of the Clergy*, and in every debate resisted its sale. This is only mentioned as a measure of Sieyes' patriotism. But it is to be recorded, as a proof of his modesty and gratitude, that when he heard of these donations from the King, he said: "*At last the court begins to know its duty, and to do what it should have done ten years ago.*"

During the year 1790, when he apprehended that the violence of factions would bring about the proscription of the factious, and that those who made themselves most conspicuous would be the first victims, Sieyes seldom ascended the tribune to speak, but chiefly employed his time in silence in the committees. He now began to wrap himself up in a mysterious obscurity, and continued so in the several assemblies of which he has been a member; and to this, as well as to his revolutionary Machiavelism, may be ascribed his escape in all the bloody conflicts between

tween all the cruel rebellious parties, fighting or intriguing for power, and proscribing or destroying each other.

Sieyes had proposed in the constitutional committee, a declaration of the rights of man, but it was objected to, as being too metaphysical; he succeeded better in his plan of dividing France into departments, districts, and municipalities; this measure was approved and decreed by the National Assembly, and is yet continued.

In 1791 he was elected a member of the department at Paris, of which the Duke De La Rochefoucault was the president, and Roederer the secretary; he distinguished himself here by a speech in favour of religious toleration, and the liberty of worship. At this time the rabble at Paris, nick-named the *active citizens*, persecuted, insulted, or murdered every clergyman who had not taken the national oath, and proscribed the members of his congregation. It was then as dangerous to profess a religion, as in former times it was punishable to be of no religion. Atheistical fanaticism had taken the place of Roman Catholic superstition; the latter chastised individual persons, the former proscribed and punished whole communities. A decree of the department at Paris tried in vain to put a stop to
those

those horrors, and Sieyès was forced to acknowledge in the tribune of the National Assembly, "*that the sovereign people at Paris mistook their defenders for their assassins, and their assassins for their defenders; and in disturbing the worship of Christ, conducted themselves like devils!*"

Every member of any abilities in the Constituent Assembly, wished to give France a constitution according to his own manner of thinking, and his own religious and political notions; it was, therefore, not surprizing, that a man of Sieyès' vanity, and who had so great an idea and so high an opinion of his own talents as a legislator, should present a plan for the constitution of a democratical monarchy, or rather a monarchical anarchy; the Constitutional Committee, however, rejected it as impracticable, and the National Assembly confirmed this rejection.

During the imprisonment of Louis XVI. after the journey to Varennes, Sieyès was bought over to the court party; but was courted by the republicans and by the jacobins, who at that period intended to make France a commonwealth. To serve the King and to silence faction, Barnave and Charles Lameth persuaded Sieyès to publish his political creed. In a letter in the *Moniteur* (July 1791), Sieyès expressed the following

sentiments: "*Neither to be wedded to old customs; nor from any superstitious opinion of royalty, do I prefer monarchy; I prefer it because it is demonstrated, that all citizens enjoy a greater portion of liberty under a monarchical, than under a republican form of government; and that in all possible hypotheses, man is more free under the former than under the latter.*" Sieyes has more than once repented of having given this publicity to his monarchical principles, and even the vote for the death of his King has not been able to atone for it. Since 1791, this letter has been republished in divers newspapers no less than sixteen times, by Sieyes' enemies, and every time some new explanation or apology has been printed by Sieyes in answer, which, instead of explaining, only exposed the sophistry of a traitor and the treachery of a coward.

When religious schism followed the religious and political innovations of the Constituent Assembly, and revolutionary intruders usurped the sees of the christian bishops, Sieyes was offered the episcopal see at Paris, which he declined, enjoying already, and without envy or danger, more than double the salary of a constitutional bishop.

Sieyes was far from approving the constitution of 1791; he predicted its short duration, and plotted with the leaders of the Legislative Assembly

bly

bly to have his prediction fulfilled. He continued to receive a pension from the King, and at the same time to conspire against monarchy, as the only means of trying a constitution of his own manufacture.

The Legislative Assembly having suffered the jacobins to overturn the throne, a National Convention was ordered to be convoked, and Sieyes was elected one of its members. In this den of brigands he did not profit by the influence his opinion had over many of his fellow rebels. He was trembling before the audacious revolutionary genius of a Danton, Marat, and Robespierre; and surrounded as he was by assassins, to save his life he tried to be forgotten, and therefore sunk again into an apparent nullity. *It was fear* that caused him to be a regicide, and secretly to advise Robespierre to assume the dictatorship; *it was fear* that made him declare on the 10th November 1793, *that as he had for a long time renounced the christian religion, he had, of course, long given up the imposition of priestcraft and the hypocrisy of priesthood*; and *it was through fear*, that some time afterwards he joined Chaumette, Hebert, and Momero in their scandalous and sacrilegious farce in honour of Momero's mistress, called the *Goddess of Reason*.

During the Convention, until the death of Robespierre, Sieyes was seldom a member of a committee, never upon any mission, and only spoke twice in the tribune : when, after the 9th of Thermidor, more moderate tyrants had divided Robespierre's power, Sieyes conducted himself for some months with the same circumspection ; but perceiving that a too long silence might entirely bury him in oblivion, he again ascended the tribune, spoke with abhorrence of Robespierre's tyranny and cruelties, and in favour of the arrested or outlawed conventional members.

In 1795, he was, with Rewbel, sent to negotiate, or rather to dictate a treaty to the Batavian Republic : he here conducted himself with that harshness and insolence which accompanied him in all his transactions, and never left him, but when fear forced him to dissemble, or to disguise a passionate character full of hatred. In the annals of civilized Europe, and of negotiations with independent, but conquered states, there is not an example of harder conditions imposed, or more dishonourable terms submitted to, than those contained in the treaty which Sieyes and Rewbel forced upon Holland, in which the Dutch gave up provinces, paid for independence, and con-
sented

sented to continue to be treated as subdued slaves to the vilest and most unfeeling tyrants.

Sieyes differed from Rewbel and other revolutionary statesmen, in his opinion of the external, as well as of the internal politics of France. Sieyes, not to excite too much the jealousy of Europe, wished that the river Meuse should be the boundary of the French frontiers; but these being extended to the Rhine, prove that Sieyes has not been more successful as a politician than as a legislator.

When, in five years, a fourth constitution was to be tried on the French nation, in which the executive power had been invested in a directory of five members, Sieyes was elected one of the directors; but *fear* again got the better of his vanity; the bleeding scaffolds of terrorism, and the unsettled state of France, frightened him to decline an honour which he wished, but trembled to accept.

The National Convention being changed into two councils, Sieyes was one of the members chosen for the Council of Five Hundred. Here again he was seldom conspicuous as a speaker; he was, however, during the years 1796 and 1797, very active in the most important committees. It did not escape the observers of Sieyes'

revolutionary consistency, that he was *one of the Committee of Five*, charged to find out means to oblige judges, and other public functionaries, to swear hatred to royalty. That a man who had proclaimed monarchy the best of governments, and in eighteen months after voted for the death of his King, and taken the oath of equality; that such a man should be made an instrument to torment and tyrannize over the consciences of royalists, is not surprizing in a rebellion, where oaths have been ridiculed as trifles, and conscience has been laughed at as an absurdity*.

In 1798, when the invasion of Egypt was determined upon, Sieyes resigned his place in the Council of Five Hundred, and was appointed ambassador to the King of Prussia.

The insolence of the Directory, in sending so notorious a regicide ambassador to a King, was only surpassed by the weakness, meanness, or treachery, of the Prussian ministers, In not only not advising their sovereign to resent it, but

* On the 12th of April, Sieyes was in more danger from the vengeance of an individual than he had ever been from the fury of parties. Another apostate, of the name of Poule, a partisan of the terrorist Babœuf, wounded Sieyes in the hand and in the side with a pistol, with which he had an intention to kill him.

persuading him to degrade monarchy and monarchs, by enduring at his court the presence of one of the murderers of another sovereign.

It was, however, not in Prussia where Sieyes found his reception the most flattering, and his residence the most agreeable: he was excluded from more than one society into which all other foreign ambassadors were admitted; and, when admitted any where, he was shunned, despised, and often execrated. When he requested to be presented to the Field-Marshal Baron Knobelsdorff, this old and loyal warrior abruptly answered, "*Non, et sans phrase*;" in allusion to a cruel expression used by Sieyes, when he voted for the death of Louis XVI*. The behaviour of this hero, and of many other Prussians, will, if possible, palliate in the eyes of posterity, the base and selfish conduct of the Prussian cabinet, both on this and on many other occasions.

But even the policy of the Directory, in sending Sieyes to Berlin, is doubted. Prejudice preceded his arrival there; suspicion watched him during his stay; and contempt accompanied him on his return to France. Sieyes was intriguing

* "*La morte sans phrase*," were the only words spoken by Sieyes in voting for the death of his King.

to engage Prussia to declare war against Austria, or at least to enter into an alliance offensive and defensive with regicide France; but he failed in both.

Sieyes was just in time relieved from the blame of his political miscarriage, and from the shame of remaining any longer in a country where he was detested, by being elected to the vacancy in the Directory, in March 1799.

Since 1795, when Sieyes refused his former election as a director, dethroned kings of faction had only been sent into exile, but not to the scaffold, as in the times of Robespierre and of the National Convention. There was besides another motive—*Sieyes had never given up his favourite plan of being a legislator.* From the character of his countrymen, and from the discontent of the factious in the two Councils, he clearly observed that a new revolution was preparing; and he hoped, that the time was at last come, when he might be proclaimed a French revolutionary Lycurgus.

Sieyes had not been long in the Directory before he forced Treilhard, Merlin, and La Reveliere, three of the directors, to resign; and requiring to be supported in his plots by military courage, he fixed upon Gen. Joubert as a proper person

to defend with his sword the metaphysical reveries and productions of his brain. With the death of Joubert, the hope and projects of Sieyes vanished; and he was nearly becoming a victim of the jacobins' contre-project, to renew the reign of terror. The unexpected arrival of Bonaparte saved his life, but annihilated his ambition. Sieyes was, it is true, for some time a consul with Bonaparte; but he soon observed that the Corsican would be the *First, if not the only Consul*; this was not the least mortification which Sieyes experienced from his new sovereign: a constitution, the work, the pride, and the ambition of his life, was laid aside for the laconic constitution of Danou, and Sieyes was compelled to content himself with ease and obscurity, amongst other rebels, in the Corsican senate.

In sixteen months time Sieyes had been a member of the Council of Five Hundred, an ambassador, a director, a consul, and the first president of a senate, of which he was made one of the first members. To all these revolutionary honours and places, Bonaparte added the plunder of an estate belonging to the emigrated De Crosne family. This last was intended to satisfy Sieyes' avarice, for the loss which his ambition had suffered; or rather, to gratify one passion at the expence of another,

another, because Sieyes is nearly as fond of money as ambitious of power or literary fame.

All these Corsican arrangements have, however, not contented Sieyes: he has more than once expressed, *that the present constitution is not yet the good one*; that is to say, that he is determined to have a trial of another. By those who are intimate with Sieyes, it is commonly believed, that he wishes for the re-establishment of a limited monarchy under its former dynasty, but that his vote for the death of Louis XVI. makes him doubt the pardon of Louis XVIII.; and therefore his plan is to offer the throne of France to the Orleans branch of the Bourbons.

Obstinate and despotic, but timid to the greatest degree, more base than passionate, Sieyes has been the soul and the servant of all the several factions; and he has survived them all. He had already some influence in the Constituent Assembly, notwithstanding he was regarded as an obscure logician, more fit to discuss, than to act, or to convince by his eloquence. His yellow and scraggy face, his wrinkled brow, his hollow eyes, his aukward attitude, his reserved policy, announce his excessively plodding, harsh, haughty, but cunning character; which the continual fear of exposing his life and fortune, causes him habitually

bitually to wrap up in much circumspection and hypocrisy: in a few words, however proud and full of hatred, he always takes care to keep upon good terms with the ruling party, but only in a manner that he may desert it when overturned, without committing himself; and as his timidity is greater than his ambition, and his vanity is destitute of courage and energy, he is careful to be at a distance during the civil commotions and revolutionary storms which he often excites himself; but the victorious faction may always depend upon seeing Sieyes amongst its first adherents, first admirers, and first deserters, when defeated.

Previous to taking leave of this famous, or rather infamous character, it is necessary to notice his present situation, and to account for his present obscurity. Bonaparte, dreading the intriguing malignity of Sieyes, in order to secure himself against his future plots, has presented him with elegant apartments in the castle of Luxembourg, now called the Palace of the Senate, where he is watched by Bonaparte's spies, despised by his accomplices, and hated by all loyal men. A state-prisoner, under the appellation of a senator, he feels the oppression of a tyrant, whom his treachery to his King has assisted to elevate into power; and he must content himself with

with being the slave of an usurper, after having revolted as a free subject of a lawful king*.

It is a melancholy reflection to a contemplative mind, that in the life of a man of Sieyes' parts, not one trait offers itself, upon which the virtuous, the religious, and the loyal, can dwell with satisfaction. It may, however, be an useful lesson to modern reformers and fashionable innovators, to see that Sieyes (whose abilities are certainly great, and whose knowledge of mankind surpasses his abilities), is the slave of a man who, in 1789, was an object of public charity, after having, during fourteen years of revolution, exposed his life, lost his reputation, degraded his character, debased his condition, condemned his King, and denied his God!

* Before Bonaparte left Paris for Brussels, he sent his first physician to Sieyes, to inquire after his health, and to advise him "*to drink the Spa waters during Bonaparte's absence.*" Sieyes took the hint, and left Paris for Spa, the day before Bonaparte set out on his journey. At this time a caricature was exposed for sale in the Palais Royal, in which a known great man was represented in royal robes, with a halter in one hand and a guillotine in the other, searching for somebody, and calling out, *Si es ? Ubi es ?* The French pronounce Sieyes, Sies !!!

FOUCHE DE NANTES,

ONE OF BONAPARTE'S SENATORS, LATE MINISTER
OF THE GENERAL POLICE OF THE FRENCH
REPUBLIC.

THE Consular Senator, Fouché De Nantes, has become notorious with many other Frenchmen, who, like himself, have, since the Revolution, been by turns abhorred for their cruelties, dreaded for their power, and envied for their influence, their places, and their riches, and who, without a single virtue to atone for all their crimes and enormities, enjoy under Bonaparte a kind of revolutionary prerogative and protection, due, no doubt, to the oblivion of what they have been or of what they have done, to the inconsistency of the French character, and to the consular favour, so liberally bestowed on every man of some talents or of any revolutionary merit, let his past conduct be ever so reproachful, and his principles ever so corrupt or vicious.

Fouché was born in 1748, of poor parents, vintagers in a village near Nantes, in Brittany. A beggar-boy in the streets of that city, he was
K noticed,

noticed, and charitably adopted and educated by the friars of the order called *Oratoire*. Uniting with some ability great hypocrisy and cunning, he insinuated himself so far, as to be at an early age received a novice, and afterwards a member of that order. From being the humble valet of these men, he was no sooner advanced to be their equal, than he intrigued to be their master, and to rule men whom he had but lately served.

Several years before the Revolution, he spread disunion, and sowed discontent, amongst persons with whom he had made the vow of peace and concord; by his sophistry he changed the principles of the weak, tormented the consciences of the timorous, and staggered the faith of many members of this religious community; and although his superiors condemned him at different times, both to severe penance and close confinement, he returned to society as little corrected by seclusion as changed by repentance.

Since the impolitic destruction of the order of the Jesuits, the education of youth in France was entrusted to their rivals, the friars of the order of *Oratoire*. The political, religious, and moral notions of modern Frenchmen, prove what France and Europe have gained by this change. Fouché, instead of improving the morals, corrupted the
opinions

opinions of those young men who had the misfortune to have him for their instructor. During the civil troubles in Brittany, in 1788, most of Fouché's pupils went from Nantes, to join at Rennes the insurgents against the legitimate authority. Since 1789, some of them have risen to revolutionary honours, others have ascended the republican scaffold; some have perished in foreign and civil wars, others, more unfortunate, are yet alive—the contemptible slaves of a Corsican usurper; but *all have approved, applauded, and served the Revolution*.*.

The instant monastic institutions were abolished by the Constituent Assembly, Fouché apostatized and married. Having, by this step, exposed himself to the severest punishment, in the event of a counter-revolution, he became from fear, like most of the other men who have figured in the Revolution, a *soi-disant* republican, or rather terrorist, and as such distinguished himself until 1799.

At the establishment of the Jacobin Club at Nantes, in 1789, Fouché was the first friar of his order, and one of the first of the clergy in Brittany,

* Fouché's speech in the Jacobin Club at Nantes, 8th Germinal, l'an ii. printed in the Gazette Nantaise of the 10th Germinal, l'an ii.

who enrolled his name as a member of this club: he was therefore immediately elected one of its secretaries, and chosen its third president. The most sanguinary and violent measures were proposed and recommended by him. He particularly distinguished himself for his persecution of the clergy, and for his hatred to his own order. When the national seal was affixed to that religious abode where his youth had been cherished, protected, and instructed, he headed, as a deputy from the jacobins, the detachment of the national guards commanded on this duty, and hunted out of their retreat, and turned upon the world, men who had renounced it for ever, who were afflicted by sufferings and weakened by age, without means to subsist, without strength to labour, or intelligence and knowledge how to be industrious. Amongst others, he dragged forward the venerable old man, Father Cholois, who, thirty years before, had picked him up in the street, a beggar-boy, the solitary victim of want and disease*.

In 1792, when a National Convention was

* La Denonciation des Bretons contre le Terrorist, le voleur et l'assassin Fouché, *dit de Nantes*, présenté a la Convention Nationale, le 15 Ventose, an iii. page 2.

called,

called, and its members were chosen from the vilest, most cruel, and corrupted class of men, Fouché was nominated one of them by the blood-thirsty jacobins at Nantes. *His election took place in the morning; in the afternoon his electors murdered all the nobles and the priests confined in the different prisons at Nantes; and in the evening he joined these assassins at their fraternal banquet, stained and reeking with the blood of their victims!* Father Cholois, Fouché's benefactor, was amongst those whom they had butchered. What must have been his feelings in the last moment, when he knew (as he did) that the murderers were the friends and associates of his adopted child—the representative of the French people*!

Arrived in the capital, strongly recommended by the jacobins at Nantes, he, on the 19th of September, 1792, made his first entrance at the Jacobin Club at Paris; and in a virulent speech, and with his usual revolutionary declamation, praised the deeds of the Septembrisers, and seconded Marat, in demanding the heads of the King and Queen (then unhappy prisoners in the

* La Denonciation des Bretons contre le Terrorist, le voleur et l'assassin Fouché, dit de Nantes, présenté a la Convention Nationale, le 15 Ventose, an iii. page 4.

Temple), and of 200,000 aristocrats, their adherents*.

From the first sittings of the National Convention, Fouché joined the party called the Mountain, composed of Danton, Robespierre, Marat, and their accomplices; and with them he voted for the death of the King. Observing, however, from the malignity and agitation of the different factions, that it would be safer and more profitable to be employed in missions in the departments, he intrigued a long time, and at last, in July, 1793, was sent as a conventional deputy, first to the department of the Rhone, and afterwards to the departments of Allier and Nievre.

When Fouché arrived before Lyons, the chief city of the department of the Rhone, it was in open insurrection against the regicides of the National Convention. Lyons was without ramparts, ammunition, artillery, and provisions, and had no other garrison, no other soldiers or defenders, but its own inhabitants, mostly manufacturers and mechanics, accustomed to a sedentary life, generally as much enervating the mind as relaxing the body; but the Lyonese underwent a long and glorious siege, and shewed so many traits

* Journal des Jacobins, du 20 Septembre, 1792, No. 40.

of valour, skill, and intrepidity, that it occupied the French republicans a longer time, and it cost them more lives to enter this open, defenceless city, than to conquer any other fortified place which they have attacked during the last war. It is well deserving remembrance, that at this period twenty thousand Swiss, or Piedmontese troops, assisting the Lyoneses, might have established a regular government in France, which at present millions of foreigners cannot effect; because La Vendée was then in arms and victorious, Toulon occupied by England, and disaffection reigned every where. Unfortunately for the lovers of order, monarchy, and religion, such has been the improvident and impolitic conduct of other nations in Europe, that they never took the advantage of any opportunity which a change offered, nor lost sight of a selfish policy, which has endangered their very existence; and should they continue to act as they have hitherto done, sooner or later they must share the destiny of Switzerland and Piedmont, at present enslaved and conquered countries.

Amongst civilized people in arms, a noble defence, a generous courage, excite admiration, even in an enemy who is liberal himself; and in rejoicing at their victories, they esteem and spare the brave, and pity the misfortunes of the vanquished.

quished. In revolutionary France, a different maxim has been adopted and followed. When Lyons opened its gates (they were never forced), every loyal man was proscribed as a traitor, and every valorous person punished as a rebel. Political fanaticism, aided and attended by the fury usual to faction, and the cruelties always accompanying civil wars, ordered not only the destruction of the citizens, but of their dwellings and of their city*. Such were the decrees of the National

* The following is one of the many letters from Fouché during his mission, to the National Convention; it is extracted from the *Moniteur* of the 4th *Primaire*, an ii. of the republic, or 24th November, 1793. No. 64, page 258, second column.

The Representatives of the Nation, Fouché de Nantes and Collot D'Herbois, to the National Convention. Commune Affranchie (Lyons), 26th Brumaire, an ii. of the republic.

"CITIZENS COLLEAGUES,

"We proceed in our mission with the energy of republicans, who are penetrated with a profound sense of their character; this we shall retain; neither shall we descend from the exalted situation to which the nation has raised us, to attend to the *puny interests of some individuals* who are more or less guilty towards their country. *We have dismissed every one of them*, as we have no time to lose, no favours to grant. We are to consider, and only do consider, the republic and your decrees, which ordain us to set a great example, to give a signal lesson. We only listen to the cry of the nation, which demands that all the blood of the patriots should be *avenged at once*, in a *speedy and dreadful* manner, in order that the human race may not lament its being spilled afresh.

"From

tional Convention, the then government of France, which had usurped all powers, executive as well as legislative; and what passion had decreed, frenzy and rage performed.

It was hardly possible to suppose, that men were to be found who could improve upon the horrors and barbarities commanded by the National Convention, had not Fouché and Collot D'Herbois

"From a conviction that this infamous city contains no one that is innocent, except those who have been oppressed and loaded with wrongs by the assassins of the people, we are guarded against the tears of repentance; nothing can disarm our severity. This they were well aware of, who have obtained from you a decree of respite in favour of one of our prisoners. Who has dared to do this? Are we not on the spot? Have you not invested us with your confidence?—and yet we have not been consulted!

"We cannot forbear telling you, citizens colleagues, that indulgence is a dangerous weakness, calculated to re-ignite criminal hopes at the moment when it is requisite to put a final end to them. It has been claimed in behalf of one individual, it has been solicited in the behalf of every one of his species, with a view of rendering the effect of your justice illusory. They do not yet call for the report of your first decree relative to the annihilation of the city of Lyons; but nothing has hardly been done yet to bring it into execution. The mode of demolishing is too slow; republican impatience demands more speedy execution. The explosion of the mine, and the devouring activity of the fire alone, can express the omnipotence of the people: their will is not to be checked like that of tyrants; it must have the same effect as thunder.

(Signed) "COLLOT D'HERBOIS and FOUCHE."

Extract

D'Herbois made that a fact, which was by many thought an impossibility. The Convention had sentenced its devoted victims to perish by the guillotine, but Fouché and his associate invented other means, more terrible and more expeditious, to desolate the city, and murder their fellow-citizens: they ordered the shooting, in mass, of hundreds of persons at the same time, or, as they wrote to the National Convention, they had found means *de vomier la mort a grand flots*. Sometimes several hundred persons, tied together with ropes, fastened to the trees of the Place de Brotteaux, were shot by piquets of infantry, which made the tour round the place, and, at a signal, fired on the condemned. At other times, when the proscribed were killed by cannons loaded with grape-shot,

Extract of another letter, Moniteur, 13th Frimaire, an. ii. (3d December 1793), No. 73, page 294.

"CITIZENS COLLEAGUES,

"No indulgence, no procrastination, no tardiness in the punishment of crime, if you wish to produce a salutary effect. *The hinge used delay when they had punishment to inflict, because they were weak and cruel; the justice of the people ought to be as quick as the expression of their will. We have adopted efficacious measures to manifest their omnipotence, so as to serve as an example to all rebels.*

"*We daily seize upon new treasure, &c.*

"(Signed) "COLLOT D'HERBOIS and FOUCHE."

they.

they were tied two and two together on the same place, and ranged along the edge of a grave, or rather ditch, digged, after Fouché's orders, by their nearest female relatives or friends, the day before their execution, and destined to receive their corpse : as it often happened that the grape-shot wounded and maimed more than it killed, the bayonets and swords of the revolutionary army dispatched those still alive and suffering from the wounds of the cannon. One hour after the execution, those females who had digged the graves, most of them mothers, sisters, and wives, were forced, by Fouché's satellites, to fill them up, and to cover with earth the mutilated corpse of their fathers, husbands, and brothers, who were always previously stripped naked, and plundered, by a band of women, in the pay of Fouché's revolutionary judges, called the *furies of the guillotine*. It is difficult to say which inspires more compassion or abhorrence ; whether the dreadful situation of the female relatives of the sufferers, or the barbarous conduct of the furies of the guillotine, who regularly accompanied all condemned persons from the tribunal to the place of execution, hooting, shouting, insulting, and often calling to their remembrance the objects of their affection and tenderness, to sharpen their regrets and sufferings,

ings, and to make their agony and death so much the more tormenting *.

After one of these executions in mass, Fouché wrote thus to Collot D'Herbois, *his friend and colleague*, then a member of the Committee of Public Safety: "*Tears of joy run from my eyes and overflow my heart;*" and in a postscript to the same letter, he adds: "*We have but one means of celebrating our victory (at Toulon); we shall send 213 rebels this evening to the place of execution; our loaded cannons are ready to salute them* †. The unfeeling

* See *Le cris de vengeance des Lionois, contre Collot D'Herbois et Fouché*; chez Delandine a Lion, an iii. (1795), page 2. In the note of page 5 is related, that when, one day in November 1793, near 300 Lyonesse citizens were ordered to be shot in mass, the wife of one of them, Daunois, had, according to the orders of Fouché, been sent the night before to dig her husband's and brother's grave. She was in a state of pregnancy, young and beautiful, and had only been married four months. In being dragged to the Place de Brotteaux, she miscarried, and was brought home senseless. When Daunois marched to his execution, the furies of the guillotine had Fouché's order particularly to torment him, and, amongst other things, told him, *that his wife, whom he dearly loved, was next decade to be married to one of the sans culottes, his executioner, whom they pointed out*; and in fact Fouché put her in requisition for this man, but she expired at the sight of him, when he presented Fouché's orders!!!

† *Moniteur*, 5 Nivose, an ii. (25th December, 1793), No. 35, page 383.

feeling Fouché disgusts as much by his inhuman reports as he shocks by his more than savage cruelty; his language even adds to the blackness of his heart.

Fouché was not only cruel but sacrilegious; and as a proof, one of the most hideous transactions of this ex-monk, who, as a minister,

FOUCHÉ TO COLLOT D'HERBOIS.

"And we likewise, my friend, have contributed to the surrender of Toulon, by spreading terror amongst the traitors who had entered the town, and by exposing to their view the dead bodies of thousands of their accomplices. Let us shew ourselves terrible; let us annihilate, in our anger, and at one single blow, every conspirator, every traitor, that we may not feel the pain, the long torture, of punishing them as kings would do. Let the perfidious and ferocious English be assailed from every quarter; let the whole republic turn into a volcano, and pour forth the devouring lava upon them: may the infamous island that produced these monsters, who no longer belong to the human species, be buried for ever in the waves. Farewell, my friend!—tears of joy run from my eyes and overflow my heart. (Signed) FOUCHÉ.

"P. S. We have but one way of celebrating our victory; we shall send 213 rebels this evening to the place of execution: our loaded cannons are ready to salute them."

According to the last-mentioned pamphlet, *Les Cris de Vengeance*, this letter was dated the 22d December; and that day, 1792 Lionese had been shot at the Place de Brotteaux, during a fete Fouché gave to thirty jacobins and twenty-two prostitutes, who from their windows on the quay, could witness the butchery Fouché had ordered, as he said, *pour la bonne bouche*. Page 25.

assisted Bonaparte, in 1802, to re-establish the christian religion, is not to be forgotten, because it shews the worth, the devotion, and the sincerity, both of the minister, and of the consul who employed him.

Challier, a Piedmontese, had, from the beginning of the Revolution, been the tormentor and tyrant of all the peaceable and loyal citizens at Lyons, where he was established as a merchant. Every insurrection, and the continual agitation of this populous city, were the work of this man and of the jacobin emissaries from Paris, assisted by some disgraced and bankrupt Lionese. In December 1792, when no honest man dared to appear as a candidate for any public employment, Challier was by some few jacobins first nominated a municipal officer, and afterwards a judge. As a recommendation to popular favour, he distributed his own portrait, with the following inscription: "*Challier, an excellent patriot, has passed six months at Paris, as an admirer of Marat and of the Mountain of the National Convention.*"

Challier's first act as a public functionary, was an order to imprison twelve hundred citizens, whom he had proscribed as traitors to the republic, because he suspected them to be his private enemies. Despairing, from the courageous resistance

assistance of the Mayor, Nievre Chol, of being able to send them to the scaffold, he, on the 6th February, 1793, presented himself in the Jacobin Club with a dagger in his hand; and caused to be decreed, "that a tribunal, similar to that which murdered the prisoners at Paris, on the 2d September, 1792, should immediately be instituted, with a guillotine on the bridge of St. Clair; that nine hundred persons, whose names he gave in, should there be beheaded, and their bodies thrown into the Rhone; and that, in want of executioners, the members of the club should perform this office." Fortunately, the mayor and the armed force prevented this horrid decree from having its effect. Some time afterwards Challier was deposed by the citizens at Lyons, but restored by the Convention; and in the daily contest between the two parties, the jacobins and the loyal citizens, he was by turns victorious and by turns defeated. At last the people at Lyons became exasperated, and erected the standard of revolt against the National Convention; Challier was arrested, condemned, and executed, on the 17th July, 1793.

No sooner had Fouché and Collot D'Herbois entered Lyons, but the busts of Challier were carried in triumph, and placed on the altars of the churches, and on the tables of the tribunals and

municipality. Fouché took upon himself the apotheosis of Challier, at a civic feast ordered in honour of his memory. Fouché chose to celebrate this feast the 1st November, 1793, a day consecrated by the Roman Catholics to prayers, and to the memory of all saints. "*Early in the morning the cannon announced the festival, and men and women carried, with an air of respect, adoration, and pomp, the image of Challier, whilst other enemies to the christian religion, brought consecrated vases; surrounded a jack-ass covered with an Episcopal gown, a mitre fastened between its two ears, and dragging in the dirt the Bible tied to its tail. After the burning of Challier's pretended corpse, of which the ashes were piously distributed amongst the sectaries of his and Fouché's morals, the Holy Bible was thrown into the fire; and as it arose into the air, in smoke, the ceremony ended with the ass drinking from the sacred chalice!!!*"

When the ceremony was over, Fouché proposed to consecrate that day, by sacrificing all arrested persons (amounting to upwards of 25,000) to the manes of the god whom they had just adored; but a storm suddenly dispersed this infamous assembly*.

* Les Cris de Vengeance, page 19; Prudhomme, art. Fouché, and Les Annales du Terrorisme, page 90.

In his letter from Lyons, of the 10th of November following, printed in the *Moniteur*, and addressed to the National Convention, Fouché said: "*The shade of Challier is satisfied; his precious remains, religiously collected, have been carried in triumph. It is upon the place where this holy martyr was immolated, that his ashes have been exposed to public veneration, to the religion of patriotism. At last the silence of sorrow was interrupted by the cries of vengeance! vengeance! Yes, we swear that the people shall be avenged! This soil shall be overthrown; every thing which vice has erected shall be annihilated; and on the ruins of this superb city, the traveller shall find only some simple monuments, erected in memory of the martyrs of liberty, &c. &c.*.*"

Having distinguished himself in such a terrific manner at Lyons, Fouché was thought by the National Convention a worthy and fit instrument of its vengeance and of its hatred, at Moulins and in La Vendée. If his active correspondence with Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety had not been preserved in the *Moniteur*, and other

* Challier was called the Marat of Lyons; and by Fouché and the jacobins, St. Challier.—*Les Annales du Terrorisme*, page 93, and Prudhomme, art. Lyons.

papers of those times, it would at present be impossible to form an idea of the crimes and enormities committed by Fouché in his different missions. In a letter to the National Convention; dated Nantes, Germinal 6th, an ii. (March 28th 1794), he says, "*the day before yesterday I had the happiness to see 800 dwellings of the brigands (the royalists) consumed by fire; to-day I have witnessed the shooting of 900 of these brigands; and for to-morrow, I and Carrier have prepared a civic baptism (drowning) of 1200 women and children, mothers, sisters, wives, daughters, or sons, of the accursed brigands from La Vendée. In two days, three impure generations of rebels and fanatics have ceased to be any more*.*" In another letter to the department of Nièvre, he wrote, "*let us have the courage to march upon the bodies even of our fathers, brothers, and sons, to arrive at liberty; let us brave death ourselves, by inflicting it on all the enemies of equality, without any distinction of sex or age, relatives or strangers†.*"

At Lyons, as well as in La Vendée, Fouché had, in the name, and for the use of the repub-

* La Denonciation des Bretons, page 36.

† Dictionnaire Biographique, tom. ii. page 35; and Les Annales du Terrorisme, page 111.

He, confiscated all the property of those whom he ordered to be shot, drowned, or guillotined; but Robespierre, by his spies, found out that Fouché had appropriated to himself the greatest part of this national plunder; he therefore denounced him in the Jacobin Club at Paris *as a thief*, and his name was struck out as a member in its matricular register. Cruel from nature, Robespierre was the natural protector of all revolutionary assassins; ambition was his only passion; his wants were few, and his expences trifling; he therefore never forgave any peculator; but fortunately for Fouché, the death of Robespierre soon after, prevented him from sharing the fate of his friends Danton, Chaumette, Chabot, Hebert, and other patriotic robbers.

After the death of Robespierre, and during the factions which succeeded him in power, denunciations against Fouché poured in from all the departments where he had been a deputy. He was accused *of rape, of murder, of drowning, of plundering, of being an atheist, and an incendiary* *.

* La Denonciation des Bretons, page 52. It is said there, that Fouché himself set fire to six villages in La Vendée, and in one of them ordered 66 old men, women, and children, to be thrown into the flames.

At this period, the National Convention apprehending the punishment due to its numerous crimes, in order to divert the attention of the people, found it necessary to make a purification (as it was called) of some of its vicious and guilty members, by sending Carrier and Le Bon to the scaffold, and declaring others, from their immoral or cruel conduct during the reign of Robespierre, unworthy of a seat in the National Convention. Fouché de Nantes, after the report of Tallien, was, amongst others, expelled from the Convention, as "*a thief and a terrorist, whose barbarous and criminal conduct would cast an everlasting dishonour upon any assembly of which he was suffered to be a member**." After another report by Dentzel, on the 21st and 22d Thermidor, an iii, (8th and 9th August, 1795), Fouché, with Lequinio and eight other terrorists, formerly of the National Convention, were ordered to be arrested, and they remained in prison until released by the amnesty granted by the Convention, some time before it finished its sittings†.

* See the *Moniteur* from August 1794 to October 1795. It contains a number of denunciations against Fouché for plunder and murder, with Tallien's report; and *Les Annales du Terrorisme*, page 114.

† See the *Moniteur* of the 10th and 11th August, 1795.

From

From October 1795, to September 1797, Fouché was employed in the subaltern capacity of a spy to the jacobin party of the Directory, and in laying out in the purchase of national estates the fruits of his robberies at Lyons and in La Vendée. After the 18th of Fructidor, or 4th September 1797, when this jacobin party of the Directory was victorious, and the Kings of Spain, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, received from *their dear and great friends*† the French Directors, as their ambassadors, the regicides Sieyes, Guinguéné, La Mark, La Combe, Grouvelle, &c. Fouché quitted his obscurity; became first a Commissary in Italy, and afterwards, in the winter 1798, was nominated ambassador to the Batavian republic, or French viceroy in Holland. Having, however, forgotten to remit to his employers their due share of his plunder in that country, he was recalled, and in 1799, when terrorists occupied the principal places, appointed, by the advice of Barras (who said, a citizen known to have been

† See the official letters from the different neutral Kings to the French Directory in November and December 1795, and from the present King of Prussia, announcing his accession to the throne in November 1798. These letters all begin, *grands et chers amis*; and published in the then official paper called *le Rédacteur*, and in the *Moniteur*.

an assassin, a spy, and a thief, could not but be a good chief over a revolutionary police), Minister of the Police of the French Republic. On the 18th of Brumaire, or 9th November 1799, when Bonaparte usurped the supreme power, Fouché was bribed over with 600,000 livres, and a promise to keep his place at least four years; and both Barras and his friend Fallien have since found, that in times of revolution, every man, however infamous, is a dangerous enemy.

Fouché had excited horror by his conduct as a conventional deputy; as a minister of police he has been allowed talents and capacity to which he can have no just claim. Before the Revolution, as has already been mentioned, Fouché was several times reprimanded by his superiors in the convent, for his continual cabals and intrigues; but he never was looked upon as a man of any great parts; he had an uncommon share of impudence, with scanty information*. To what then is Fouché indebted for the present general opinion of his abilities? to nothing but the unlimited power he enjoyed during his ministry, and to his want of respect for any thing either sacred or just. Any man with even less sense and knowledge

* La Denonciation des Bretons, page 3.

than Fouché possesses, might do as great things (though perhaps not so tyrannically), if he only laid aside all feelings, all principles of probity, of of honour and justice. Fouché's skill as a police minister was as much below that of a Sartine and a Le Noir, as his means and power were above the means and power which these ministers possessed from the late King.

The present French police, as it yet continues, was organized by Fouché. So widely differing, by its tyranny and oppression, from the police of Great Britain, and even from that of countries the most despotic, every thing relating to it must be interesting to the inquisitive, instructive to the moralist or politician, and useful as an article of information to travellers. The Writer of this has been in all countries of Europe, but no where is the liberty of individuals oftener violated than in France, except in Italy, where Frenchmen govern Italians.

It is a curious fact, that the Continent of Europe never has been less free than since they began to talk of liberty in France. No man since that period can travel without a pass, and no pass protects him from a journey to Siberia, a voyage to Cayenne, or a dungeon at Olmutz, Spandau, or Munich. A similitude of name or of person,

is sufficient to annul any pass whatever, and the honest and most innocent traveller suffers years of exile or imprisonment, because he happens to bear the name of a man who is disagreeable to the mistress of a favourite, or favourite minister at St. Petersburg, St. Cloud, Vienna, Berlin, or Munich. Formerly a single act of despotism, such as the confinement of the *not* innocent Baron Trenck, caused a general sensation, and excited universal pity: the numerous examples of republican France have lately accustomed men to all acts of violence and oppression, and by raising apprehensions for one's own safety, appear to have superseded all pity for the sufferings of others.

The press, so useful and so necessary to unmask tyrants, and to inspire abhorrence of tyranny, Fouché has enslaved, either by French intrigues or by French power; and in no part of the Continent dare any friend to rational liberty, to truth, and loyal principles, write, or any printer publish, "*that Bonaparte is an usurper and a poisoner, and his senator Fouché an assassin and a robber,*" whose ideas of liberty are as generous, liberal, and just, as those of the Emperor of Morocco or the Dey of Algiers.

During the monarchy, the general police of France belonged to the ministry of justice and of
the

the interior. Paris, Lyons, and other large cities, had their *lieutenants de police*, as they were called, but the *lieutenant de police* at Paris was the principal one; and some time before the Revolution, that office was a certain recommendation to advancement and promotion*; but these, the police ministers of the King, could have no direct correspondence with his civil or military governors, parliaments, intendants, bishops, &c. &c. the noblemen occupying those places would never consent to communicate with a man whom they regarded as the chief spy, or the chief of the French spies. Since Fouché's regulations, any petty commissary has more power to do what he chooses, unpunished, than the King's *lieutenant de police* ever possessed. If he were guilty of any abuse of authority, he was not only reprimanded, but fined by the then existing parliament, and the King's privy council. There was not a man in France during Fouché's ministry, either judge or counsellor of state, who did not tremble at the very name of Fouché, or his police commissaries; the mayor at Brussels, Lacoué, the secretary to the consular council of state, his *chefs*

* During the reign of Louis XVI. Marquis de Sartine was promoted to the ministry of the marine department, from the office of a lieutenant de police at Paris.

de hureak, and the judges of the tribunal at Brast, occupied, in 1801, the dungeons of Fouché's bastille, the Temple, because, instead of following the interested and arbitrary dictates of Fouché, they obeyed the laws of their country, and the dictates of their consciences. The King's minister of police had all the information that he wanted in civil or political affairs, through the office of the ministers of the home and foreign departments, and he was always obliged to execute their orders or the orders of the King's governors, or commanders. At present, the prefects, generals, commanders, mayors, &c. &c. are forced not only to carry on a direct correspondence with Bonaparte's police minister, but to obey all his orders, without any representation whatever, let them be ever so tyrannical or unjust : the consequence was, that during Fouché's ministry, in the many bastilles of the different departments in France, numbers of innocent citizens, from a likeness of persons or names to Fouché's private enemies, more numerous than, or always confounded with, the enemies of the Republic, have suffered for years in dungeons, however well persuaded the governor or general who arrested them was of their innocence ; because any person who was once confined by the order of Fouché, could only

only be released by an order from Fouché himself, even though acquitted by the tribunals; and the same levity, corruption, and indifference, prevailed at his office, *as to the liberty of individuals*, as in the reign of Robespierre, with respect to their lives; it was therefore not only difficult, but nearly impossible, to obtain such an order of release, without great loss of time and many sacrifices.

The author of this work called, in 1801, sixty-two times at Fouché's office, and was obliged in the end to pay fifty Louis d'ors for the release of his friend, Mr. P. an American, arrested by *mistake, as an accomplice in the escape of Sir Sidney Smith from the Temple, in 1798, although Mr. P. proved that his residence at that time was at Baltimore, in America, and that he never, before the year 1800, had been in Europe.*

But, even without any abuse of authority, Fouché and his successors, by merely following the yet existing revolutionary laws against the liberty and safety of citizens, have more power than any king's minister ever had. Before the Revolution, no man, either a foreigner or a Frenchman, wanted any pass to travel or to reside in France, and no where was any pass ever demanded: a traveller only told his name, or what

name he chose, if he was interrogated, in passing through some fortified cities; and at Paris wrote a name down in the inn where he lodged.

By the present police laws and regulations of Fouché, every person, Frenchman or foreigner, must have a pass, or be exposed to imprisonment, if only three miles from his home or place of residence, should any capricious or tyrannical commissary of police, or even *gens d'armes**, ask for it; and at Paris, as well as in every other city, town, or village, of France, the landlord of the inn to which a traveller goes, is to demand his pass, and copy from it the name, and description of his person, age, &c. which are immediately sent to the commissary of police. If a traveller stays longer than twenty-four hours, he must present himself at the prefecture of the police at Paris, and in all other places to the police commissaries, in order to obtain a permission to reside there; which never is granted, but after answering different questions, as to his business, his ac-

* Gens d'armes, are police horsemen, who are quartered every where in France, and who patrole, day and night, all public roads, and often stop the diligences, coaches, or persons on foot, to inquire after passes. (On the frontiers they are particularly strict. In December 1801, the writer was stopped by them thirty-two times between Metz and Coblenz. Their number amounts to 28,000.

quaintances, &c.; and always his friends are bound to answer for his appearance; or, if a foreigner, the sanction of his consul, or minister, is necessary: and this very permission (or, as it is called, *carte de surêté*, or *carte d'étranger*) to stay any where, contains, in the margin, an order of arrest, should the bearer pass the limits of a city, town, or village: the permission to reside any where is for a fixed number of days, and, when expired, must be renewed. In some places, as at *Marseilles*, in 1800, foreigners were obliged to renew their permission every five days, although they had the security of their consuls; even captains or masters of vessels, who resided on board their ships, were forced to submit to the same slavish and troublesome regulation.

Formerly no public gambling-houses were permitted in France; but after Fouché began to rule the police, the privilege of keeping gambling-houses has been let out as openly and as publicly as the King's ministers farmed out the duties upon salt, tobacco, or wine, to the farmers-general of his revenue. Cards of address to gambling-houses are distributed in all parts of France, in the same manner as quack bills in London. This scandalous and immoral transaction brought into Fouché's pocket upwards of ten thousand pounds

per month. The late prefect at Lyons, Vernignac, learnt, to his cost, how dangerous it was to meddle with this *lawful* income of citizen Fouché; for, having ordered the suppression of all gambling-houses at Lyons, Fouché represented him in such a light to Bonaparte, that he lost the honourable place of prefect, and was sent in disgrace, as minister, to Switzerland; a situation no prefect's secretary would by choice accept, on account of the unsettled state of that country, and the disagreeable and difficult part a French minister had to perform there*.

Besides what the farmers of the gambling-houses paid to Fouché every month, they were obliged to hire and pay 120,000 persons employed in those houses at Paris, and in the provinces, as *croupers*, from half a crown to a half a guinea a day; and these 120,000 persons were all spies for Fouché, without any expence, although he always took care to charge the government the same for them as for 200,000 other spies, whom he employs every where else. To such a de-

* In the autumn 1801, Vernignac lost his place as prefect at Lyons, and in autumn 1802, his employment as a minister in Switzerland; and such is Fouché's influence, that, without any known reason but what has been mentioned, Vernignac is yet in total disgrace.

gree had Fouché carried this detestable practice in France, that he has not only caused his spies to be protected, but also respected. A known spy, who, under the monarchy, was exposed; insulted, and despised every where, is at present, by the free French republicans, not only feared but caressed, since Fouché has honoured them with the title of *agens de police*, or agents of the police*.

Such are at present the general mistrust and want of confidence amongst the French republicans; that there is not a public functionary in France, from the First Consul down to the lowest commissary of police, who has not his private spies. Fouché, however, so long as he was police minister, had most of them under his own immediate control, as much by his bribes as by his power. It was by these means that he, in 1800, gained over Lucien Bonaparte's spies, on his brothers; and on himself, and was enabled to inform the First Consul of all Lucien's plots, crimes, or intrigues, that caused his disgrace, the loss of his

* *La Police de Fouché dévoilée*, Neuchâtel, 1802, page 8. A Swiss officer, the supposed author of this pamphlet, which was seized at Berne, was arrested there by General Ney, and is yet in the Temple, 1803.

place as a minister, and his mission to Spain. It was in the same manner that he detected all the royalist or jacobin conspiracies, and particularly the latter, by gaining over his old protector, Barrere, who, in 1793 and 1794, when one of the members of Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety, employed him, and who, in his turn, under the patronage of Fouché, was, and is yet, the known agent of police, or spy upon the newspaper writers and printers, and upon the jacobins, whose confidence he possesses, although several have paid for it by transportation to Cayenne or Madagascar*.

Ever since the Revolution it has been the constant plan of all the different factions, but particularly of the regicides, to induce government, or the public, indirectly to sanction all their infamous and inhuman deeds. Next to the humiliation of kings, this was one of the principal causes why the late Directors sent regicides to represent the French Republic, as ambassadors to their *loyal friends*, the Kings of Prussia, Spain, and Denmark. It was of course easy for Fouché to persuade the consular government to sanction his *private* plan of public gambling, by directing a na-

* La Police de Fouché dévoilée, page 24.

tional lottery to be drawn five times every ten days, or *decade*; viz. every second day of the decade at Strasburgh; every third at Bourdeaux; every fifth at Paris; every seventh at Brussels; and every ninth day of the decade at Lyons. That the people might lose no time in ruining themselves, besides extra couriers, the telegraphs were employed to announce, in a few hours, the numbers drawn. The writer of this has known at Paris, before twelve o'clock, the numbers drawn at Strasburgh at eight o'clock the same day, and Strasburgh is upwards of 300 miles from Paris. Tickets in these lotteries may be had to any amount, from ten sous (five pence) to a million of livres, or 42,000 pounds. The plan of Fouché was made out in such a manner, that the servant and the master, the chimney-sweeper and the banker, may all enjoy the only liberty and equality existing in France, of ruining themselves. Close by every lottery-office, even in the same house of many, as well as in or near all other gambling-houses in France, reside pawn-brokers; and it is a well known fact, which happens every day, that numbers of the lower class of the people literally strip themselves, in order to procure money to gamble with. To this public gambling is ascribed the great number of murders and suicides.

stated

stated in a report of the minister Chaptal, in the proportion of 192 to 1, compared with former times*.

Modern philosophers, reformers, and innovators, have, for these last fifty years, continually declaimed against emperors, kings, and other sovereign princes, for tolerating and permitting lotteries in their dominions; amongst others, the revolutionary philosopher Mercier, reprobated very strongly the French kings and their ministers, for their *crudelty, in suffering lotteries to be drawn under the French monarchy fifteen times a year*. Since France has become a republic, governed, or rather tyrannized over, by his fellow philosophers and reformers, *lotteries are drawn fifteen times each month*; and the reformer Mercier has accepted of, and still occupies the place of one of the directors of the republican lottery, with a salary of 12,000 livres a year!!!

Before the Revolution, common women were obliged to give in their names, and places of abode, to the police office of the city or town in which they resided, and when sick or disordered, they were taken care of by medical men, paid by go-

* La Police de Fouché dévoilée; pages 27 and 28.

vernment. It is one of the favourite principles of the *disinterested* French republicans and regicides to make money of every thing. Fouché, therefore, ordered that these wretched women all over France must take out, under pain of being flogged or confined to hard labour in the house of correction, what is called *patent d'être-femme publique*, or a license to be a common strumpet or street-walker: this license must be renewed every month, and is paid for at the rate of from five shillings to ten guineas every three decades, or month, according to the age, beauty, or fashion, of the unfortunate person. Besides this contribution to the police minister, each girl paid five shillings a month, whether she was ill or well, to some of Fouché's spies, called by him agents of health to the police, who are to visit them twice in the decade, rather to levy these arbitrary impositions, and to collect information (most of them were, moreover, Fouché's spies), than to inquire into the state of their health*.

Besides the 320,000 registered and paid spies, there is not any person at Paris, or in France, who has a permission from the police necessary

* La Police de Fouché dévoilée, page 31.

to gain his livelihood, but is obliged to be directly or indirectly its spy. Itinerant musicians who paid Fouché twenty pence a day, ballad-singers who paid him ten pence a day, old clothes men who paid him twenty-five pence a day, hackney-coachmen who paid him half a crown a day, peddlers, fruit-sellers, fishwomen, carmen, &c. &c. were all registered at the police, and obliged to send or give their regular reports of what they heard, saw, or observed; and often, when Fouché thought proper, were forced to pass days, even weeks together, in serving him, without any reward. In 1801, Fouché's ordinary spies had, for several weeks, attempted in vain to find out one of the chiefs of the chouans, whom Fouché knew to be concealed at Paris, and who was suspected to have conspired against Bonaparte. One of his spies in the Temple (he had spies every where) heard another arrested chouan say, that this his friend was a great lover of music. No sooner was this fact reported to him, than Fouché put into requisition six of the best music grinders at Paris, who were ordered to play before or in the court-yards of the hotels every day, in every street, by turns; and having given them the description of the person he wanted, they were to observe all persons coming to the windows to look out

out or to listen to the music ; and by these means those musical spies discovered the chouan chief, who has been since transported to Cayenne*.

Before the Revolution there were no more than 64 guard-houses at Paris, and nobody was stopped, either in the day or at night, to give an account of himself : at present there are 162 guard-houses (twenty round the Palais Royal alone, where, in 1789, were only two) ; and, after eleven o'clock at night, all persons are exposed to be asked by the patroles, centinels, or *corps de garde*, for their pass, or citizen's or foreigner's card, and if, without it, must remain prisoners in the watch-house until the next morning, and then are marched from thence, between soldiers, to the prefecture of police, where, if it happens to be a holiday, or a day of much business, they remain confined amongst thieves and murderers for 24 hours, and often three times 24 hours, before they are examined or released, in particular, *if they want money to purchase their liberty*, or powerful friends to claim them†.

Fouché's power, as a consular minister, and a favourite of the Corsican, and the use which he

* La Police de Fouché dévoilé, page 43.

† Ditto, the Preface, page 2.

made of it, deserves to be illustrated by some anecdotes, collected from persons who have suffered from, or been concerned in it.

Bonaparte, having determined to make the situation of the castle of the Thuilleries strong enough, from its situation, to resist any sudden or unexpected attack, ordered, by the advice of some officers of engineers, a number of houses, private and public, in the neighbourhood of the castle, to be demolished. One of the owners of these condemned houses insisted, before any demolition took place, upon having, in ready money, the sum he had himself paid for his house 26 years before. The republican treasury, from the extravagance of the republican rulers, never being overcharged with money, his demand could not be complied with. To cut the business short, the owner of the house was, by a mandate of Fouché, arrested; and upon his appearance before him, was told, "that his name being upon one of the numerous lists of emigrants, he might transport him, or otherwise punish him, as such, and dispose of his property, as belonging to the nation; but in consideration of his age, being near 80, his name should be erased from the fatal list, if he would consent to take for his house an annuity of 2000 livres (or 82l. sterling) a year."

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The old man having children, grand-children, and great grand-children, this offer of the generous Fouché was refused, who therefort sent him without farther ceremony, accompanied by two gens d'armes, as a returned emigrant without permission, to be transported to the other side of the Rhine, although he could prove, that, for the last forty years, he had not once been twenty-four hours out of Paris. At the common prison at Metz, on his way to Germany, Providence put him out of the reach, as well of Fouché as of all other tyrants—the old man died there of a broken heart. Of his house not a stone remains; and not a shilling has been paid for it to his ruined and distressed family *!

When Bonaparte had usurped the supreme power in November 1799, his first occupation, by the advice of Fouché, was to pacify the royalists, or chouans, in the different departments of France. Fouché's intrigues soon embroiled or divided the chiefs; and when they ceased to be united amongst themselves, he gained over the greater number of them, by some momentary

* La Police de Fouché dévoilée, page 16. In the note, it is said the man's name was Derue: the transaction took place in the winter 1800.

pecuniary sacrifices. The common price for a chief who deserted the cause of royalty was 300,000 livres, or about 12,500*l*. Bourmont, D'Autichamp, and some others, received that sum; and it was offered to George and Frotté, but declined by them: however, when Frotté found himself deserted by all the other chiefs, and the greatest part of his army, he proposed to lay down his arms, on condition that he and his friends might enjoy their property, without being obliged to reside in the republic.

The republican commander against Frotté, General Guidal, consented to the terms proposed, and sent Frotté a *safe conduct* for himself, his staff, and followers, to come to Alençon, where General Guidal's head-quarters were, to sign the treaty, and their submission, to the republic. At the time appointed, Frotté and his friends arrived, and from the inn where they lodged, sent word to General Guidal of their arrival, who, by one of his aids-de-camp, invited them all to his house.

General Guidal had regularly informed the French government of the progress of his negotiation with Frotté, and had received its orders to conclude it; but Fouché wrote at the same time to General Guidal, that General Chamberlat, who had arrived at Alençon the day before Frotté was
was

was to surrender himself, was to sign on the part of the French republic, together with Guidal, the peace with these royalists, although the latter continued to keep the command.

General Guidal behaved to Frotté and his followers with great politeness, and was determined strictly to fulfil his agreement with them; but when they were at supper with him, and after six o'clock the next morning had been finally fixed to sign the peace, one of General Chamberlac's aids-de-camp entered the room, and desired some private conversation with Guidal; whom he informed, that Chamberlac had that moment received a courier from Fouché, with orders to arrest, and the next day to try by a military commission, Frotté, and the royalists who accompanied him; and, without waiting for an answer from General Guidal, he ordered twelve grenadiers concealed in the next room, to rush upon the royalists, and to make them prisoners: although General Guidal protested against this treacherous conduct, which implicated his own character, as a commander, and as a man of honour, Frotté and his friends were all murdered by the judges of Fouché, who, to colour his own villany, and the perfidiousness of the French government, ordered his creature, the stupid Chamberlac, to

make a false report of these royalists, as if they had been surprized in a castle in the country, when, in fact, they were taken in the very house of the republican General Guidal, at Alençon, the head-quarters of the republican army; and Frotté had this general's *safe conduct*, or passport, in his pocket.

General Guidal, for his protest and complaints, was ordered on an inferior command to the army of Italy; and Chamberlac, for his treason, was promoted to the rank of a general of division, and appointed commandant of Mentz.

It is true, that Frotté was more beloved by his party, and had greater talents than most of the other royalist chiefs; but this was not the cause of his death; nor yet, as some people believe, a letter, which was published with his name, called, "A Letter from a French Nobleman to the Corsican Usurper, Bonaparte;" but Fouché had bought several estates belonging to Frotté's relatives and friends, which were, according to the plan of a pacification, to be restored to their lawful owners; to prevent this, it was necessary to sacrifice Frotté and his adherents.

These particulars the author heard from General Guidal himself, in May 1801, at Paris, who permitted him to make them public. In the June follow-

Following, this general (who never concealed his abhorrence of Fouché, nor that, although a republican by principle, he preferred, tyrant for tyrant, a Bourbon to a Bonaparte) was ordered to leave Paris in 24 hours, and to retire to an uncle's house near Nice, 600 miles from the capital, under pain of being transported to Madagascar or Cayenne, if he left his place of exile without Fouché's permission.

It is necessary to inform foreigners, particularly English merchants and manufacturers, who may be enticed by French emissaries, or forced by business to go to France, that in the whole republic there is not a house, except the Consul's, which is not exposed to the domiciliary visits of the police minister's agents or spies: under pretext of looking for some suspected persons, or for prohibited or smuggled goods, their dwellings and warehouses are searched, and put under the national seals, in particular, if they are foreigners, and thought to be rich; and when once justice is obtained, if obtained at all, and the seals are removed, they may think themselves fortunate if not more than half of their property has disappeared.

Even during a peace, whatever may be said to the contrary, *no Englishman is safe in France*, nor free from vexation, plunder, and insult; nor will he
be

be so, as long as France remains a republic. It is, indeed, as absurd as ridiculous in foreigners, to expect even a temporary protection, in a country where the *natives* groan under perpetual, vile, and abject slavery and oppression.

As to the safety of commercial speculation, when Fouché, and others of Bonaparte's favourites or ministers, dispose of the laws of their country as they think proper, it depends entirely upon their will, their caprice, or their interest. The following is one of the many examples of this truth:

The exportation of rags from Brabant and Flanders to foreign countries, has always been strictly prohibited; owners of paper-mills, therefore, used regularly to agree with merchants, or collectors of rags, to furnish them with a fixed quantity at a fixed price; and these, in their turn, were accustomed, for years, to deliver their paper to dealers, either in wholesale or retail, at a certain profit. Contracts of this description were made in general for five or ten years. At the moment peace was concluded with England, a house at Ghent, in Flanders, paid one of Fouché's agents twenty-five thousand crowns for the privilege of exporting to England (where rags which sold in Flanders for one guinea, fetched sixteen guineas), during a limited time, a certain quantity of rags.

The

The consequence of this monopolizing privilege was, the rise of the article upwards of 400 per cent. in a month, to the ruin of many, and to the great loss of all concerned in that branch of commerce ; when one single individual, the friend of Fouché, pocketed one hundred thousand crowns for the twenty-five thousand laid out.

Others in the same manner have bought exclusive permission, or patents, either from Fouché or the minister of the home department, to export several prohibited articles, as wool, corn, raw silk, &c. ; and to import foreign productions or manufactured goods, to the detriment of their interdicted fellow-citizens, speculating lawfully at the same time. English merchants, enjoying the blessings of a just and stable government, are the best judges of the effects of such corrupt and impolitic proceedings upon commerce.

In most of the provinces, Fouché's commissaries of police improved upon his plan of *private* and *extraordinary* contributions. In 1801, the regicide Lecointre Puyraveaux, Fouché's commissary for the police at Marseilles and its department, amongst other impositions, laid the bakers of that city under a tax of 30,000 livres, or 1250l. sterling a month ; and to enable them to discharge it, he consented to an advance of the price of bread

bread from three to five sous a pound, when at Paris, and in other places, at that time, the pound of bread was only two sous and an half.

This same Lecointre ordered, in June 1801, his subaltern commissaries of police and the gens d'armes, under pretext of protecting the merchants who visited the fair of Beaucaire (one of the most frequented in France, kept in July every year), not to suffer any person to attend it who was not provided with a pass from him; and this pass cost three livres, or half-a-crown English. In consequence of this arbitrary regulation, Lecointre signed in twelve days 46,000 passes, and put 46,000 half-crowns in his own pocket or private treasury.

In August 1801, Lecointre was offended with some of the merchants at Marseilles, because, in a private dispute between him and La Croix, the prefect of the department, they did not make his cause their own, as he had the impudence to demand. To punish them, and at the same time to shew his power; he invented and decreed a new ordinance, about the exchange hours and transactions; by it all merchant's clerks or sons, except one, were deprived of the permission to frequent the exchange; and Lecointre, or, if prevented, one of his agents or spies, was always
to

to be present to demand the licenses, passes, or cards, of those citizens whom they thought proper to exclude, or suspected to be excluded by Lecointre's regulations; and as it had been stipulated in them, that the exchange hours were to be between the hours of one and three o'clock in the afternoon, every day, a quarter before three o'clock, two drummers entered the exchange, beating their drums, *literally* drumming out the merchants from the exchange. The Author has received the honour of being drummed out in this manner from the exchange at Marseilles upwards of sixty times!

This same Lecointre, the favourite of Fouché, in order to extend his authority, even to the amusements of the people, and to punish the proprietors of the principal theatre at Marseilles, who had refused to raise the price of their tickets of admission in his favour, forced them to shut up the principal place of entrance to the boxes of the first rank, and to build upon that spot a private box large enough to contain twelve persons, for him and his family.

At Marseilles, and in every other city or town in France, the public pay, as it is alledged, to charitable uses from 2d. to 6d. upon each ticket of admission to play-houses, or other public amusements:

ments : this money is always delivered into the hands of the commissaries of police, who, not being subject to any controul, employ it just as they chuse.

Such is the minute catalogue of petty tyranny, and such the indignant triumphs of little villains, flowing from the corrupt fountain of republican grandeur : vexations and plunders, which even a tyrant on a throne has never sanctioned or practised, but peculiar to every people who bear the oppression of a thousand tyrants. The vexations and plunders, indeed, of Fouché and his commissaries were as numerous and various as they were extensive, reaching over all France, Italy, Holland, and Switzerland. On the 15th of August 1801, a commissary of police at Aix, in Provence, at half-past eleven o'clock at night, forced a friend of the Author, with thirty-six other passengers in the same inn with him, to rise suddenly from their beds to shew their passes. During this domiciliary visit, the inn, situated in the suburb of Aix, was surrounded and guarded by fifty gens d'armes. As it was an infraction of the constitution to make any domiciliary visits at night, the landlord was asked the reason of this unlawful measure : the answer was, that this commissary was a protégé and favourite of
Fouché,

Fouché, who regularly visited three or four times in the decade, all the different inns at Aix, not to look for, or arrest any suspected persons, but to lay those passengers under contribution who had no passes, or whose passes were too old, or wanted any of the numerous and oppressive formalities to which all persons travelling in the *free* French republic, are obliged to submit, or else expose themselves to be taken into custody, and transported, as suspected, often without a trial, to Cayenne, St. Domingo, or Madagascar. The landlord added, this commissary did not make it a secret that these tyrannical and unlawful domiciliary visits brought him a yearly income of 1000 Louis d'ors.

Such is the degraded state of public character and public spirit in France, that although every body complained and declaimed against these abominable vexations of Fouché and his agents, no man, nor any body of men, dared to make any formal complaint to the consuls; indeed to complain to Bonaparte of Fouché, was exactly the same thing as to complain to Fouché of Bonaparte.

Amongst other inventions to insult loyalty, to honour disaffection, and to encourage discontentment against lawful governments, Fouché, assisted by Talleyrand, made out, after the peace

of Luneville, a list of all known persons in Europe, statesmen, politicians, and authors, who had either written or spoken for monarchy, morality, religion, or who had published opinions in favour of modern innovations, praised the French Revolution, and extolled its past and present republican rulers. This list begins with the letter A, and finishes with Z, and is a large volume in folio, left with the commissaries of police in all the frontier towns of France. In *the margin* opposite to each name, are instructions for the police commissary how to act towards travellers: if royalists, either to arrest them or affront them; to send them back with insult, or to permit them to continue their way with precaution, accompanied by a spy or a gens d'armes; but, if *fashionable patriots*, to receive them with more or less revolutionary distinction, either by the commandant and the municipality *en masse*, or only to *honour* them by a visit of the police commissary; either to feast them at the expence of the republic in style, or privately by the commissary.

This curious list contains, besides the names of several *foreigners*, those of *state creditors*; they are to be stopped under different pretences, until they lose all patience, and are *by no means permitted to go to Paris*. If they become troublesome, they are to be escorted to the other side of the French frontiers

tiers by gens d'armes, and forbid to return, under pain of being regarded and punished as spies.—Mengaud, the police commissary at Calais, has one of these lists, which explains a part of his late insolent conduct towards different British travellers*.

The people in France having, since the Revolution, seen so many persons of the lowest extraction, and the most vicious habits, not only make great fortunes, but occupy the first places both in the military and in the civil government, there are but few who do not expect the same success, and trust to chance for riches and rank, for favour and preferment, which, in republican France, virtue and merit have never yet obtained. To keep up this spirit of hope and expectation, which naturally checks their inquiry about state affairs, and the conduct of the men at the head of the present government, Fouché has ordered numbers of his spies to become fortune-tellers: most of them have printed answers, agreeable to the age, sex, condition, or appearance of the persons wishing to penetrate into futurity, and foretelling

* La Police de Fouché dévoilé, page 44. The Author has seen one of these lists deposited at the police office at Cologne, and by the names of Pitt, Windham, Grenville, &c. &c. were some very curious instructions, which prove the illiberal, unjust, and cruel characters of Bonaparte and his ministers.

prosperity and success. At the bottom of these printed answers are always some numbers for the lottery, which are called fortunate for the purchasers. This is another interested object of the consular government, to engage the people to gamble in the lotteries*.

The

* The following answer the Author received when, from curiosity, he made an inquiry as to futurity: it is copied *verbatim* with its faults.

SATURNE.

Saturne est la 4me. des 7 planètes.

Les Romains la confondoient avec Januë le premier mois de leur année, cette planète a double domination sur celles de Jupiter et de Vénus, son influence est douce et paisible.

Les signes du Zodiaque qui president au cours de votre vie, joints à la planète de *Saturne*, vous predisent de ne point vous alarmer, si quelques evenement de votre vie n'ont point été tout a fait aussi heureux que vous etiez en droit de l'esperer. Malgré touté l'affabilité de votre caractère, vous n'etes pas sans avoir éprouvé des injustices qui n'ont pas manquer de vous rebuter; peut-etre en ce moment l'inquietude vous domine, mais rassurez vous, votre planète est heureux, et sous peu de tems vous eprouverer un avantage certain, tant du coté du cœur que de la fortune, qui s'apprête à vous tendre les bras; brusquez-la avec hardiesse et vous êtes sur de la fixer. Vous ne l'avez deja echappé plusieurs fois que parceque le moment d'en profiter n'etoit pas encore venu pour vous. Saturne enfin cette planète reconnue pour etre d'une influence douce et paisible, s'apprête a vous preparer par degrés, à la jouissance d'une vie calme et denuée de chagrin.

Par Collignon,

C'est à l'age de maturité que la prosperité vous attende.

P. G. R.

The Boulevards, and all public places and squares at Paris, abound with those fortune-tellers ; and in the provinces, these fellows relieve each other, so that if the credit of one should diminish, another takes his place, to serve Fouché, and to deceive the public : in every city, town, or large village, in France, some of them are always to be found. At Paris, the prices paid.

P. G. R. Vous avez été bien long-temps jeune, et vous avez eu bien de la peine à vous décider à quitter les amis, avec lesquelles vous avez été élevé, mais l'âge ayant muri vos idées, vous vous êtes déterminé à le faire pour votre interet personnel. Avant de vous marier, vous ferez un voyage très lucratif ; mais il faudra bien prendre garde, car plusieurs personnes chercheront à vous surprendre. A votre retour vous epouserez une personne jeune, jolie, et aimable, avec laquelle vous vivrez en très bonne-intelligence : Vous entreprenez le commerce, vous y reussirez au gré de vos desirs : Vous aurez des enfans qui vous donneront beaucoup de satisfaction, sur-tout une fille qui sera votre unique espérance. P. G. La femme que vous aurez. — Déposés à la Bibliothèque Nationale.

Air — Il pleut, Bergère.

Vous aurez femme sage, ,
 Ayant mille agrémens, ,
 Qui fuira le langage, ,
 Des séducteurs amans ;
 Quoiqu'à tort et sans bornes ,
 Jaloux de ses appas, ,
 Vous croirez porter cornes ,
 Vous n'en porterez pas.

Les numeros 22, 74, 81. Par le Citoyen Tenand.

to those attending the most frequented walks or places, are from two to six sous; but in the country, the prices are even less.

Those ambulatory prophets have only the members of the lowest classes of society for their customers; but there are besides, particularly in Paris, at fixed places of abode, frequented by the first people of rank and fashion, several who receive from six livres to a Louis d'or for telling their fortune with cards, in coffee, with dice, &c. they are all registered as spies to the police, and are obliged to pay to Fouché's agents a monthly sum for protection.

Fouché's income, which he has bought or plundered from the national property, is upwards of five hundred thousand livres (or 20,000*l.*) a year; his salary *per fas et nefas*, as a minister of police, nobody knew to a certainty; the general opinion was, that it exceeded three millions of livres (or one hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds), but as long as Fouché occupied this ministry, it was very dangerous in France to speak upon that subject. A young clerk at one of the first banking houses at Paris, had the imprudence, in the spring 1802, to mention at a restaurateur's, "that he was sure the house which he belonged to, had bought up for Fouché, since the peace, upwards of five millions

millions of stock in the foreign funds, under different names." Some few days after this declaration, the young man disappeared; and the ninth day after he had conversed about Fouché's property, his body was found in the river, near St. Cloud; he had been murdered, and thrown into the Seine*.

During Fouché's ministry, 16 royalists were guillotined, 302 were shot, 1660 were transported, 96 died in the Temple and other prisons, and 44 are yet detained state prisoners. Of the jacobins, 9 have been guillotined, 24 shot, for robbing the *diligences*; 120 transported, and 10 confined as state prisoners. Fouché discovered, as a police minister, from June 1799 to November 1802, 32 conspiracies, or pretended conspiracies: he doubled the number of French spies; and the number of criminals punished in 1802 were double the number of those condemned in 1799. In these last four years, from 1799 to 1803, 2502 suicides were committed at Paris, and 3809 in the provinces: 2006 state prisoners have been at the Temple, and 166,009 names of criminals have been entered in the gaolers' books all over France; of these 29,650 have been re-

* La Police de Fouché dévoilé, page 60.

leased or acquitted, 15,051 guillotined or shot, 25,060 have been transported, 36,464 have been condemned to the galleys, and the remainder were still imprisoned in December 1802*.

The jacobins, who, in 1799, forced Talleyrand to resign his place as minister of the foreign department, promoted Fouché to the ministry of the police. After the Revolution effected by Bonaparte in November the same year, Fouché was continued as minister of police, and Talleyrand reassumed his former station. It was, however, not to be supposed, that two such equally vicious and equally cunning men, but whose revolutionary principles were so very opposite, could long agree as ministers in the same councils, without trying to supplant or exclude each other.

By persons about Bonaparte it was easily discovered, from his execrations against the jacobins, or his apprehension of the royalists, whose influence was the greatest, and whose reports were most believed. Talleyrand always insisted that the royalists were not dangerous; whilst Fouché assured him, that the jacobins had neither the means nor the inclination to trouble Bonaparte's government. Until the pretended plot of the jacobin and Cor-

* La Police de Fouché dévoilé, page 69.

sican, Arena, had been forgotten, Talleyrand excluded Fouché for some time from the consular favour; Fouché, in his turn, at the discovery of St. Regent's infernal machine, caused Talleyrand to be both slighted and suspected. Hardly a month passed that it was not expected in the consular circles, that one of these two ministers would be forced to resign.

Talleyrand got, however, so far the better of his rival, that, contrary to the wishes and to the interest of Fouché, a prefect of the police at Paris was nominated; and, what was of more consequence, this prefect of police was one of Talleyrand's creatures. From this step Fouché easily concluded, that the instant he was no longer wanted he would be dismissed, although contrary to Bonaparte's promise; and that to be wanted, it was necessary to keep the Corsican in continual alarm and fear of intrigues, plots, and conspiracies. Twice in every decade, Fouché had orders to present his report of the public opinion, or what was otherwise interesting, and occurred concerning the safety of the First Consul and his government.

Those reports belonged to the *secret police of the interior*, and Bonaparte therefore never shewed them to any body. One day, when his daughter-in-

in-law, Fanny Beauharnois, married to Louis Bonaparte, and a great favourite with the First Consul, observed him much agitated in reading a paper, which, at her approach, he put over the chimney-piece, curiosity, or perhaps the advice of somebody, made her contrive to penetrate into the cause of her father's uneasiness. In playing with him, as she often did, she got hold of this paper, and, to prevent any suspicion, she tore another paper near it to pieces, and threw them through the window, saying, "dear father, I hope you are not angry that I have destroyed the villanous paper which made you so uncomfortable." Bonaparte freely forgave her, when, in presence of her mother, she mentioned what she had done. The paper she had concealed was found to be one of Fouché's reports, instilling fear and suspicion into the Consul's mind, of persons even the nearest and dearest to him. What most surprized Madame Bonaparte was, that Fouché mentioned those informations as extracted from the report made to him by Dubois, the prefect of police.

Madame Bonaparte knew that Dubois owed his place to the protection of Talleyrand, and that Fouché was Talleyrand's enemy; she therefore sent for him, and presented him the report of the police minister. In some few hours Talleyrand informed

informed her that the whole was an invention of Fouché, to make himself necessary, but that he should take care the First Consul should not long continue the dupe of this man.

It is said this report was transmitted to Bonaparte in the morning of the 8th of August, 1802, and that it was in consequence thereof he wrote for the *Moniteur* of the next day, that absurd and virulent philippic against England; Fouché having reported, amongst other falsehoods, "that English travellers in France, and George, and the French chouans residing in England, were closely connected, and conspired with those disaffected persons who were about him."

On the 15th of the same month, Bonaparte's birth-day, Talleyrand had an opportunity to congratulate the First Consul "upon the tranquillity that reigned every where, and the union of all parties under his mild but firm government, which he had heard with so much satisfaction from Dubois, the police prefect, who assured him that, for the last six months, he had not received any intelligence of discontent or disaffection, either amongst foreign or intestine rivals or enemies."

This compliment made Bonaparte thoughtful; and the next morning he ordered Dubois to send to him for the future his police accounts in secret,

cret, and to continue to forward them to Fouché, as was his duty.

These counter-reports proved both the guilt and intentions of Fouché, who some time afterwards was unexpectedly dismissed as a police minister; but this crafty intriguer possessed too many of Bonaparte's political, revolutionary, and *family secrets*, to be entirely disgraced, and he was therefore appointed a senator; a place of little profit, and less importance*.

When the Swiss mock-consulta was put into requisition for Paris, Helvetia, after being enslaved, was insulted, by seeing such a vile man as Fouché one of the consular negotiators, or rather dictators, as to the future constitution of that country; a person who, as an accomplice of those Septemberers who, on the 2d September, 1792, in the Abbey prison, murdered the unfortunate Swiss officers and soldiers who had escaped their fury on the 10th of the preceding August, and whose blood had neither been revenged by their country nor regretted nor bewailed by France.

At his office, Fouché was seldom accessible, if money or women had not prepared the way. He

* The particulars of this intrigue are taken from *Les Nouvelles à la Main*, No. IV. an xi.; and *La Police de Fouché dévoilé*, page 72.

made, during 1800 and 1801, great sums of money by the permissions (*surveillances*) granted to emigrants to return to France: none were sold for less than twenty, and some as high as one hundred Louis d'or^s. In the usual routine of office, he depended entirely upon his *chefs des divisions* and *chefs de bureau*, some of whom had been employed at the police for upwards of thirty years. He was implacable against any one of his inferiors who took any bribes, without sharing them with him. In August 1800, in one decade of Thermidor, he sent four *chefs de bureau*, and ten clerks, only on suspicion, without a trial, to Cayenne. His *secret general police* was under the direction of his secretary Desmarets*, called by the French, *the damned soul of Fouché*. It was he who examined all state prisoners, and amongst others, last summer (1802), the Duke of Bouil-

* Desmarets is about 34 years of age, the son of a breeches-maker at Fontainebleau. By the generosity of an Italian settled in France, he was educated at the college of Harcourt, at Paris. In 1794 he sent his benefactor to the scaffold, and forced his only child, to save her life, to accept him for her husband. He was one of Fouché's associates at Lyons, and in La Vendée. In 1800, he caused his own brother, whose poverty was a reproach to his affluence, to be transported to Cayenne, where he died. He is a tyrant over his wife and family, and keeps a mistress in his own house.—*La Police de Fouché dévoilée*, page 77.

lon. Talleyrand pretends, and with some justice, to have discovered all the plots of the royalists in England, Switzerland, Italy, and Germany, during the last war, and that the arrests and seizures made of most state prisoners, and their papers, originated from the information which the police obtained from the foreign office*.

Future ages may judge of the moral and political principles of all classes of society of the present day, when it is known that persons of rank and fashion, from most countries in Europe, travelling in France, have degraded themselves by dancing attendance at the office, and waiting for hours in the anti-chambers of this Fouché, merely to obtain an audience, and his signature to a *pass*, which enabled them to leave *free* France with safety, and to return to their homes with a broken constitution and a ruined fortune, often after having lost their health with one sex, and their property, loyalty, morals, and religion, with another.

It is to be remembered, that Fouché, in his promotion to the senate, was accompanied by the atheist Röederer, and the christian, or rather consular archbishop of Paris; so that Bonaparte added

* La Police de Fouché dévoilé, page 68.

on the same day to his heterogeneous collection of senators, a regicide, a convicted assassin and thief, a known atheist, a traitor to his accomplices and to his King, and an old respectable priest, who from dotage, being 92 years old, had been persuaded to accept first a revolutionary mitre, and afterwards to dishonour the purple, and scandalize religion, by becoming a Corsican senator.

The office of a minister of the general police in the French Republic, was, after Fouché's promotion, united with that of the grand judge; a chief officer of the Corsican Legion of Honour. Regnier, the person who occupies this place, has, since the Revolution, been, by turns, a jacobin and a terrorist; has carried the red cap, and adored Marat; has been the promoter of revolutionary tyranny, in the name of liberty; has at all times, either as a legislator or a judge, opposed moderate and recommended violent measures*. It is, therefore, to be supposed, that if with Fouché the tyrant of the police was removed, the police tyranny will be continued; and as long as France remains a republic, its police, organized by Fouché, will remain the same, and never suffer either

* Dictionnaire Biographique, tom. iii. page 236.

any change or diminution in its vexations, corruptions, or oppressions.

Fouché is distinguished by an insinuating character, and a certain manner of expressing himself easily and agreeably. He writes and executes with facility, and has a great knowledge, both of the Revolution and of all men who have acted a part in it. He knows their foibles, their passions, and their vices, and how to turn them to the best advantage. As a friar, he was ungrateful and ungenerous; as a deputy of the National Convention, cruel and infamous, enforcing the awful and aggravating even the dreadful; and, as a minister, despotic to his inferiors, treacherous to his equals, and obsequious, submissive, and contemptible, with his superiors. From his present senatorial nullity not much is to be apprehended, were he not still the favourite, and often the counsellor, of Bonaparte.

BARRAS.

IN revolutionary times, in times when royalty is calumniated, humiliated, degraded, and insulted; when rank without power, virtue without riches, and religion without hypocrisy, are exposed to the contempt of the rebel without honour, the rich without generosity, and the hypocrite without a conscience;—in such times, when it is not regarded whether the powerful is guilty, the rich infamous, and the pretender to religion an atheist; when little morality is found in the first classes of society, and less religion amongst the people; when rebellion is not only incited by impunity and encouraged by success, but successful by the weakness or selfishness of princes, by the intrigues of their favourites, the treachery of their ministers, and the ignorance of their counsellors;—in such times, it cannot be uninteresting to read the revolutionary life of one of the revolutionary kings of faction, who, during four years, commanded the destiny of Europe;

who has fraternized with kings, plundered empires, enslaved nations, changed republics into the provinces of princes, and made principalities provinces of a republic.

Many nobles of the first families in France, who were persecuted by their creditors, or dishonoured by their vices; who had no property or character to lose and no honour to preserve, joined with ardour in a revolution, which, from its beginning, promised to level all distinctions between the good and the vicious, the worthy and the worthless. This explains why Viscount De Barras was amongst its first supporters and promoters.

Paul Francois Jean Nicolas Viscount De Barras, was born at Foxemphoux, in Provence, on the 30th June, 1755: he descends from one of the most ancient families in that country. It is a saying there—“*Noble comme les Barras, aussi anciens que les Rochers de Provence.*” At the age of sixteen, he obtained a commission as a sub-lieutenant in the regiment of dragoons of Languedoc, where he soon caused himself to be remarked, not for his talents and application, but for his vices and irregularities. During the reign of the virtuous Louis XVI. nobility was never a protection for the infamous, nor poverty an excuse for baseness.

baseness. Barras having appropriated to himself 100 Louis d'ors belonging to one of his comrades, was publicly degraded, and dismissed with humiliation and disgrace*.

Barras' family was as poor as it was illustrious; and one of its members had, as an opportunity to enrich himself, obtained the very lucrative place of a governor in the Isle of France. Dishonoured in France, Barras was very happy to obtain, by the influence of this relative, a place in the regiment of Pondicherry, chiefly composed of young adventurers, who, like himself, having neither property nor reputation in Europe, went to the Indies, in hope to acquire both. In proceeding to join his regiment, he was wrecked upon a sunken rock near the Maldiva Islands, on the coast of Coromandel. Dangerous as his situation was, he shewed both courage and presence of mind. After many hardships, he at last arrived safely at Pondicherry, where he remained until it was obliged to surrender to the English. He afterwards served on board M. De Suffrein's squadron, and with the French troops at the Cape of Good Hope. When peace was concluded he

* See *Le Théé*, published at Paris, August 1797. After the Revolution of the 4th September, 1797, Barras transported the author to Cayenne.

returned

returned to Europe, where he arrived in 1784, with the rank of a captain-lieutenant, without having either retrieved his character or gained any riches.

Great cities as often conceal the shame of the guilty as the virtues and sufferings of the unfortunate: as often does impudent crime meet there with resources, as modest worth is left in distress. After Barras' return from India, he went to Paris, and there joined the numerous gamesters and debauchees with whom that city abounds: he soon after married a prostitute; kept a gambling-house; became fashionable, and despised; and with a competence was scorned.

In such a situation, the Revolution found Barras, without honour, probity, or character, or even any pretension to either. He was disowned by his parents, slighted by his relatives, and shunned by their acquaintances; the Orleans faction had therefore not much trouble to augment the number of its associates by such an accomplice. Barras was observed amongst the plunderers in the suburb of St. Antoine, in April; amongst the murderers and captors of the Bastille, in July; and amongst the assassins at Versailles, in October 1789.

The alarm which the plots and cruelties of the
Orleans

Orleans faction caused every where in France, and the temporary disgrace of its *nominal* chief, the late infamous Duke of Orleans, made Barras, like many other fashionable patriots, change sides, and become the denouncer and witness against those in whose crimes and confidence he had participated.

After many and tumultuous debates, the National Assembly decreed, that the Tribunal of the Chatelet should try those who were accused, or suspected to be the conspirators against their King and the Royal Family, on the 5th and 6th October, 1789. Barras therefore made his bargain with La Fayette; and having obtained a company in a colonial regiment, he turned evidence against the Duke of Orleans and the Count De Mirabeau, and by his discoveries, these traitors were deeply involved. He finished his deposition with these remarkable words: "*that having, on the 5th October, heard three persons utter horrible things of the King and the Queen, he desired to prove to them the INNOCENCE OF THE KING, but was so ill received, that he was forced to retire, shuddering with horror**." The money of the

* "Qu'ayant entendu, le 5 d'Octobre, trois personnes vomir des horreurs du Roi et de la Reine, il avoit voulu leur prouver L'INNOCENCE

the Orleans, and the intrigues of Mirabeau, caused, however, the intimidated Assembly, and the too good Louis XVI. to bury in oblivion the shocking particulars of this conspiracy.

In 1790, when all loyal officers resigned their commissions, Barras received one in a regiment at the Isle de Bourbon; but anarchy was as great in the colonies at that time as in France; and in expectation of the issue, Barras was permitted to remain at Paris.

That a traitor to his King will easily betray a faction, Barras had already proved; but the Orleans party wanted his revolutionary experience, and therefore overlooked his revolutionary trea-

CEINCE DU ROI, mais qu'ayant été mal reçu, il s'étoit éloigné en FREISSANT D'HORREUR."—Procès du 5 et 6 d'Oct. 1789, page 66.

When two of the judges from the Chatelet demanded an audience of the Queen, to inquire of her what she knew about the plots on the 5th and 6th October 1789, they received this noble and generous answer: "*I have seen every thing, I have known every thing, but I have forgot every thing* (J'ai tout vu, J'ai tout su, mais J'ai tout oublié). It is well known, that if two of the King's *garde du corps* had not stopt the assassins sent by Orleans to murder the Queen, in the morning of the 6th October, by calling out to her to save herself, and sacrificing their own lives to give her time to escape, she would certainly have perished that day. In her journey the same day from Versailles to Paris, the cruel Parisian mob carried the heads of those *two garde du corps*, upon pikes, before the Queen's carriage!!!

chery.

chery. He again shared in their confidence, propagated their principles, plotted against the throne, and undermined the altar. By the influence of the Orleans faction, he was, in August 1792, appointed a juror of the High National Court at Orleans, a tribunal instituted to try all persons suspected to be inimical to the Revolution, and as such proscribed. It was erected by the Constituent Assembly in June 1791, and was the forerunner of Robespierre's Revolutionary Tribunal; but Barras had no time to exercise his honourable function as a revolutionary juror, because the sovereign people at Paris, who had murdered the numerous prisoners confined in the many prisons of that city, after forcing the National Assembly to order the Orleans prisoners to Paris, went to meet them, on their way thither, at Versailles, and there cruelly and basely butchered them.

In September 1792, Barras was elected for the department of the war, a member of the National Convention; an assembly composed of every thing that was vile, infamous, and guilty; but intended to renovate the government of France and to regenerate Frenchmen; to establish a republic upon the ruins of the throne; and republican equality, instead of monarchical liberty; and to change the subjects of a king into free

free citizens of a commonwealth. How it succeeded, we have all witnessed ; and Frenchmen, when they remember what they have suffered these last eleven years, *how they were before, what they meant to be, and what they are*, cannot but curse a Convention, the detestation, disgrace, and reproach of France and of Europe.

In 1790, Barras wished to prove to the calumniators of Louis XVI. *his innocence*. With the accustomed consistency of modern patriots and factious men, he, in 1793, condemned his *innocent* and good King to the death of a criminal, and by it confirmed the historical truth, *that a rebel easily becomes a regicide*.

Degraded nobles and apostate priests have brought forward the most cruel and ungenerous measures, and committed the most disgusting atrocities of the French Revolution. It was in consequence of Barras' and Buleau De Varenne's horrid speeches at the Jacobin Club, that the unfortunate Queen, and the virtuous Madame Elizabeth, ascended the scaffold.

Barras has neither political abilities nor military talents, but he possesses, to a high degree, all the low cunning of the intriguer, with all the indelicacy and impudence of the unprincipled knave ; he therefore, by turns, served and betrayed the Orleans
leans

leans faction, and served and betrayed the Brissot faction; he was, by turns, the accomplice and accuser of Marat, Danton, and Robespierre.

When, in 1793, he observed the popularity of Robespierre to increase, and his cruelties to silence clamour by terror, he insinuated himself into the protection of the younger Robespierre, and prostituted an unfortunate cousin, to change protection into friendship.

After Toulon had surrendered to the English, Barras was sent, with the younger Robespierre and Freron, as a deputy of the National Convention, to organize an army for the recapture of that city. All the violent measures in the south of France, and the permanency of the guillotine at Marseilles, Orange, Avignon, and other places, were the effects of Barras' orders and regulations.

It was during the siege of Toulon, that Barras formed his acquaintance with Bonaparte; and after that city had been evacuated by the enemy, Bonaparte executed the cruel orders of Barras; their victims, the unfortunate inhabitants of Toulon, were murdered *en masse* *.

The

* Upon the faith of a proclamation of Barras, Robespierre, and Freron, offering a pardon to all Toulonese who had served or assisted

The friendships, or rather the connexions of the guilty, are seldom of long duration. In sharing the plunder of the Toulonese, Barras did not observe the equality prevalent in his proclamations, and in the speeches of his fellow-rebels of the National Convention. He and Freron defrauded the younger Robespierre of his part, and were therefore recalled from this patriotic mission.

At his return to Paris, Barras observed, from the conduct of the elder Robespierre, that he was in disgrace, and he knew disgrace with Robespierre was death. He therefore united with Tallien, Bourdon, and several other persons proscribed by Robespierre, who confounding, *as all French rebels have done*, their own safety and interest with the interest and welfare of their country, conspired the destruction of a tyrant who had published his determination to destroy them; and they pretended to have saved France from his bloody tyranny, when they only saved their own lives from his guillotine; for, as long as Barras and his ac-

the English during their occupation of Toulon, and who should assemble on the Grand Place, to give in their names, and take the oath of equality, upwards of 1200 men, women, and children came there together, but they were *all butchered by the grape shots from Bonaparte's cannons*. His report of this patriotic transaction is signed *Brutus Bonaparte, citizen sans culotte*.

complices

complices could share with security in Robespierre's crimes, the honour and safety of their country, and the sufferings of their countrymen, were never thought of, and Robespierre was their idol.

After the death of Robespierre, Barras was a member of the Military and Diplomatic Committees, and of the Committee of Public Safety. Having no talent but audacity, no recommendation but crime, he was not a member of any great influence; and when, in 1795, a Constitutional Committee was decreed, he was excluded from it.

At this period, Barras' only ambition was security, and his only security, he thought, was in a distant mission; he intrigued, therefore, to procure it, and obtained for himself the nomination as a conventional governor of the Isle de France; and for his *worthy* friend Bonaparte, who had the same reasons to leave his country, and to avoid the reproachful eyes of Frenchmen, he procured permission to go to Constantinople, under the protection of the French ambassador, there to offer his services as an officer of artillery.

It is said Cromwell had already embarked, with some other fanatics, for America, but was stopped and prevented from sailing, which consequently was the cause of his subsequent crimes and eleva-

tion. When Barras was ready to set out for L'Orient, and Bonaparte for Marseilles, the indiscreet zeal of the royalists united all guilty men, and the greater their guilt, the greater the confidence their accomplices placed in them. The destination of Barras and Bonaparte was changed; and to this change may truly be ascribed all that Europe has suffered these last eight years, and what it suffers still*.

Barras, like most men who had dishonoured the military service before the Revolution, and who were members of the National Convention, had promoted himself to the rank of a general; but fearing his own inability, when he was offered the command of the conventional troops against the armed Parisian sections, he caused Bonaparte to be appointed general and commander, under his inspection as a national deputy.

The massacre of the Parisians by Bonaparte on the 6th October 1795, made Barras a Director; and it was now for the first time that his ignorance,

* Barras had already received his instructions, and an American vessel was waiting for him at L'Orient. To save Bonaparte his travelling expences, he was trusted with dispatches for the French ambassador at Constantinople, and a Ragusan vessel was hired at Marseilles to carry him there. The imprudent arming of the Parisians changed his destiny, and the destiny of the world.

insolence, and guilt, assumed the pretension of information, and the language of power, without the manners of eminence, or the etiquette of sovereigns. He appropriated to himself all the hunting equipages, all the unsold pictures and furniture of his murdered King; and he insulted foreign sovereigns and independent states, by treating their ambassadors with insolence, contempt, and cruelty, by ordering them to quit France, or by sending them to the Temple. Passion and caprice were his only law of nations; and his equality upon his republican throne, was to endure neither an equal nor a superior.

To all the arrogance of an upstart, and all the cruelty of a rebel, he united the haughtiness of a despot, and the vices of a man highly corrupt. He kept a seraglio of women, but was suspected of other infamous propensities, and was always surrounded by young and debauched men, who owed to him their promotion, when persons of merit, morality, and virtue, were disregarded, neglected, or oppressed; he was therefore accused of crimes as abominable as unnatural; and when, in July 1798, he ordered young Du Bourg, formerly a page to the King, to be shot as an emigrant, it was commonly reported and believed at Paris, that he died a victim to Barras' vile passion.

Barras promoted Bonaparte to be a commander in Italy, in 1796, and made Talleyrand a minister in 1797; and it was by his connexion with, and the assistance of those two traitors, that, on the 4th. September, 1797, he again crushed the hopes of royalty*; procured new success to rebellion, and new respite for regicides and rebels.

Barras, when he shared the throne of France with four other guilty men, under the appellation of Directors, was by turns a jacobin or a royalist, a democrat or an aristocrat—having no principles of his own, the only motive for his conduct was fear, and his only policy was to continue in power, or to be safe when out of power. In 1796 he caused some jacobins to be guillotined; in 1797 he transported some royalists; in 1798 he condemned some aristocrats; and in 1799 he annulled the elections of the democrats chosen for the Council of Five Hundred. At all times, however, he feared and courted the jacobins more than the royalists.

Whilst, in 1799, after the defeats of the republican armies in Italy and Germany, the royalists were organizing themselves in La Vendée, and the jacobins at Paris were preparing their reign of terror, Barras, by the advice of Talleyrand, and

* By the massacre of the Parisians, in October 1795, he had disappointed royalty for the first time.

Sieyès, hastened the return of Bonaparte from Egypt, as the only means of continuing rebellion, and of saving himself and his associates.

It is often more easy, in countries tormented by civil troubles, to get into power with advantage and popularity, than to quit it without risk and detestation. Barras was certainly pleased that Bonaparte, in preference to any other man, should succeed him; but he was not satisfied with Bonaparte's usurping a power to himself alone, which he had been forced to partake with four; and knowing how to estimate the gratitude of the guilty, he was apprehensive that Bonaparte would treat him as he had treated his rival accomplices, and expected death or transportation to follow de-throned usurpation.

After Bonaparte had, with the assistance of his brother Lucien, swindled the Bourbons of their throne and the Directory of its power, Barras sent his secretary Bottot to the Corsican, to know in what manner he intended to act with his revolutionary predecessor. Bonaparte's answer was laconic, and little satisfactory to a man under whose orders he had butchered 1200 Toulonese and 8000 Parisians. "*Tell Barras (said he) that he must know I do not like blood, and that I am not cruel.*" This Corsican message was not very

consol-

consolatory to a trembling traitor; Barras therefore wrote a long letter to Bonaparte, in which he expostulated on their former friendship, and the services he had rendered him. He added, that not depending much upon his life in a revolution where so many had perished, he had deposited in a banker's hands in London, all Bonaparte's former letters to him, besides a memorial, containing the particulars of the origin and the continuance of their acquaintance; how Bonaparte had murdered as a terrorist at Toulon, and assassinated as a republican at Paris; how he married his mistress to gain promotion, and prostituted his wife to obtain a command; how he had transported French soldiers to Egypt, to silence their demands for what was due to their victories in Italy; how he had deserted the remnants of a defeated army entirely confiding in him, at a time it was threatened by inevitable destruction, either from the arms of its enemies or from the diseases of climate; how his poison had murdered those wounded soldiers who had fought his battles, and his bayonets butchered disarmed enemies, trusting to laws of war, of humanity, &c. &c. So long as he lived (continued Barras) these letters and memorial would never be published, but they should appear the instant he was no more. Bonaparte had afterwards an interview with Barras, and settled upon

upon him an annuity of 120,000 livres, on condition not to reside at Paris.

Barras then retired to his estate, Grosbois, near Paris; but Fouché soon found out that he plotted anew with Arena and other jacobins, and he was therefore forced to retire to Brussels, under the inspection of the prefect Douliet des Pont Coulant, another degraded rebel nobleman; but even there he has not escaped the suspicion of Bonaparte, and of his grand judge the minister of police. He has been accused, at the same time, of favouring the schemes of the royalists, of serving the plots of the jacobins, and conspiring to usurp the supreme authority. This last reproach was made against him three years ago (in 1800) by Bonaparte himself, and was repeated again at Brussels, at an interview of a quarter of an hour, the only time he saw Bonaparte during his late stay in Brabant, Bonaparte having ordered four Mamelukes to be quartered in Barras' house, to whose care he had been consigned until the former had left Brussels. This new contempt and tyranny have highly exasperated Barras, who cannot show himself in the streets, without meeting with insults from the mob, encouraged and protected by the police. Bonaparte's object is, no doubt, either to provoke Barras into some indiscreet measures, which

which may afford an opportunity to transport him to the colonies, or to force him to shut himself up a prisoner in his own house, and be indebted for his safety to his obscurity*.

Barras is tall and robust, but not handsome; his complexion is of a yellow hue; and his face has often convulsive movements, or, as Carnot has said, *he continually gnashes his teeth*. When in the Directory, amongst the aukward and ignoble figures of his associates, he was distinguished and admired by strangers, who, if they had seen him in the crowd, would hardly have noticed him. He has no genius, but good sense; and he has shewn some judgment, even in the crimes he has committed, or caused to be committed. He has more activity than information, more ambition than capacity. During the four years he was a director, he influenced the determinations of the Directory more than any of its other members, although he was the most ignorant, and preferred pleasure to business; because they knew him to be more desperate than courageous, and feared his ferocity more than his bravery. All Barras' panegyrists extol *his great courage*; but *no cruel man* can be called *courageous*; and that Barras has always been cruel, even his flat-

* See Journal d'Olivarius, July 1803.

terers cannot deny. On all occasions, when Barras' courage has been put to a trial, he had no choice left between victory and death, and he did by despair what a coward, in his situation, would have done from fear.

As long as Barras was in power, all his biographers were his panegyrists. Since his exile, those who, at the expence of truth, painted, not the man, but the director, want either honour, or have not impartiality enough to correct what was erroneous, or to revoke what was false, in their former characters of this person. This sketch has therefore been thought necessary, not only to prevent our contemporaries from being misled, but to instruct posterity concerning a man who has acted such a conspicuous part upon the revolutionary stage of France and Europe*.

* The former characters of Barras were the productions of revolutionary flatterers or enthusiasts, and chiefly copied from a work called, *Les Cinq Hommes*, or from Dr. Meyer's *Fragmente* of Paris; an author who, as a true philosopher of the French school, although born a German, has alike admired La Fayette and Mirabeau, Brissot and Petion, Marat and Robespierre, Rewbel and Barras, and who is at present the strenuous admirer of the military despot, the Corsican usurper and tyrant, Bonaparte! yet Dr. Meyer pretends to be a republican, and a lover of liberty and equality!!!

Carnot's answer to Barras' accusation against him, printed at Nurembergh, 1798, contains some of the remarks inserted here, but with discretion, as Carnot was Barras' enemy.

ROEDERER,

ROEDERER,

ONE OF BONAPARTE'S SENATORS.

ROEDERER was a counsellor of the parliament at Metz, when, in 1789, he was elected a deputy to the States General. In every part of France, most of those who were chosen members to these states, were before known, either as disaffected or as intriguers, either as encyclopedists, atheists, philosophers, or economists* ; to these last Roederer pretended to belong.

All the plotters against the throne and the altar were enlisted under the banners of one or the other of these very numerous parties and sects, which were speculating, scheming, preaching, and writing, about politics and about religion. In all

* Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, Helvetius, and others, called themselves philosophers, and as such, inserted in the French Encyclopædia their irreligious and anti-social productions ; their adherents were therefore called Encyclopedists.

The late minister of Louis XVI. Turgot, and Dupont De Nemours, were, with Roederer, the most active of the economists, so styled from their absurd schemes of dangerous or impracticable innovations in the political economy of states.

classes

classes of society in France, just before the Revolution, it was as fashionable to be discontented, and to speak in favour of innovation, under the name of reform, as it was ridiculous and dangerous to believe and acknowledge that our ancestors knew as much as we do, and that monarchy is, for the welfare of mankind, the best of governments, and christianity the best and only religion for future felicity, as well as for present policy.

Amongst all these fashionables, Roederer was the most fashionable. Speaking with fluency the language of sophistry, he seduced the ignorant, confirmed the irresolute, and converted the weak ; he bid defiance to shame, morality, and religion : married to a virtuous woman, by whom he had several children, he publicly kept the wife of his private secretary as his mistress, with whom he squandered away the dowry of his wife, the inheritance of his children, and the fortune of his family ; he was, besides, in debt, extravagant, and ambitious, and therefore joined with ardour, from the beginning of the Revolution, those traitors who prepared the way for it.

When the States-General decreed themselves to be a National Assembly, Roederer belonged to the Orleans faction : after the massacre at Ver-

sailles, when this faction became detested, he united himself with La Fayette and his party, to create (what was as absurd as impolitic) a royal democracy.

Röederer was a member of several committees, and one of the advocates and propagators of the dangerous *Rights of Man*: he voted for the destruction of the nobility, for the cessation of privileges, for the sale of the church lands, and for the schism in the religion of his country.

With all that duplicity (the reproach of his countrymen, the people of Lorain), he continued to serve the cause of rebellion, but at the same time to court the favour of royalty by an hypocritical moderation: his speeches were democratical, his conduct equivocal, but his anonymous writings were loyal.

Röederer had too great ambition not to pretend to celebrity, but too great cowardice to aspire to renown as a chief of a party. Any faction which he observed popular, he flattered; and he cajoled its opposers, by presenting plans of reconciliations that he knew could never be accepted, but which were serviceable to him in the several conflicts for power between the several rival rebels, either as a recommendation to notice or an extenuation for deceit.

As

- As an economist, Rœderer had claims to be a member of the Financial Committee, which, in 1790, was the dispenser of assignats and the disposer of the national treasury; but as there were so many more popular rebels of the National Assembly, who, like him, had debts to pay, to his mortification he was excluded.

Rœderer's principal creditors were the Jews at Metz, who, with their sectaries, suffered in France an unjust and odious oppression, both from political prejudice and religious fanaticism. To pay his debts, and to gain new resources for future prodigality, Rœderer did not cease to write and to speak, until the Jews had obtained the privileges and rights of other Frenchmen. For this disinterested, patriotic, and philosophical transaction, he received from the synagogue 1,200,000 livres.

After the return of Louis XVI. from his unfortunate journey to Varennes, Rœderer connected himself more closely with La Fayette, La Methe, Barnave, and other traitors, who, not satisfied with having degraded monarchy, expected to reign in the name of their King, and were then the distributors of all places and pensions.

When, in September 1791, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, the Duke De La Roche-

foucault was elected the president of the department of Paris, called the Upper Seine, and Röederer its *procureur syndic*, or secretary.

Röederer, as well as the other constitutional rebels, had nothing more to hope or to apprehend from a sovereign without power, insulted, and betrayed; but he had every thing to fear from the revolutionary progeny, the jacobins, who, in their turn, wished to be powerful and rich. In November 1791, the Duke De La Rochefoucault, and Röederer, intrigued, in vain, to exclude the jacobin Petion from the mayoralty at Paris. This ill success proved to Röederer the necessity of inventing some new means to please the jacobins, without losing his place or offending his party; he therefore insinuated himself into the friendship of Petion, by disclosing to him a part of the deliberations of the department, entirely composed of his enemies.

At this period, Röederer spoke publicly in favour of constitutional monarchy; but he wrote secretly with Condorcet and Brissot, on the advantage of establishing a republic. In his official writings he denounced the jacobins as rebels and conspirators; but in his private publications he praised them as patriots, and extolled them as philanthropists.

It

It was the policy, as well as the interest, of many men of abilities in the National Assembly, to have a newspaper of their own manufactory, or to be the editors of some well accredited paper. Mirabeau had his *Journal de Provence*; Brissot his *Patriot Français*, and Condorcet his *Chronique de Paris*: Roederer therefore was engaged in conducting the *Journal de Paris*, the only daily paper before the Revolution: he expected to make it the official gazette of the constitutional royalists; but in wishing to content all parties, he offended the factious of all factions, to the ruin of thirty families, proprietors of this most ancient French newspaper. The presses of the *Journal de Paris* were seized and confiscated by Marat's band, after the 10th of August, 1792, and again by the jacobin faction of the Directory, after the 4th September, 1797; and from being only the editor, Roederer, by many infamous intrigues, has since become the sole proprietor of this paper, for which he paid no more than what was the profit of a single week in 1789.

The constitution of 1791 was no sooner accepted by the King, than it was undermined by the rebellious jacobins; and a king without nobles, and a monarchy of equality, were easily changed into a republic of brigands, and an anar-

chy of assassins and plunderers. The first attack against the ruins of the throne, on the 20th June, 1792, did not, however, succeed, and the chief conspirator, Petion, was, by the department of Paris, censured for his conduct, and suspended for his negligence, from his functions as mayor of that city. Roederer, as a secretary, had concurred in, and signed this censure and suspense; but, with his usual perfidiousness, he dissuaded the King from sanctioning it; and Petion continued to conspire with impunity.

On that fatal day, the 10th of August, 1792, Roederer, as a public functionary, was at the castle of the Thuilleries, and, in the name of the constitution, *ordered the Swiss and the National Guard to repel force by force, attack by attack*; but no sooner did the insurgents, with the Mar-seillois, present themselves, than he entreated Louis XVI. with his family, to seek for safety in the National Assembly; and in accompanying the King, he left the Swiss guards and the royalists to their cruel fate; it is well known, most of them perished.

At this time the Prussians and the emigrants were advancing towards Paris, and the issue of the French rebellion was yet in suspense and uncertainty. The probability, however, was, that order
and

and monarchy would be restored ; Röderer therefore wrote to the French Princes, and told the royalists at Paris, *that his advice to the King, to put himself under the protection of the National Assembly, had preserved his life and the lives of all the members of the royal family.* After the retreat of the Prussians, and the victory of Dumourier, Röderer told the jacobins, *that they were indebted to this same advice for their easy victory on the 10th of August, for France being a republic, and for having Louis XVI. and his family in their power, whom, by the bye, he recommended them to dispatch as soon as possible*.*

But the jacobins were not so easily duped and satisfied as the royalists ; several of them denounced and accused Röderer of having ordered the Swiss to fire upon the sovereign people, and Röderer was ordered to be arrested ; he escaped, however, imprisonment and death by concealment ; but all his effects and papers were laid under the national seal, and sequestered.

In 1794, after the death of Robespierre, Röderer presented himself again upon the revolutionary stage, and pretended to honours for his late proscription, and to confidence for his past patriotism. In the *Journal de Paris* he published several sketches on the happiness under a republican

* Recueil d'Anecdotes, page 462.

government; but at the same period he circulated several writings, to prove the impossibility of a great and vicious nation being quiet and happy as a republic.

In the later years of the reign of Louis XVI. Roederer had already shewn pretensions to a place in the ministry. After the Directory had, in October 1795, usurped the throne of Louis XVII. he again began to intrigue to be a minister of the home department; but the votes of Rewbel, Barras, and Carnot, excluded him from a place to which he was proposed by the Director La Tourneur.

To revenge himself, Roederer made his *Journal de Paris* a vehicle of abuse and ridicule against the Directory; but to save himself from their vengeance, his nephew passed for, and was nominated the editor; and when, after the revolution of the 4th September, 1797, the jacobin faction of the Directory transported most of the editors of newspapers, Roederer's nephew was sent to Cayenne (where he died) for what his uncle had the cowardly infamy to force him to publish*.

Roederer was, however, ordered to be arrested, but, by a new concealment, escaped for the second time the fury and punishment of faction. By some pecuniary sacrifices in 1798, his arrest was

* Secret Anecdotes concerning the 18th Fructidor, by De La Revas, page 93, in the Note.

annulled;

annulled; and until the return of Bonaparte, Roederer principally occupied himself in anti-christian lectures at the republican Lyceum, and by speculating in purchases of national property. For two years purchase he bought, and still possesses the numerous forges in the countries of Luxembourg and Metz; and for 12,000 livres in cash, he purchased an abbey, of which the buildings alone cost upwards of one million of livres.

Some persons imagined now, that avarice had got the better of his ambition, and that he preferred obscurity and safety to power and trouble; but when Bonaparte wanted to unite all the different rebels of all the different rebel factions, all traitors either to their king or to their accomplices, Roederer presented himself, and was created a president in the section of interior of the Council of State, as a reward for the assistance he, with Talleyrand and Volney, had lent Bonaparte in the overthrow of the Directory.

In proportion as the fortune of Bonaparte strengthened his usurpation, Roederer became his humble valet, under pretence of being an absolute favourite and a necessary counsellor: whatever measures Bonaparte proposed, even the most tyrannical, absurd, and contradictory, Roederer approved or improved: his conduct was so base, that

that he was the scorn and contempt even of Bonaparte's contemptible Council of State.

When, in the autumn 1800, Lucien Bonaparte was disgraced, and resigned the ministry of the home department, Röderer intrigued to be his successor; but Talleyrand interfered, and, either through jealousy or fear, pointed out to Bonaparte the danger of trusting this place to a man who, in his present situation, had never conferred a place, in his gift, upon talents, but upon ignorant relations, or vicious sycophants, in reward for the prostitution of their wives, sisters, or daughters.

In 1801, Röderer was sent as a pro-consul to his native country, and to several departments in the neighbourhood, to organize the different prefectures: he here made a parade of his luxury, of his profligacy, and of his consequence; he had his levees at Metz, as Bonaparte had his at Paris; and no petitions were received, or if received, attended to; except those presented by vicious beauty to vice in power, or accompanied by presents to his son, and to his nephew Gentil, who were his confidential secretaries.

On Röderer's return to Paris, Bonaparte made his son a secretary to the legation at Amiens, with a pro-

a promise of being continued in the same place with the French ambassador in England.

Fouché, as well as Röderer, had felt the effect of Talleyrand's exclusive influence with Bonaparte, and they therefore agreed to plot his ruin. Talleyrand, however, not only discovered their plan, but turned it against themselves; as the first proof of his revenge, he prevented the promised appointment of young Röderer; and some time after, he caused both Fouché and Röderer to be sent in disgrace to the Senate; well knowing that senatorial nullity would be a severe punishment to intriguing activity and to active intriguers. Here probably Röderer's revolutionary fortune will rest, until some new revolution shall either proscribe him again, or change a Corsican senator into the counsellor or confident of some of the successors of the Corsican.

There are, however, yet some traits in Röderer's conduct and character which deserve notice, because they well paint the man.

In 1791, Röderer did every thing in his power to expose the parliament of Metz, of which he was a member, to the censure of the National Assembly, or to imprisonment and to a trial at the great national court at Orleans, and that at a period when prison, trial, and death, were synonymous.

In

In 1801, he wrote a long dissertation on the necessity of unanimity in all public and civil bodies; and that a counsellor of state who calumniated his comrades, or exposed their defects, was as guilty as one who betrayed the secrets of the state, or who plotted against his country.

In 1790, he created a jacobin club at Metz, *as the best support of a constitutional government*; and he wrote in the *Journal de Paris*, that it was impossible to fix the limits between the liberty and the licentiousness of the press; *that the latter destroyed the utility of the former.*

In March 1796, when all clubs were interdicted, and the liberty of the press was permitted, he wrote in the same Journal, *that clubs were only useful against a government which one wished to overturn, but dangerous to a government which one wished to preserve; that clubs make men and undo things; whilst the liberty of the press is necessary, both for the preservation of men and of things; the protector of governors as well as of the governed*.*

In 1792, the Swiss citizens of the King's guard were, by his treachery, sacrificed and butchered. In 1802, after many intrigues, he was made one of the French negotiators, who imposed upon the deputies from Switzerland its present Corsican constitution.

* Les Nouvelles à la Main, Germinal an ix. No. VI.

Rœderer was at all times an enemy to the Christian religion: *his writings, for years, went to ridicule all religions, and, in particular, the idea of a religion of state.* In 1802, he published an elaborate speech, *proving the absolute necessity of a religion, and the great usefulness of an established, or state religion.*

In his justification to the jacobins, printed in 1792, he declared himself to have been always *a friend to equality, without which, he knew no liberty could subsist.* In 1802, he called the friends of equality, dreamers, fools, or rogues; and he said, *where equality was proclaimed, liberty was always annihilated*.*

Amongst the Corsican slaves, Rœderer is one of the greatest anti-Anglomans: he proposed in the Council of State, in 1800, to erect into a system of education, and to inculcate in lessons to all French youth, hatred to England, and the necessity of its ruin for the welfare of the universe. England is particularly honoured with the detestation of all French rebels; and the more numerous their crimes, and the greater their apprehension for the return of order, the more violent their enmity to Great Britain, and the more ardent their wishes for its destruction.

Rœderer, faithful to the double character of

* See Journal de Paris, October 15, 1792, and March 8, 1802.

pretension and perfidy, of insolence and meanness, praises now a consular republic, as he did formerly a constitutional monarchy. He is a sycophant to Bonaparte, as he has already been to La Fayette, Petion, Robespierre, and Barras. Vain without honour, proud without dignity, and ambitious without courage, he prostrates himself before the idol of the day, if either a legal king or a Corsican usurper, either a prince or a regicide: they are the same to him, provided he only cringes, has a place, and is noticed.

CHASSEBŒUF DE VOLNEY,**ONE OF BONAPARTE'S SENATORS.**

THE enthusiasm of the French, since the Revolution, for the institutions of the ancients, was at first ridiculous and foolish, afterwards dangerous and fatal. They have by turns exhibited an extravagant admiration for unmanageable democracies, for a savage anarchy, for badly organized aristocracies, for very imperfect legislations, and for a tyrannical consulate, totally incompatible with their customs and morality, the extent of their territory, the great progress in their civilization, and their wish for a rational liberty. They have foolishly shewed the most violent passions for sentiments always exaggerated, often ferocious; for pretended public virtues, which smothered or suppressed all private and domestic comfort; for fanatics, who to a chimerical liberty sacrificed their brothers, their children, their fathers; the security of their fellow-citizens, and the liberty of the world; forgetting it would be better to be less free, and more humane and

just ; to have less share in the sovereignty, and a greater portion of happiness and tranquillity ; to be a loyal subject of a lawful king, rather than the degraded slave of an usurper. M. De Volney, by his writings and by his example, has contributed his part to what has been either frivolous or cruel, hazardous or degrading, in the transactions of his countrymen, for these last fifteen years.

M. De Volney was one of the few men of any real property, who joined with ardour in a revolution which has often proscribed the proprietors, and always made their possessions unsafe. Elected for the Senechal of Anjou a member of the States-General, afterwards called the National Assembly, he arrived there with a literary reputation, which was not improved, but rather diminished, from his want of oratorical talents, and of a liberal and political conduct.

M. De Volney, before the Revolution, had property, but no rank ; abilities, but no patron ; no religion, but great presumption. He intrigued in vain, to obtain promotion, either in the church, in the army, or in the state ; and, in revenge, he assisted to trouble the state, disorganize the army, and to destroy the church. Under a pretence of unveiling priestcraft and ridiculing superstition,

persition, of exposing the horrors of tyranny and proving the blessings of liberty, he has sacrilegiously calumniated the religion of his country, reviled its hereditary monarchical government, and at last, after the sufferings and wretchedness of his countrymen for years, and after the sacrifices of millions of lives, he has, with other atheists and propagators of equality, been forced to submit to a consular tyranny, both dishonourable and oppressive.

Whilst a member of the National Assembly, he always joined with the most violent party; and he voted for the most outrageous and ungenerous measures against the nobility and the clergy. In August and September 1789, he often ascended the tribune, to hasten the judgment and condemnation of Baron De Bezenwal, a Swiss general officer in the French service, who, for doing his duty, in obeying the orders of the King's ministers, had with difficulty been saved from the then fashionable lantern of the revolutionary Parisian brigands; and, contrary to the treaties and capitulations between France and Switzerland, was in a prison, waiting for a trial by a civil court of justice, for what belonged only to the cognizance or inquiry of a military council.

In all his speeches, during the different debates

about a plan for a new constitution, M. De Volney, with the greatest tenderness, spoke for, and defended the absurd and imaginary sovereignty of the sovereign people. On one occasion (February 1791), *he called the attempt to invade or to divide its power and rights, a regicide suicide*; and at another time (May 1791), he said, in a moment of revolutionary enthusiasm, *that a traitor to the sovereign people, was a monster, outlawed by the laws of Nature, of God, and of Man, whom every body has a right (no! it was every body's duty) to pursue, every nation ought to proscribe, and who had to expect no safety upon earth, and no rest in heaven.* This is only mentioned as a specimen of his eloquence, and as a proof of his principles, at this period of the French Revolution.

When any question was discussed concerning the power and privilege of the executive government of France, he often declared himself against the royal prerogative and the King's authority. In May 1790, during the deliberations about the right of declaring war, or of concluding treaties of peace, he strenuously maintained, that the King should not only be deprived of the power to declare offensive wars, but even prevented by the constitution to act on the defensive, if attacked, without the consent and approbation.

bation of the national representatives, to *whom* alone he would have trusted and confided all negotiations about treaties, either political or commercial, either offensive or defensive alliances.

With warmth and activity M. De Volney proceeded to have the plunder of the clergy, and the confiscation and the sale of the church-lands, decreed. He, with many other anti-christian members of the Constituent Assembly, wished first to beggar and ruin the christian clergymen, before they proscribed them and their religion. Their plan was too well contrived not to succeed: and for eleven years, or from 1789 to 1800, plunder and proscription, proscription and plunder, have continued to succeed each other, and have been the sole rewards in France, both for the preachers of the gospel and for the worshippers of Christ. According to Camille Jourdan's report in the Council of Five Hundred (May 1797), no less than 19,000 priests, friars, and nuns, had THEN perished since 1789, in the prisons, in exile, and on the scaffold; and, according to the report of Portalis in the Council of State, in April 1802, since 1797, the Directory had, *without any trial*, sent 800 priests to Cayenne, where most of those who survived the ill-treatment during their voyage, were exposed to certain.

certain death, from want, from disease, and from the effects of an unhealthy climate; and when Bonaparte recalled these victims of revolutionary intolerance, only 62 were alive of the 800 transported; and of these 62, only 44 arrived in France. It cannot be supposed that M. De Volney, had he foreseen the misery and the sufferings of this class of his countrymen, would have been cruel enough to bring about measures, the consequence of which he did not know, although he might easily have conjectured, from the characters of his associates, and their avowed principles, that the lives of their fellow-citizens were of little value to them, as they highly esteemed, envied, and coveted their property. In all his declamations against priests, he laid it down as a rule, that they could only be divided into two classes, *religious hypocrites and religious fanatics*: nobody accused M. De Volney of being a revolutionary hypocrite; but when, on all occasions, he shewed himself the personal enemy of the old, virtuous, and respectable Archbishop of Paris, M. De Juignie, whom his enmity at last forced to emigrate, even the less liberal of his adherents declared that they despised him as a revolutionary fanatic, and more dangerous than a religious one.

In August 1791, he presented (and did homage)

to.

to the National Assembly his lately published work, called *The Ruins: or Meditations on the Revolutions of Empires*. In this work, as well as in all his former or later publications, in his Voyages as in his Historical Lectures, he either directly or indirectly attacks the christian religion; and, as a great writer has observed, in them *subtily furnishes arms to impudence, and invention leads on credulity*. A pretended philosopher, he affects to meditate on, and to describe the ruins of former empires, at the same time that he, as a real conspirator, assists in bringing about the ruin of his own country, that he may, as Abbé Maury said (September 1791), in another volume add a pathetic and true picture of the ruins of the French empire.

After the return of Louis XVI. from Varennes, and his temporary suspension from the royal authority, M. De Volney united with the determined republicans, Condorcet, Brissot, Petion, and Robespierre, and tried with them to change the suspension of the King into a change of the government; he differed, however, with these men as to the executive power, which he desired to entrust to an hereditary president, and to make this presidency hereditary in the Orleans branch of the Bourbon family. In a pamphlet printed about this time, and supposed to come from the
pen

pen of the Marquis De Clermont De Tonnere (called M. De Volney demasqué), it is said, amongst other severe reproaches, "*that he intended to degrade monarchy, by making a president a monarch, and to elevate insupportable republics, by decreeing them hereditary monarchies; that he expected to be the first president's first minister, and to govern a republic impossible to be governed, and from the tail of the Orleans faction, ascend to head the presidency of the Orleans.*"

Within two months after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, M. De Volney thought himself forgot, or at least confounded amongst the many guilty and nameless men, who with him had brought about the Revolution. To make France and Europe again converse as well of De Volney the patriot as of De Volney the author, he picked up a matter both ridiculous and impertinent. Voltaire, and other philosophers of his school, had made it as fashionable as it was advantageous, to court the Empress of Russia, Catharine II. by dedications of their works, and to flatter her literary vanity, by praising her great literary abilities. In 1787, he presented to the Russian ambassador at Paris, for his sovereign, a work, called *Mm Voyage*, accompanied with a letter, as absurd as servile, demanding *the favour of*
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the protection, and the honour of the protection, from such a great and competent judge, the FEMALE SOLOMON of the North. In return, the Empress ordered her ambassador to present M. De Volney with the usual gold medallion, with which she rewarded most men of letters who sent to her the productions of their genius. After Louis XVI. had been arrested at Varennes, the Empress had recalled her ambassador in France; and when the King had been *forced* to accept the constitution of 1791, and notified this acceptance, and his desire to continue the former ties of amity and alliance with Russia, by sending an ambassador, the Empress declined the latter, because she knew that the King had not been free to accept or refuse the former. More from a hope of being noticed than the zeal of patriotism, M. De Volney had, on the 4th December, 1791, the impudence to write to Baron De Grimm, the Russian chargé d'affaires at Paris, and to return the medallion. This letter, where he says *that a citizen of regenerated* (he should have said *revolted*) *France could not retain any thing coming from an enemy of the French Revolution,* is remarkable through the whole for a style as unbecoming as contradictory to that of his letter in 1787. It was answered by a very able and spirited writer, who signed himself Petroskoy,

troskoy, and M. De Volney was held up to just and well deserved contempt. He had, besides, soon reason to regret the publicity he gave to his factious ambition and to his factitious patriotism, because, when the jacobins exalted his disinterestedness, the royalists found out, and published as a proof of it, *that within a fortnight after he had returned a gold medallion worth 20 Louis, he bought a national estate for 20,000 livres, worth at least 200,000 livres.*

The modern philosopher J. J. Rousseau had been invited by the Corsicans, during their civil wars, to come and reside amongst them, and to prepare for them a republican constitution, which should make them alike free and happy. Rousseau, in his letters to the Marshal Lord Keith, at Neuchatel, says, *that he had accepted of this offer, because the Corsicans were a new people as to their civilization, without the prejudices and vices of other European nations* (Rousseau did not remember that this *new people* were known to ancient Rome, both for their vices and treachery, so much so, that the Romans would not have a Corsican even for a slave). However, Rousseau changed his opinion of going to Corsica. What he had said about this *new people*, made a great impression on the minds of many young zealots who have read his
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dangerous works; amongst others, M. de Volney was no sooner of age, and could dispose of his patrimony, than he went to settle amongst this *new people*. In buying large estates there, he was imposed upon, and in resenting the imposition, he was threatened with the stilettos of the impostors; to save his life, he was, therefore, in 1786, obliged to dispose of his Corsican property at a great loss, and he left Corsica in disgust, and, as he has often said, with an abhorrence of these infamous islanders. He was now cured of his romantic ideas about happiness, *a la Rousseau*, amongst this *new people*; but it did not prevent him, as has already been observed, from trying upon his own countrymen, and in his own country, the absurd theories, or rather reveries of Rousseau, the fallacy of which he had so recently experienced.

The danger that in 1792 accompanied an anarchy in France, brought about by M. de Volney and his associates, obliged him to seek a refuge in America. By this prudent step he saved his life, and at the same time had an opportunity of experiencing the comfort of a republican government. That his residence in that country was not very agreeable to him, is evident from his sudden return to France, as soon as the activity of

Robespierre's guillotine had ceased ; and from the contempt and ridicule with which he honours the *new people* of America, who, he says, surpass as much the Corsicans in rudeness, and in inhospitality, as the Corsicans surpass them in cruelty and treachery. The modern reformers and innovators are rather too nice, or too presuming, in demanding perfection in a world where nothing is perfect ; instead of judging their books from what they see of society, they judge society after their books, and meet with disappointments where they could never expect success.

In October 1794, M. de Volney landed again in France, where he found ruins, *nothing but ruins*, the effects of his favourite Revolution that had regenerated France. In a letter to General Washington, of the 15th Vendemiaire, year iii. or 8th October, 1794, he says, "*I have only been absent from my country two years, and I hardly know it again : two centuries have not made so great and cruel changes in other devastated countries, as these last two years have made in France. I see every where ruins, and nothing but ruins : our throne, our altars, our cities, our villages, our castles and our cottages, are all in ruins : our ci-devant nobility and clergy, our magistrates, our merchants and manufacturers, are all ruined.*"

After

After such a confession, it is hardly possible that the virtuous Washington could any longer esteem the reforming philosopher De Volney.

In November the same year, he was nominated Teacher and Professor of History in the Normal Schools at Paris: being a very indifferent orator, his historical lectures were little frequented, and, after he had printed them, less read. In 1796 he was chosen a member of the National Institute; but he continued, however, to an ambitious mind, in a tormenting oblivion, until the Revolution of the 18th Brumaire, or 9th November, 1799. According to the advice of Sieyès, Bonaparte determined to employ all men of talents of the Constituent Assembly, and Volney was one of the first whom he sent for and consulted. In December the same year, he was appointed a member of the Conservative Senate, after he had in vain intrigued and wished to be one of the consuls.

Since 1789 M. De Volney has much changed his revolutionary and political principles; he is no longer an advocate either for the sovereignty of the people, or for the rights of man; but his hatred against the Christian religion is always the same. When Bonaparte, in April 1802, caused the Concordat for re-establishing the Christian

religion to be proclaimed, he demanded an audience; and strongly remonstrated *against this Farce*, as he called it. M. De Volney had, since 1799, been rather a favourite with Bonaparte, and his remonstrance therefore received no rebuke; the Consul only told his senator, *that a 99-100th part of the French people desired the return of religion.* That may be true, answered M. De Volney; but it is also true, "*that 99 $\frac{1}{2}$ -100th part of Frenchmen sigh and pray for the return of the Bourbons.*" Since that time Bonaparte has seldom noticed him, and he continues, in revenge for this neglect, to write in the newspaper, *Le Citoyen Français*, sarcasms against the clergy, and abuse against religion.

M. De Volney affects rudeness, frankness, and a blunt conduct: his friends say, that this is his natural character; but his enemies accuse him of imitating the ancients only through affectation, and the desire of being distinguished; they say that he wishes to convert a passionate character into a blunt one, and to disguise the want of feelings by an unfeeling frankness. He certainly possesses a great deal of information, but no profound knowledge, nor a correct and penetrating judgment. He writes with facility, but he abuses this facility in all his writings. Like most of his countrymen,
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he has a great presumption of his own abilities, and a high opinion of his literary, political, and revolutionary merit; but as in all his writings he eternally attacks and calumniates the Christian religion;—and where there is no religion, there can be no virtue, and where no virtue, no happiness;—all loyal men suspect that his senatorial toga covers neither a religious, a virtuous nor a happy man.

GENERAL PICHEGRU.

THAT offspring of rebellion, the French Republic, was from its cradle, and is yet, surrounded by murderers and plunderers, and governed by men whose policy is to dare every thing, and whose religion consists in respecting nothing, either sacred, eminent, or illustrious; who, in the name of liberty, plot the slavery of the world, and in holding out equality, meditate the wretchedness and ruin of the universe: their fraternity is destruction, their commands blood, their alliance infamy, and their reward proscription or death. Every man who is not an accomplice, is regarded as an enemy, and punished as a traitor or a rebel. With them guilt is merit, and merit guilt; and it is as dangerous to be innocent, as it is a recommendation to power, and advancement to be criminal or corrupt.

General Pichegru is a revolutionary phenomenon: he has passed through the blood and mire of the Revolution, without contracting a soil, and has obtained renown, and deserved the esteem of the good and the loyal, although he has obeyed the orders of regicides, and fought the battles of repub-

republican tyrants, more dangerous, as well as more numerous, than all other despotic rulers.

Under moral governments, where the law punishes the vicious, and justice recompenses and promotes the deserving, it is a duty, it is the interest of all, to be virtuous and loyal. Under republican France, poverty and contempt, prison, exile, and the scaffold, await loyalty; whilst riches, honours, distinction, and a throne, are the pleasing prospectives for the accomplices of a rebellion, encouraged and sanctioned by success, approved or applauded by Frenchmen, and respected by foreigners. In this age of egotism, intrigue, and ambition, only to hesitate in the choice, is goodness; but to choose the former and to decline the latter, is a greatness seldom met with, and therefore so much the more praiseworthy. The particulars of General Pichegru's public and military life, will prove that such an eminent character exists.

Pichegru, late a general in the French Republic, was born in 1761, at Arbois, in the province of Franche Comté, of obscure and poor, but honest parents. He began his first studies at the college at Arbois, and continued and improved them in the same town, at the convent of the monks of the order called Minims. Shewing a
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great aptness, and a decided taste for the abstruse sciences, these monks persuaded him to teach philosophy and mathematics in a college of their order at Brienne.

Innovators and declaimers against Christianity and its religious institutions, have forgotten that Europe is indebted to the so much blamed and ridiculed, solitary and devout inhabitants of monasteries, for the preservation of sciences during the barbarous centuries of the middle age, for the cultivation of them in the succeeding ones, and for the progressive success they have made within the last three centuries. Erasmus, Bacon, and Mallebranche, were friars; and Corneille, Descartes, Racine, and Voltaire, were educated by friars, as well as a Richelieu, a Mazarin, a Turenne, a Condé, and an Eugene: Pichegru Moreau, Kleber, Desaix, and Bonaparte, the five best republican generals, amongst the thousand others who have figured since the Revolution, had friars for their instructors. What those guides and teachers of youth have effected, we all know; but time alone can evince what France has gained, by changing Christian colleges into republican *pritanées**, and by creating atheistical philosophers the successors of christian priests.

* *Pritanées* are the republican public schools in France, so called after the ancient Grecian *Pritanées*.

Pichegru, in teaching the sciences to others, completed his own studies and information. As no man, and no class of men, are without their foibles, to augment the number of their own order, with subjects of genius and virtue, was the constant endeavour of the fathers of the Minim order. Pichegru was strongly entreated by them to begin his noviciate, and become one of their community ; but having a natural inclination for a military life, he enlisted, in 1779, in the first regiment of artillery. His officers soon observed the unusual knowledge and valuable dispositions of their recruit, and within six months he was nominated a serjeant. In 1780, he was, with a division of the regiment to which he belonged, embarked for America ; and during the last three years of that war, he had an opportunity to profit from his vast learning, by practising what he knew from theory. His disposition to study, to improvement, and to labour, procured him many occasions to observe with advantage every thing connected with a maritime war, and much enlarge his own ideas by useful comparisons.

In 1789, Pichegru had the rank of an adjutant in his regiment, and was on the eve of being promoted to the rank of an officer ; and indeed several years before this period, Pichegru had
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been honoured with the confidence of his colonel, and was entrusted with all the particular transactions and management of this regiment, both military and economical, and may therefore be said to have been its real chief; his reputation was then so well known and established, that the royalists wished him to emigrate, and the democrats promoted him, as an encouragement to serve the cause of the Revolution.

Pichegru believed, with many others, that the post of honour was the post of danger, and that the post of danger for all loyal men, was where loyalty was proscribed, and probity and virtue butchered or sent to the scaffold: that these were his sentiments in 1789, the whole conduct of his life proves.

When other revolutionary generals, as a Jourdan, a Hoche, a Vandamme, a Leibeau, and an Anselme, by intrigues or bloody deeds, ascended to the rank of generals, in one leap from common soldiers, Pichegru's modesty caused him to be promoted by degrees and seniority; and if change had not shewn the value of his talents, and necessity and danger urged usurped power to employ them, he would probably have remained amongst the nameless thousands who have fought or died for a cause they detested.

Piche-

Pichegru soon had occasion to evince that he deserved the reputation which he enjoyed. In the latter part of 1790, the command was offered to him of a battalion of national guards, amongst whom several former commanders had tried in vain to introduce order and subordination. Pichegru accepted the offer, and in a short time established an exact discipline, solely by that firmness and vigour, as calm as uninterrupted, which have in such an eminent manner distinguished him during all his commands. This success caused him to be employed under the ministry of Narbonne, in the autumn and winter of 1791, to organize, or to assist other commanders, in organizing regularity and tactics amongst the national volunteers of no less than six departments*.

In 1792, after the Brissotine faction had forced the virtuous Louis XVI. to declare war against Austria, Pichegru was attached to the staff of the army of the Rhine, under Custine, and he continued to serve in the same army during the spring and summer of 1793, when Biron, Beauharnois, and other generals, were its commanders, although he had already been advanced, first to the rank

* Dictionnaire Biographique; and Recueil d'Anecdotes, Brunswick, 1799, page 36, tom. i.

of general of brigade, and afterwards to that of a general of division.

In autumn, or October 13th, 1793, General Wurmser forced the lines of Weissemburgh. Some time before Valenciennes, Condé, and Duquesnoy had surrendered to the English and Austrians, and *were taken possession of in the name of the Emperor of Germany*, and the promise of the Prince of Cobourg to Dumourier, to settle a King of France upon his throne, was laid aside; this impolitic conduct determined all true and loyal Frenchmen rather to join and serve the colours of rebellion, than to suffer their country to be invaded, divided, or conquered, by foreigners. Pichegru therefore accepted the command of the army of the Rhine, regarding it as a duty, even at the risk of his own life, and, what was more, contrary to his known principles, to assist regicides, but to preserve, if possible, his country from threatened destruction.

The army of the Rhine had, for the nine last months, experienced continual and repeated defeats; and one recently, by General Wurmser, at the taking of the lines of Weissemburgh, which nearly annihilated and scattered it, during its retreat, or rather flight to Zornn.

It has with justice been remarked, that General

ral Dumourier was the first French commander, who during the revolutionary war taught Frenchmen how to fight; but Pichegru certainly was the first general who instructed his countrymen how to become victorious. In Alsace, as well as in Flanders, Pichegru found the territory of his country invaded, its armies disheartened and almost dispersed, and in both points he did not resign the command before he had fixed victory in his camp.

From the first day of his command over the army of the Rhine, Pichegru occupied himself, not only to stop the farther progress of the enemy, but to restore amongst his own troops a long-lost discipline, as absolutely necessary and indispensable, before he could act either on the offensive or defensive; but hardly had he succeeded in this difficult task, and digested a plan of operations to deliver Alsace, and to pave the way for future victory, before the commissaries of the National Convention, seduced by General Hoche's declamations and boastings, put him under the order of the latter. Hoche joined him with the army of the Moselle; and he was forced to execute, as second under Hoche, his own projects, and see him appropriate to himself the whole glory of their success.

The modesty and prudence which have always characterized General Pichegru, induced him to support this iniquity, and the only revenge he took was worthy of him: *he was the first who, on the 8th and 9th December, 1793, entered and forced the lines of Haguenau.*

Pichegru carried the redoubts of these lines by the bayonet, and the Austrians were even driven from the town with great slaughter. He had infused a new spirit into the troops, and it was determined, both on the part of the leader and the soldiery, either to conquer or perish. The heights of Reifhoffen, Jandershoffen, and Wrotte, deemed more impregnable than those of Gemappe, were therefore on the 26th of the same month, stormed in succession. At length, after a series of battles, hitherto unexampled in modern warfare, the republican army regained possession of Weissemburgh, the siege of Landau was raised, Fort Louis was evacuated, and Kaiserslautern, Germersheim, and Spires, submitted to the French under Pichegru.

Such was the sudden change effected by the confidence which Pichegru's great talents and courage inspired, and such was in consequence become the spirit of enthusiasm with which the
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French soldiers on this frontier were acquainted, that General Wurmser, who had but lately attempted to obtain Strasburgh by a secret negotiation, and Landau by force, was now obliged to retreat across the Rhine; while the Duke of Brunswick, astonished at the zeal and activity of the enemy, and uncertain of the ultimate intentions of Pichegru and Hoche, who now sustained the glory of their country, made a hasty retreat to cover Mentz, and soon withdrew from the command in disgust.

During the short, but brilliant period of three months, that Pichegru had commanded the army of the Rhine, neither his services nor his victories could preserve him from the then proscribing imputation and reproach of not being a general sans-culottes, or an anarchical jacobin, because his language was always as his sentiments, that of a gentleman, and he had never carried a red cap, nor once frequented any jacobin club. It was, therefore, not his merit, but the urgent necessity Robespierre's committee of public safety felt for his military capacity, that preserved his life, and caused him, on the 5th of February, 1794, to be appointed commander in chief of the army of the North.

Before Pichegru left Strasburgh, and resigned

his former command, the conventional commissaries sent for him, and told him, "that all the former disasters of France originated from its generals not being true sans-culottes; they therefore advised him to change, for the future, his revolutionary opinion, and become a mountaineer* and a republican, that he might owe his prosperity hereafter to his own patriotism, and not, as lately, to the patriotism of his army; to deserve victory as a jacobin, and not to swindle it as an aristocrat." To this fraternal admonition Pichegru answered, "that he did not believe either the Duke of York, the Prince of Cobourg, or the Duke of Brunswick, were sans-culottes, or their soldiers jacobins; that they had, however, been often victorious; and if the love of his country, and his wishes for the liberty and welfare of his countrymen, constituted true patriotism, he was the best patriot in France, as much above the fanatics of a club, as the factions in a national assembly †."—This anecdote evidences both the temper and qualities of the republican rulers of

* The mountaineers of the National Convention were Robespierre, Marat, Danton, Barrere, Fouché, Carrere, and the most blood-thirsty of the regicides.

† Recueil d'Anecdotes, art. Pichegru.

those times, and the respectable character of a republican general, who, when it was dangerous only to be suspected of virtuous principles, had fortitude enough to acknowledge virtue as his only guide.

General Pichegru received with his new command no instruction for his proceedings, but “an imperative and ridiculous order to conquer;” and in his conferences with the ministers at Paris, he was *vaguely* directed to attack the Allies in the centre, and, in the mean time, to harass their flanks *.

Of Pichegru’s predecessors in this hazardous command, within ten months one had been outlawed †, and deserted, one killed on the field of battle ‡, and two were guillotined §. The officers of this army were ignorant, undisciplined, without education, skill, or ardour; and the soldiers were worse than the officers, frequenters of clubs, denouncers and informers against their commanders, whom, from principles of equality, they hated, and, from experience, mistrusted; but how much depends upon the choice of a superior chief is evident, when, with such an army, Pichegru in six

* David’s Memoires on Pichegru’s Campaigns.

† Dumourier. ‡ Dampierre. § Custine and Houchard.

months retook what had occupied the enemy, even assisted by treason, upwards of twelve months in conquering; and in three months more he added Holland to the other conquests of France.

During the years 1793 and 1794, the reign of terror, enforcing obedience to the conventional decrees, caused an activity, and produced resources, which are totally incompatible with the respect for the lives and property of individuals in civilized nations. The existence of no person was certain for an hour, and the possessions of all persons appertained to the nation at large. The Agrarian law was not proclaimed, but the absurd speculations of J. J. Rousseau were forced into practice; and it may truly be said, that in France, "the earth belonged to nobody, but its productions to every body *.

The general who was not victorious was punished as a traitor, and an army defeated, was an army suspected and proscribed; and many of those who had escaped the sword, the cannon, and the bayonets of the enemy, were doomed to suffer in republican bastiles, or perish by the revolutionary guillotine.

* J. J. Rousseau, in his discourse on the inequality of the conditions of mankind, addressed to the Academy at Dijon.

The decree for the levy in masse had already placed all the youth of the most populous nation in Europe at the disposal of a government, which boasted of having one million two hundred thousand men in arms. The war with the maritime powers having interdicted the importation of gunpowder and military stores, these were now supplied by the talents of the chemists, and the industry of the artisans, of France. Paris alone, from its three hundred forges, and fifteen foundries, furnished eleven thousand five hundred and twenty stand of arms, and one thousand one hundred pieces of brass cannon, *every month* *. The insurgent cities were ordered to transmit a certain portion of saltpetre, by way of fine; the feudal castles of the murdered, exiled, or imprisoned nobility, still supposed to frown on the liberties, or rather anarchy, of the republic, as well as the forest that had sheltered the brave and loyal men of La Vendée, also provided their quota of an ingredient so necessary in the modern art of war. Nor were the commercial signs of wealth, at all times indispensable for carrying on military operations, wanting. In addition to the almost inexhaustible fund arising from assignats,

* The report of Barette, Frimaire an xi.

the credit of which was supported by the *maximum* and the *guillotine*, the virtuous pity of their ancestors presented them with other resources, which were at this period called into action ; for the estates of the clergy, and the sacred treasures and vases of the Christian religion, were freely resorted to, and even the consecrated bells, were melted, to furnish cannon for armies amounting to 780,000 fighting men*. That nothing might be wanting to give efficacy to these immense preparations, the archives of the war department were searched for the schemes and memorials presented to the Duke De Sully, to the Cardinals Richelieu, and Mazarine, and other great ministers, and drawn up during the reigns of Henry IV. Louis XIII. and Louis XIV. ; a chosen body, consisting of the ablest military men in France, formed plans for the campaign, and often laid down instructions for the generals, under the inspection of Carnot, a worthy member of the cruel Committee of Public Safety, who pretended to be one of the best engineers and ablest states-

* After Carnot's statement, published by the National Convention in Nivose an xi. The army of the North consisted of 220,000 men ; the armies of the Rhine and the Moselle, 280,000 ; the army of the Alps, 60,000 ; of the Oriental Pyrenées, 80,000 ; the army of the South, 60,000 ; of the West, 80,000.

men of the age, although he had never commanded a siege or a battalion, or carried on or negotiated a single treaty; but in the different situations in which rebellion and crime placed him, he profited by the information of those who groaned under his regicide tyranny, and appropriated to himself the success of plans diametrically opposite to those of his own invention *.

* In the Dictionnaire Biographique, a Work from an able hand, is, tome 3, page 173, the following note concerning Carnot:

On ne s'auroit trop faire remarquer l'impudeur avec laquelle ce Carnot, à qui quelques gens ont accordé une reputation militaire, on ne sait trop pourquoi, puisqu'il ne derigea jamais un bataillon, et qu'il ne montra que des talens d'administrateur ou de curaliste, a voulu enlever à Jourdan la gloire de la bataille de Fleurus, et faire croire aussi qu'il étoit l'auteur du projet d'invasion de la West Flandre, (voy. son Rapport du 1re Vendemaire, An. 3.). Il n'est pas etonnant que ce conspirateur, à vûes aussi étroites que sanguinaires, et dont rien ne s'auroit egaler la vanité, ait cru pouvoir fair oublier l'entetement avec lequel il soutint les plans sur la foret de Mormale, puisqu'il imaginera bien pouvoir faire oublier aussi que sa main, qui osa tracer depuis les mots de vertu et d'honneur, avoit signè tous ces arrets qui devasterent sa patrie. Ennemi personel de Picbegru, dont il envioit la gloire, ainsi que celle de tous les généraux, il a, dans ses Exploits des Francois, omis ou attribué à des officiers en sous ordre les victoires de ce general avec mauvais foi tout-à-fait mal-adroite.

The Report of Bayeul to the Council of Five Hundred, concerning the conspiracy of the 18th Fructidor, an v. confirms the above, and exhibits Carnot in his true colours.

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This was the case with a plan for a campaign sent to Pichegru a short time after his arrival at the head-quarters of the army of the North. According to Carnot's orders, the war committee at Paris, and the conventional deputies, insisted that Pichegru should attack the centre of the enemy in the forest of Mormale, although this general represented both the danger and absurdity of so doing, which the several defeats already experienced by the French, on this point, seemed to confirm; thus, when, after repeated losses, at the risk of his life, Pichegru entirely changed this favourite plan of the infatuated Carnot into his own project of invading West Flanders, the regicide Carnot, in his report to the National Convention, of the first Vendemiaire, year iii. had the impudence to take to himself all the honour of Pichegru's victories*.

Soon after Pichegru had assumed his new command, from the beginning of March, he formed a great number of encampments, to accustom the many recruits of his army to military movements. After a fortnight passed in this manner, he collected a greater quantity of troops round Cambray and Guise, for the purpose of execut-

* See the last Note.

ing Carnot's orders, and driving the Allies from the forest of Mormale, and forming the siege of Quesnoy. He began on the 29th of the same month, by attacking the Austrian posts at Cateau, Beauvais, and Solesme, which he carried ; but although his attack was both well formed and skilfully directed, the Imperialists rallying, obliged him, after being repulsed on his whole line, to retreat, with the loss of six hundred men killed and wounded.

Notwithstanding the several almost daily engagements, the opening of one of the most famous and momentous campaigns, either amongst the ancients or moderns, and which placed Pichegru above Bonaparte and all other republican generals, as much for his talents as for his virtue, had not yet taken place ; at length, on the 16th of April, the combined armies, consisting of Austrians, British, Dutch, Hanoverians, and Hessians, and amounting to 187,000 men, assembled on the heights above Cateau, and were reviewed by the Emperor of Germany, who lately had assumed the command in person. In pursuance of the plan previously agreed upon, they advanced during the succeeding day, in eight columns, three of which were intended as corps of observation. The first, composed of Austrian
and

and Dutch troops, under the command of Prince Christian of Hesse Darmstadt, seized on the village of Catillon, where they obtained four pieces of cannon, and having crossed the Sambre, immediately occupied a position between that river and the Little Helpe, so as to invest Landrecies on that side. The second, led by Lieutenant-general Alvintzi, took post in the forest Nouvion. The third, headed by the Emperor and the Prince of Cobourg, after forcing the enemy's entrenchments, advanced to the heights called the Grand and Petit Blocus. The fourth and fifth columns were formed from the army under the Duke of York, that of which His Royal Highness took the direction being intended to attack the village of Vaux. Major-general Abercromby commenced the assault with the van, supported by the two grenadier companies of the first regiment of Guards, under the command of Colonel Stanhope, and stormed and took the star redoubt, while three battalions of Austrian grenadiers, commanded by Major Petrash, attacked the wood, and made themselves masters of the works which the French had constructed for its defence.

Sir William Erskine was equally successful with the other column; for, finding the enemy posted at Premont, the brigade of British infantry, with

with four squadrons of light dragoons, was detached under Lieutenant-general Harcourt to turn their position, while he himself attacked in front with three battalions of the regiment of Kaunitz, supported with a well-directed fire of British and Austrian artillery, under the orders of Lieutenant-colonel Congreve, and not only obtained possession of the redoubts, but of two pieces of cannon and a pair of colours.

The success of this extensive and complicated attack, in consequence of which the French under General Pichegru lost thirty pieces of artillery, nine of which were taken by the column under the immediate command of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, being now complete, it was immediately determined to lay siege to Landrecies. The direction of this important affair was entrusted to the Hereditary Prince of Orange, while His Imperial Majesty, with the grand army, estimated at 60,000 men, covered the operations on the side of Guise, and the troops under the Duke of York, amounting to near 30,000, were employed in a similar service towards Cambray. A body of Austrians and Hessians, to the number of 12,000, under General Wurmb, were at the same time stationed near Douay and Bouchain; Count Kaunitz, with

15000, defended the passage of the Sambre; and General Clairfayt, with 40,000 more, protected Flanders, from Tournay to the sea. Such were the strength and position of the Allies, even without the assistance of the Prussians, who made no movement in their favour, that all generals of the old school imagined success to be inevitable. And appearance, for a time, seemed to confirm these conjectures, for on the 21st of the same month, the Hereditary Prince of Orange made a general attack upon, and carried, all the posts still occupied by the enemy in front of Landrecies: he also took their entrenched camp by storm, and obtained possession of a strong redoubt within six hundred yards of the body of the place.

To raise the siege of Landrecies, Pichegru ordered an attack on the advanced posts of the Prince of Cobourg at Blocus and Nouvion; at the former the French were repulsed, but Nouvion was carried, and general Alvinzi obliged to retreat; some success on the part of General Wurmb rendered this, however, an event of small importance.

Apprehensive that he could not succeed in raising the siege of Landrecies, and yet not daring to infringe the orders of the Committee of Public Safety to persevere in attacking the centre of the allies, Pichegru collected, in Caesar's Camp, a force

Force of thirty thousand men under Souham, and twenty thousand under Moreau, for the purpose of making a detached invasion of West Flanders, General Otto being sent on the 23d to reconnoitre them, an engagement ensued, in which the French were driven into Cambray with loss, and the next day they were repulsed with great slaughter, in an attack on the heights of Cateau, where the Duke of York was posted; on this occasion Lieutenant-general Chapuy, with three hundred and thirty officers and privates, were taken prisoners, and thirty-five pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the English. But these defeats were not of sufficient consequence to prevent Pichegru from persevering in his original enterprise.

While the subordinate generals were employed in this incursion, Pichegru, on the 26th, advanced in five columns, drove in all the out-posts and piquets of the besieging army, attacking along the whole frontier, from Treves to the sea; but in the progress of this day he did not succeed; on the contrary, he was forced to retreat, and pursued to the very gates of Cambray, with loss both of men and artillery.

Pichegru, however, returned to the charge on the 29th, assailing an almost impregnable post, defended.

defended by General Clairfayt at Moucron, and, by his success, retrieved the disaster of the former conflict, besides animating his troops with the confidence resulting from a first victory; and notwithstanding the defeat of a body of 30,000 men of his army, who had attacked the Duke of York at Tournay, on which occasion they lost thirteen pieces of cannon, and above four hundred men taken prisoners, he in a short time after obtained possession of Werwick, Courtray, and Menin, the last of which held out during four days; when, finding no probability of succour, the garrison, consisting chiefly of emigrants, forced their way through the enemy with great bravery, but with great loss.

Landrecies had now surrendered, and Pichegru, convinced of the impracticability of Carnot's plan, recommended by the Committee of Public Safety, desisted from further attacks on the centre of the Allies. He would not even attempt the recovery of Landrecies, but leaving small garrisons in the central fortresses, to prevent surprize, projected a combined movement with the army of the Ardennes, and taking Beaumont, made some incursions between the Sambre and the Meuse.

The army of the Allies, in consequence of the offensive operations of Pichegru, who, whether
vanquished

vanquished or victorious, proved incessant in his attacks, being thus broken into many separate masses, and destitute of unity in its operations, was evidently liable to be overcome.

Numerous skirmishes took place during the early part of May; and on the 10th an attack was made on the Duke of York near Tournay, in which the French were defeated, and three thousand killed. General Clairfayt, who, since his defeat at Mouscron, had occupied a strong position, so as to cover Ghent, Bruges, and Ostend, at the same time attempted to drive the French from Courtray; but a reinforcement was judiciously thrown into the town by Pichegru; and in an engagement which took place the ensuing day, General Clairfayt was driven back into his original position at Thieft. This last action did the greatest honour to the gallant, but unlucky Austrian general, and Pichegru decided the fate of the day solely by the vivacity and unity of his attacks.

During this conflict, while Pichegru was pursuing his victorious career in the West, General Jourdan, already celebrated for his victories at Hoondschoote and Maubeuge, had the command of the army of the Ardennes, and with this army, and the right wing of the army of the North, he

crossed the Sambre, forced General Kämtz to retreat, and took momentary possession of Fontaine, l'Éveque, and Binch, which, however, he was obliged to relinquish on the appearance of an Austrian force, with the loss of near 5000 men and three pieces of cannon.

The armies of the North and Ardennes, again partially united, were at this time under the tyranny of the constitutional deputies St. Just and Le Bas, who stimulated the troops to exertion by perpetual threats of execution in case of failure; threats which, from them, could never be considered idle or nugatory, because, as they often repeated, "*the permanency of the guillotine was the order of the day.*" After the last defeat of Jourdan, Pichegru went to assist him to re-organize the army of the Ardennes, and to instruct him how to act with more method even in accelerating his operations; but he found this army not only terrified by the cruelties of the two pro-consuls, but when he had formed plans for passing the Sambre, and besieging Charleroi, they were frustrated by the precipitation, violence, and ignorance, of those men who controlled him and superseded his authority.

To expel the French from Flanders became a principal object of the Allies, and Pichegru, in

his

his turn did every thing in his power both to maintain and extend his conquest in this province. To allure General Clairfayt from his advantageous position near Thielt, Pichegru ordered General Moreau to hem in, and blockade Ypres in the beginning of June. In his attack to relieve this city, General Clairfayt met with nothing but defeats, particularly on the 18th June near Hooglède, which caused the fall of Ypres, and by it mostly decided the fate of West Flanders. The Allies were, however, determined to make another attempt, and for this purpose, after many skirmishes, in which Lannoy, Tunesing, Roubaix, Mouveaux, and all the great posts in the road from Lille to Courtray, were taken by the Duke of York, on the 16th, and the next day, a general attack was made under the eye of the Emperor himself; but it was rendered unsuccessful by the delay of two columns, which ought to have forced the passage of La Marque, but whose tardiness, from fatigue, left open the communication between Lille and Courtray, and deranged the whole plan of operation, though, in detached points, the Allies gained some advantages. In several reports and narratives of the French, His Royal Highness the Duke of York is much praised for his vigorous attacks, and able

manœuvres on that day, when he led on seven battalions of British, five of Austrians, and two of Hessians, with six squadrons of light dragoons and four of hussars, and forced the French, after the greatest resistance, to evacuate Lannoy and Roubaix, and afterwards advanced against Mouvreaux*. General Abercromby attacked at the same time, with four battalions of Guards, seconded by the seventh and fifteenth light dragoons, under Lieutenant-colonel Churchill, and the enemy was compelled to retire, with the loss of three pieces of cannon.

Early the ensuing morning, the republicans under Pichegru attacked, in great force, the post at Tarcoing; two battalions of Austrians, detached by the Duke of York to make a diversion, failed in returning to him, and thus left an opening on his right. The French, pouring in torrents of troops on every side, had completely surrounded the British battalions; but these, with the greatest bravery, although with much difficulty and loss, cut their way through, and made an honourable retreat. *General Pichegru had received positive orders from the Committee of*

* Coup-d'œil sur la Campagne de Flandres, au 1^{er} an ii. par un Republicain, page 9.

Public Safety to direct the chief attack against the British troops, and the Royal British Commander was therefore assailed on all sides by such a superior number of republicans, that his troops were forced to give way, and he found it impossible either to join the Brigade of the Guards, or that commanded by Major-general Fox; but, "*by the greatest intrepidity and presence of mind,*" he was at length enabled to escape to a body of Austrians, commanded by General Otto, accompanied only by a few dragoons of the sixteenth regiment; while Major-general Abercromby, with some difficulty, made good his retreat to Templeuve; and Major-general Fox fortunately succeeded in gaining the village of Leers*.

During this battle, which lasted the whole day, Pichegru ordered Moreau, although with inferior forces, to occupy General Clairfayt, which, by his able manœuvres, he effected. According to the French account, they took this day fifteen hundred prisoners, and sixty pieces of cannon; but it is on the other hand asserted, that they left on the field four thousand slain, while the Allies lost only three thousand.

* See Coup-d'œil sur la Campagne de Flandres, page 12. Praise from an enemy is justice, but no flattery.

In their estimates of the successes of this day, the opposing armies widely differed: the Duke of York, in his public orders, declared he had little to regret besides the loss of so many brave men; while Pichegru, believing the Allies to be destitute of artillery, made on the 22d a general assault on their lines with a hundred thousand men, intending to force the passage of the Scheldt, and invest Tournay. The assault began at five o'clock in the morning, and the French continually bringing up fresh troops, continued it the whole day: about three o'clock in the afternoon the right wing of the Allies, being greatly fatigued, began to give ground, when the Duke of York detached seven Austrian battalions, and the second brigade of British infantry, under Major-general Fox, to their support. The spirit and perseverance of the English soldiers decided the fate of the day; they stormed the village of Pont-achin, rushed with fixed bayonets into the heart of the French army, and threw them into such confusion, that they could never be rallied, notwithstanding all Pichegru's endeavours, who continued for fourteen hours in the midst of the fire, leading on or rallying his troops: this general had during the battle three horses killed under him, and two aides-de-camp shot by his side.

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The Allies lay on their arms that night, expecting a renewed attack in the morning; but the French retreated to Lille, Pichegru having made the most judicious arrangements to preserve his army from being turned or assailed by the numerous Austrian cavalry. Such a battle has seldom been fought; the republicans were in action under an incessant fire of cannon and musketry upwards of twelve hours; besides a retreat of four hours always in the reach of cannon shot; twelve thousand of their men were left dead on the field, and five hundred taken prisoners: the loss of the Allies was estimated at four thousand.

The spirited conduct of the British troops, though but a very small number, on all these occasions, rendered them at once the admiration of the Allies and the terror of the French. Their heroic valour, which ought to have gained them respect, kindled the fury of the republican government; and the infamous Convention was base enough to concur in a proposition made by the ferocious Committee of Public Safety, decreeing, on the 26th of May, *that in future no quarter should be given to British or Hanoverian troops.* This savage edict was recommended to the army by an address, the production of Barrere, one of Bonaparte's favourites and counsellors, in which,
after

after falsely accusing the British government of all the crimes perpetrated by French rebels, or regicides, against their own country and countrymen, he asserted, "that not one of the slaves of George ought to return to the traitorous territory of England*."

When Pichegru received this abominable decree, and the no less abominable address, he convoked all the generals of his army about him, and in the presence of his staff told them, "*that he believed them all to be brave men, and therefore no assassins, but if he was mistaken in his opinion, he would that instant throw up his command, though he knew that certain death would be the consequence;*" but they unanimously agreed with their chief, and promised to instil the same sentiment into the troops of their respective corps; and that if the conventional deputies accompanying the army insisted upon the enforcement of this law of blood, they would to a man resign. As Robespierre had spies every where, it was not long before he got information of what he called the aristocratical and mutinous conduct of Pichegru and his officers,

* This decree was of the 26th May, and the address of the 30th May, 1794. As monuments of French republican ferocity, they are never to be forgotten.

and

and Pichegru's, Moreau's, and 592 other names of military characters in the army of the North, went, after Robespierre's death, found upon his list for the guillotine, as a job (corvée) in mass after the campaign was over. It requires more real courage to brave the scaffold than the mouths of the cannons *.

It is, however, necessary to observe, that one republican general was cruel and cowardly enough to execute this mandate of the regicides. When in July 1794, some Hanoverians were made prisoners in the maritime Flanders, General Van Damme, to stimulate his troops by his example, put one to death with his own hands, as he had some months before some unfortunate emigrants at Furnes†. This General Van Damme is now amongst Bonaparte's first friends and favourites, and his governor at Lille, in Flanders, after being, in 1794, imprisoned by the order of General Pichegru for his crimes in the Low Countries, and, in 1800, degraded by General Moreau, for his plunder and vexations in Suabia‡.

The

* Le Coup-d'œil de la Campagne de Flandres, page 16.

† See the last-mentioned pamphlet, page 17; and the History of the Campaign of General Pichegru, by David, page 56.

‡ In August 1800, General Moreau degraded Van Damme as an accomplice of the Commissary-General Pommier, condemned

The conduct of the Duke of York upon this occasion was at once dignified and humane, becoming the son of a king, and a commander in the cause of honour, virtue, and loyalty. Instead of issuing orders for immediate retaliation, and thus producing all the horrors of mutual assassination, His Royal Highness, in an address to his army, dated June 7, 1794, nobly requested the troops to suspend their indignation, and reminded them, "that mercy to the vanquished is the brightest gem in a soldier's character;" while the republican rulers were the butchers of their fellow-citizens, the English Prince acted as a generous soldier, whose profession was disgraced by such an attempt to abolish the laws of war and humanity, and a guardian of the subjects of his august father, who were thus invidiously singled out, as people to whom alone the ordinary regulations of civilized nations ought not to be extended.

In the mean time, the French army, pressed by the republican tyrants St. Just and Le Bas, had on the 20th of May repassed the Sambre, recaptured Fontaine l'Eveque and Binch, and partially invested Charleroi; they were, however, again

to be shot by the sentence of a court-martial, for plunder and extortion in Suabia. Van Damme continued during the whole campaign in the rear of the army.

routed

routed by General Count Kaunitz, with the loss of five thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners, and fifty pieces of cannon. The loss was, however, compensated on the other side, where a portion of the army of the Moselle was placed under Jourdan, and received the name of the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. This force, consisting of forty thousand men, invaded the duchy of Luxemburg, took possession of Arlon, and obliged Beaulieu to fall back on Marche, in order to cover Namur. The Duke of York's position at Tournay was thus rendered, for several days, very precarious, as a great portion of the allied army was obliged to fall back to cover Brussels and Ghent, and the Prince of Cobourg marched the principal part of his army to their relief.

St. Just and Le Bas, ignorant of tactics, and cruel, like most upstarts in power, were, contrary to the representations of Pichegru, still persevering to sacrifice the lives of the soldiers, for the attainment of a proposed point, and again compelled the troops to cross the Sambre on the 3d of June, and commence the blockade of Charleroi; but being attacked by the combined army under the Hereditary Prince of Orange, and by a judicious sally of the garrison, they were compelled once more to fall back to their former position after a great loss both of men and artillery.

Notwithstanding their reiterated miscarriages in that quarter, the enemy soon after recrossed the Sambre, and assumed a position near Goselies, on purpose to cover the siege of Charleroi, before which they had already begun to open trenches; but the same general who had defeated them a few days before, arrived again, and obliged them on the 6th of June to retreat, with the loss of near six thousand men, twenty-two pieces of cannon, thirty-five ammunition waggons, and a considerable number of horses and baggage. But General Jourdan having received numerous reinforcements from the army of the Moselle, crossed the Sambre a fourth time, stormed the Austrian camp at Betignies, and prepared again to besiege a city which had so long eluded his attacks.

The right wing of the army of the North, so often, by the infatuation of St. Just and Le Bas, defeated before Charleroi, had now joined the army of the Sambre and the Meuse; and Pichegru, who commanded them, confident in superior forces, determined at all events to succeed. The Prince of Cobourg on this occasion abandoned Tournay, leaving the defence of the Scheldt to the Duke of York, and withdrawing all his posts from before Valenciennes, Quesnoy, and the other French towns in his possession, to fulfil the

more

more important task of succouring West Flanders. For this purpose he spent two days in preparation, and then made, on the 27th of June, a general attack on the advanced post of Jourdan's army. Charleroi had the preceding day been forced to surrender at discretion. The Prince of Cobourg, assisted by the Prince of Orange and General Beaulieu, not being acquainted with this event, after the attack on the advanced post, marched with the combined army, divided into five columns, and made preparations to relieve the place. Having attacked the enemy's entrenchments, in the direction of Lambisart, Espinies, and Gosselies, he obliged a few detached bodies to retreat, though protected by several very strong redoubts; but such was the opposition experienced on this occasion by the Allies, that it was evening before the left wing had arrived at the principal heights, which were fortified by an extensive range of field-works, lined with an immense number of heavy artillery. Although a variety of unforeseen obstacles had interposed, an attempt was now made to force this strong position with the bayonet; while Jourdan, on the other hand, having obtained the assistance of the besieging army in consequence of the fall of Charleroi, determined, *after the advice and plan*

of *Richebourg*, to decide the fate of Flanders in a pitched battle. He accordingly advanced with a numerous army, and made such a disposition, as to enable the greater part of his forces to contend with the left wing of the Allies only. Nevertheless, such was the impetuous valour of the assailants, against four times superior forces, strengthened and protected by the nature of their position, and by every thing the modern art of war could invent, that they repeatedly penetrated the French lines, and formed several times under the fire of their cannon; but towards seven o'clock in the evening, the advantage obtained by Jourdan became conspicuous; for having drawn his troops out of their entrenchments, and made three distinct charges upon the enemy, after an action which commenced at dawn of day, and did not entirely conclude until near sun-set, victory, which had been hovering by turns over each of the rival armies, declared finally in favour of the republicans. The combined troops taking advantage of the night, immediately fell back, first on Marbois, and next on Nivelles, with an intent if possible to cover Namur.

† See *Le Coup-d'œil*, page 24.

Thus

Thus ended the battle of Fleurus, which obliged the Allies to forego all hopes of retaining possession of Flanders, as their force, which consisted originally of a hundred and eighty thousand men, was reduced to seventy thousand, while that of the republicans was increased to more than three hundred thousand. Neither the loss of the Combined Powers during this battle, nor that of the French, has been precisely ascertained. The effects, however, were prodigious, for the Allies were defeated in all quarters, and Bruges, Tournay, Mont, Oudenarde, Brussels, and even Namur, were left without protection.

That, however, the French, during the first three months of this severe campaign, had lost more men even than the Combined Powers, or rather, sacrificed a greater number of their countrymen to the absurd and cruel obstinacy of the National deputies, may be concluded from a French author, who states, "that the officers and soldiers killed and wounded in one point, in the attempts to pass the Sambre, and to blockade or besiege Charleroi, amounted, according to the French army estimates and registers, to 44,604; of whom, the same author says, 30,000 might at least have been spared, if St. Just and Le Bas had not acted
contrary

contrary to the proposal and designs of General Pichegru*.

About the same period, or on the 26th June, the virtuous patriot and able general, the Earl of Moira, arriving at Ostend with seven thousand men, found Ypres and Throtout, on one side, and Bruges on the other, in possession of the French; and, despairing of rendering effectual assistance in any other quarter, on the 28th pressed forward to join the Duke of York, who with the body of English and Allies under his command, had participated of course in the disasters of the campaign, taking his route through Bruges, which at his approach the French evacuated, to Malle. General Van Damme was in the neighbourhood, with twenty thousand men, and would have fallen upon the English force, but for the skilful marches and evolutions of the Earl of Moira, and the ingenious deception of that highly valuable officer Major-general Doyle, the British Quarter-master-general, who made the burgomaster of Bruges believe the English army consisted of fifteen thousand men, and that as many more would arrive the same evening; intelligence which was conveyed:

* See the last-mentioned pamphlet, page 26.

to the French general, and prevented his attacking the English troops*.

It was on this occasion that General Pichegru, who had sent Van Damme purposely to intercept and capture the Earl of Moira's army, the small number of which was known to him before it left Ostend, wrote to Van Damme's protectors, the conventional deputies, and accused him of incapacity, and finished by saying, that he was as ignorant as barbarous. This letter had been expedited to Robespierre, and was found amongst his papers, and marked, "*to be forwarded in time to the public accuser at the revolutionary tribunal, as a proof of Pichegru's aristocracy.*" This admirable patriot of the modern republican school, Van Damme, had, before the Revolution, been condemned to the gallows, and afterwards both murdered and plundered *in mass*. To charge such a *worthy* citizen of the French commonwealth with *incapacity and barbarity*, was an unpardonable crime with his accomplices, the terrorists and jacobins, and, by their code of laws and revolutionary justice, deserved nothing less than the guillotine †.

* Coup-d'œil, page 40.

† The same pamphlet, page 42, and Courtois' Report to the National Convention, page 6.

After several marches and counter-marches between the 1st and 8th of July, the Earl of Moira at last, after numerous difficulties, by means of a rapid movement completed the object of the expedition, and effected his junction with His Royal Highness the Duke of York. During his Lordship's fatiguing marches, the French took possession of Ostend, and marched towards Ghent; the Prince of Cobourg was again, after a noble resistance, defeated by a vastly superior enemy at Mons and Soignes; the French gained possession of Mons; the Duke of York, always pursued by Pichegru, was obliged to retreat from Revaix to Grammont, and subsequently to Asche, Malines, and Kontieq, while the French rendered themselves masters of Ghent, Oudernarde, and Tournay. The French army of the Sambre and Meuse, under Jourdan, being joined by that of the North under Pichegru, they both pressed their advantages on every side, and after a series of engagements and skirmishes, possessed themselves of Brussels on the 9th of July, where the conventional deputies, the representatives of the Great Nation, sat in dreadful state, issuing orders of blood and plunder.

The republican armies halted in positions fixed by Pichegru, and reached from Liege to Antwerp,

werp, while the Austrians defended the banks of the Meuse from Buremonde to Maestricht: the troops of England and Holland having retired beyond Breda, were encamped at Osterwist, and a corps was posted at Ludhoven to keep open the communication between the armies. Malines, Louvaine, Judoigne, Namur, Antwerp, Tongers, Liege, St. Amand, Marchiennes, Cateau, and other places, had already been evacuated; and Condé, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, and Landrecies, abandoned to their own strength, were invested by the republicans, who were fortified by the additional terror of a savage decree of the regicide convention, forbidding them to give quarter to any of the garrisons, unless they surrendered on the first summons.

During these last four months, while Pichegru, in gathering so many laurels for himself, had done such great and effectual services to his country, he had not only to contend with the ignorance, covidity, and jealousy of the dépotés accompanying his army, but with the envy, malevolence, and cruelty of Carnot, Robespierre, and the other members of the Committee of Public Safety.—Pichegru, after his victory of the 18th of May, at Turcoing, intended, by a bold but wise combination, to pass the Scheldt near Oudenarde, and
to

to cut off General Clairfayt from all communication with the English army, to fight the Austrians singly, and afterwards fall upon the rear of the troops opposing Jourdan; but the Committee of Public Safety sent him another order for his operations, which, absurd as they were, he was obliged to obey, and thousands of lives were sacrificed, which might have been spared, and the same end obtained.

Although Pichegru had only influence and command in the combined and general plans of the motions and transactions of the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, he was nevertheless regarded as the commander in chief over all the republican troops and armies on this frontier. His power, his successes, his talents, and his glory, offended alike the republican proconsuls, and they were mean enough to let him often perceive it, particularly at Brussels, where they did every thing to counteract or change all his projects, and to impede his future progress. With that virtuous severity which characterizes him, Pichegru contented himself with telling them, *that he observed aristocracy had only changed hands in France, but that the aristocracy of revolutionary upstarts, or political hypocrites, was more dangerous* and

and disgraceful than that of kings or of patricians. In revenge for this just and pointed remark, the regicides, to lessen the extent of his authority, forced him to separate the armies of the North, and of the Sambre and the Meuse, which but lately, and with so much pains, had formed their junction.

Though Pichegru was disgusted with the behaviour and principles of these deputies, and of the members of the Committee of Public Safety, his constant and only study and labour were to serve his country, and to silence or calm the vile passions of its vile tyrants by new victories. He therefore, after the capture of Antwerp, formed a plan, which by cutting off all connexion between the English and Austrian armies, would have brought him nearer to the last, and ensure the successes of the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, as well as prevent the movements of the republican troops on the Rhine, but the jealousy of his superiors, and of General Jourdan, prevented the execution of this well-contrived plan.

From these scenes of carnage, where the horrors of death are diminished by the "pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war," attention is called to contemplate transactions no less sanguinary, though infinitely more dreadful,

exhibited in that internal government of France; which had appointed Pichegru to the command, and held continually the axe of the guillotine suspended over his head. Terror, avowed as a system, stalked through the land, dealing on every side the blow of fate, and extinguishing love, mutual confidence, honour and pity. The various devices for proving treason, or treasonable inclinations, gave vigour to a host of spies, informers, and persecutors, some of whom were in the pay of government; some hoped to conciliate favour*; and others thought, by denouncing their nearest relatives or most intimate friends, to avoid those persecutions, of which a moment might make them victims. No man could consider himself sure of an hour's life, yet no man

* Miot, one of the jacobin ministers in Tuscany, during the first six months of the French republic, was suspected of having received bribes, without sharing them with his *worthy* employers, and therefore was sent a prisoner to the Luxembourg at Paris; where, to obtain favour, he became an informer against his fellow prisoners, and a spy of Chaumette, Robespierre, Barrere, and Fouquier Tinville; and, according to the author of "*Mémoires sur les prisons de Paris, en an ii. et iii. page 44.*" Miot's denunciations brought 226 innocent persons to the scaffold. He was in disgrace under the Directory, but in 1799 Bonaparte made him one of his tribunes, and he is yet a confidential friend of his Consular Majesty, who has promised him an embassy.—*Les Nouvelles à la main, Brumaire ix. No. 11.*

was permitted to prepare himself for death; and he who dared to express or inculcate a hope of a better existence beyond the grave, incurred imminent danger of being sacrificed as an incorrigible fanatic.

As no motive of safety, nor any prospect of advantage, stimulated the conventional rulers of France to so profuse a waste of human blood, it could be nothing but their own blood-thirsty characters, and their total disregard for all moral and religious principles, that produced so many horrors and such horrible deeds; but with the usual revolutionary cant of republican tyrants, while daily inundating the scaffold with the blood of hundreds of their victims, and proscribing by a single decree 250,000 families*, they spoke of hu-

* On the 17th September, 1793, Merlin de Douai caused the Convention to decree, "that all persons of the former privileged orders, and their relations, should be arrested *as suspected*," and within four weeks 250,000 families were imprisoned in all parts of France, with intent to expose them to the same massacres as the prisoners at Paris had experienced on the 2d September, 1792. Merlin was then, and is yet, called *Merlin-suspects—Merlin-potence*. He is the same person who was made one of the directors after the revolution of the 4th September, 1797, and is at present Bonaparte's favourite, and attorney-general to his tribunal of revision. He was before the Revolution a pettyfogging attorney without character or property; but during the Revolution he has bought ten millions of national estates.—See *Dictionnaire Biographique*, page 18 et 19, and *Prudhomme*, art. Merlin.

manity, generosity, and justice, as often as of their liberty, equality, and fraternity.

On the 31st January, 1794, Robespierre made a report to the National Convention, on the nature and operations of the revolutionary government, in which he contrived, with singular art and sagacity, to impress general notions of *virtue, mildness, and benevolence*, while by decrying the two extremes of coldness and ultra-revolutionary vigour, he subjected every man to a rigorous inquisition, which might declare him the enemy of the republic, and to persons of that description the revolutionary government owed *no protection but death* *.

Such were the avowed principles of the republican government, or, what is the same, of the National Convention, which had usurped all powers, and each of its members, as long as he belonged to the victorious faction, was a privileged and protected despot. That all parts of France, and every class of Frenchmen, might groan under the same oppression, feel the same cruelties, and witness the same immorality †,

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* See Prudhomme, vol. v. page 326.

† The deputy Subrany was the representative of the people at Pau, where he, to approach the state of nature, stripped himself

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conventional deputies were sent as pro-consuls, with unlimited authority, to all the departments, as well as to the different armies.

St. Just, who in 1792 was a student at law, and the attorney Le Bas, were, as has been mentioned, the two conventional commissaries who had accompanied and inspected the operations of the army under Pichegru; who unnecessarily had caused the butchery of so many thousand innocent persons, and who had denounced him to Robespierre as an aristocrat, because he opposed their sanguinary measures, and did not dishonour his victories by inhumanity. These and other representatives of the French people, by the armies, were followed in their missions by a horde of commissaries, clerks, and secretaries, their relations and friends, whose principal occupation was to enrich themselves at the expence of their countrymen, when in France, and by plunders, requisitions, and extortions, when in an enemy's country. The pillage to which they addicted

one night, and forced all public functionaries, with their wives and daughters, to accompany him to the play-house *naked*, and he with his party not only continued in that indecent state during the play, but from his box he declared every body who did not follow his example, enemies to equality.—*Les Annales du Terrorisme*, page 70.

themselves, was unrestrained by principle or shame; and while the representatives robbed in mass, their followers, by their *republican* activity, let nothing escape their cupidity, and the victories of Pichegru ruined Belgium for a long time, because he had no authority to controul the civil administration of his army*. According to David's history of Pichegru's campaign, "*lact, and articles of a like nature, were put in requisition at Brussels and in Brabant, under pretence of providing for the wants of the troops*†; and in an act of accusation against Joubert, one of the principal commissaries of the army of the North, signed by five thousand Belgians, he is accused of

* L'inéptie, ou la Cupidité des administrations des vivre, firent naître tant de difficultés, qu'il s'éleva des discussions assez vives. Toutes vouloient, s'approvisionner a Bruxelles; mais pour mieux dire, toutes se jalousoient et chacune vouloit avoir le paturage le plus gras pour s'engraisser plus promptement.

Pichegru vit de sang-froid, et la petitesse des proconsuls et des disputes vetilleuses des administrations. Pour tout concilier, il accorda tout ce qu'on demanda pour l'armée de Sambre et Meuse; mais il ne put convenir de rien sur les mouvemens des troupes, parceque, quoique general en chef de ces deux armées, les pouvoirs illimités, eurent l'ambition de faire agir l'armée de Sambre et Meuse, suivant leurs idées.—*David's Campaigns du General Pichegru*, page 60 et 61.

† See the last-mentioned work, page 46, English translation.

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having put in requisition plate, jewels, and diamonds, for the use of the army hospitals *.

A short time after Pichegru had made his entrance at Brussels, St. Just and Le Bas had perished with Robespierre, and some of his and their accomplices; but neither Pichegru, nor the inhabitants of those countries his army had conquered, gained any thing by this revolution, because the republican tyranny only changed hands; and other deputies, as greedy and cruel as St. Just and Le Bas took their places, continued their exactions, insulting Pichegru's abilities by their ignorance, and his patriotism by their crimes.

From these short remarks, it is easily seen what goodness of heart, what firmness of character;

* See La Denonciations des Belges, printed at Paris in the year 4, and presented to the Council of Five Hundred in April 1797. These particulars are mentioned, page 6 and page 9. They say that the inhabitants of Belgium "*have paid more to France, in forced loans, contributions, extortions, and plunder, in twenty months; than to their former sovereign in the two preceding centuries.*" In the Dictionnaire Biographique, pag. 231, tom. ii. is said, "*Ce fut sur-tout sous le commissariat de Joubert, ont écrit eux memes les Belges, qu'il n'y eut plus de bornes pour les vols et les exactions. Il les sanctionnoit tous par son exemple. Cet effronté concussionnaire acheva d'opprimer le peuple. Ecrasés de tous côtés par ces insolens vampires, nous n'eumes bientôt plus la liberté de nous pourvoir devant les administrateurs. Joubert les cassa et substituâ d'autres, sous complices de ses brigandages, &c. &c.*"

and what patience it required in Pichegru (who could not but be conscious of his own worth) not to throw up his command, and refuse to serve any longer his ungrateful country and its barbarous and corrupted governors. He was then the only republican general in whose talents, not only the government and the army, but the whole nation placed their confidence and hope, and it is more than probable, that his resignation in the present circumstances would have disbanded the armies lately organized by him, entirely changed the face of affairs, and Brabant and Holland might yet have been free.

On the other hand, had Pichegru possessed the unprincipled ambition of a Bonaparte, he might, with the applause not only of France but of Europe, assumed a temporary sovereignty of the French commonwealth, because at this very time the abominable ferocity of the republican rulers had extended its terror to all nations, and any meritorious and moderate man would have been hailed and respected as the saviour of the liberty and civilization of the world. Pichegru's patriotism and modesty on this occasion, have caused as many sufferings to mankind since, as the virtue, and ill-applied, and ill-placed humanity
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of Louis XVI. had produced some years before*.

In the mean time the armies, but little influenced by the convulsions that had taken place in the capital, were put in motion, and resumed the

* That true patriot, the loyal, able, and distinguished writer, Mr. Bowles, makes, on the mis-application of this humane principle by the virtuous and unfortunate Louis XVI. some remarks, as acute as judicious, as liberal as just, and they ought to be printed and re-printed in all works where the horrors of rebellion are exposed, obedience instilled to subjects, vigilance and firmness insinuated to sovereigns and their ministers.—“*La mort d'un gouvernement est toujours un suicide.*” All friends, favourites, counsellors, or ministers of lawful princes, should adopt this phrase of Voltaire as their motto.

In his “Thoughts on the late General Election,” page 73, Mr. Bowles says: “Strange as it may seem, mischiefs which involve the ruin of states, and the destruction of social order, may originate in honourable and amiable feelings, which produce the most disastrous effects; because they are not under the guidance of judgment; because they are not accompanied with comprehensive views of the nature of society. The preservation of order and security imposes an indispensable duty on all who exercise authority, to resist, as dangerous weaknesses, those compassionate feelings which, if indulged, would screen offenders from punishment, encourage the commission of crimes by the prospect of impunity, or suffer resistance to ripen into rebellion, by neglecting to repress the first beginnings of turbulence and commotion. While they remember, that it is their bounden duty to temper justice with mercy, they should not forget, that ill-judged lenity to the guilty is cruelty to the innocent. The ambition of Louis XIV. the bigotry of Charles IX. and the tyranny of Louis XI. were not a thousandth part

the operations of the campaign. Accordingly, while Pichegru prepared, with one body of troops, to attack Holland, another assembled in the neighbourhood of Brussels, under Jourdan, and proceeded in pursuit of Clairfayt, who had succeeded

part so severe a scourge to France as the misplaced lenity and amiable weakness of Louis XVI. No usurper, of ancient or modern times, ever waded through such seas of blood to a throne as have deluged that unfortunate country, in consequence of the apparently humane resolution of the last-mentioned Prince, that *no blood should be shed in his cause*. There cannot, indeed, be a greater and a more mischievous error, than this unfortunate Prince fell into, in supposing, that when the authority of a Sovereign is assailed, it is *his* cause exclusively, or even principally, which is at issue. The authority which he has received from that Power by which "Kings reign, and Princes decree justice," is bestowed not for his own sake, but that of his people. It is a sacred trust reposed in him for the benefit and security of his subjects. He is the guardian of the persons and property of those who are placed under his care. The laws are weapons put into his hands for their defence. And if to indulge the generous emotions of his heart; if to escape those pangs which every human mind cannot but feel in inflicting punishment upon criminals, he suffers those laws to lose their effect, and to be no longer "a terror to evil doers"—if he "bear the sword in vain," he will be reponsible to the great King of Kings, whose minister he is, for all the sufferings which his ill-judged and destructive humanity may bring upon the people committed to his charge—and, indeed, for every outrage upon the person or property of any of them, which this sacrifice of justice to mercy may invite—nay, for the very guilt of offenders, who may be drawn into the commission of crimes by those hopes of impunity which a reliance on his lenity shall have encouraged them to form.

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the Prince of Cobourg, as commander in chief, and was the only general of the Combined Powers who now kept the field; for the Duke of York by this time, before vastly superior forces, had withdrawn into Dutch Brabant, after a long, ineffectual, but glorious struggle; and the Hereditary Prince of Orange was obliged to cross the Dyle, to prevent his small army from being surrounded.

Pichegru wished to advance, and undertake the siege of Breda, and the troops desired it as well as himself; but the army of the Sambre and the Meuse had not yet been able to drive the Austrians to the other side of the river Meuse, consequently, if he had marched to besiege this city, his right wing would have been uncovered. Besides, the administrations of provisions, &c. for the army of the North, had acted with such little intelligence and unanimity, that the incertitude of subsistence for the troops, gave more uneasiness to General Pichegru's mind, and perplexed him more, than the direction over the movements of the army. This part of the administration was conducted with such great negligence and ignorance, that ever since Pichegru's departure from Ghent, he continued to get bread from Lille, which was often wanted, and oftener arrived

arrived half rotten and not eatable. He wanted forage, and means to transport and convey it; and when he complained to the members of the administration, they answered, "*that they were independent of all military authority;*" and if he addressed himself to the representatives of the people, they said, "*his conquests were too rapid: they therefore wanted more time, to provide with order and regularity**;" that is to say, they had not time enough to pillage and exhaust the resources of one country, before his victorious army was marching in another.

So circumstanced, it was too hazardous for Pichegru yet to penetrate into the vast heaths of Dutch Brabant, and these considerations determined him to let his army encamp for eighteen days in its positions near Antwerp; and after much trouble, Pichegru at last succeeded, during this interval, to have magazines established at Ghent, Malines, and Antwerp. This measure diminished some of the obstacles, but it did not cause them entirely to cease, because these magazines were so ill supplied, that in case his army had met with a defeat, it would immediately have been reduced to penury, and want of the first necessities for its

* Le Coup-d'œil, page 33.

subsistence. The commissaries had not even waggons enough to transport the bread for the troops, and the horses destined to this use were so badly taken care of, and starved, that during each convoy, thirty or forty died or perished on the road*.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, Pichegru was determined to try the conquest of Holland; and to realize what Louis XIV. had attempted in vain. Alarm and consternation now spread among all those Dutchmen who really felt a patriotic zeal to rescue their country from the horrors of French domination. The Stadtholder had already appealed to the United States in an energetic address, disclosing the just apprehension which he entertained, invoking them to imitate the strenuous valour of their ancestors in resisting the Spaniards, shewing the miserable consequences which must result from permitting themselves to be deluded by the arts of deceit, seduction, and corruption, which could alone render their situation desperate, and give the desired advantages to the enemy; and exhorting all classes to co-operate in securing to themselves liberty, independence, and permanent happiness. Unfortunately for Holland and

* Les Campagnes du Pichegru, page 72 et 73.

Europe, this, and other patriotic appeals of the worthy chief magistrate of the Batavians, had little effect, and the people, in an evil hour, continued to shew a general disposition to court the fraternity of France.; a fraternity which offered gratification to many base and malignant passions, and for which the people had been assiduously prepared by French emissaries and agents.

After a suspension of operations for nearly two months, during which interval the four frontier garrisons had been subdued, Pichegru reassumed the offensive, and the army of the North quitted the environs of Antwerp on the 20th of August, and marched that day to Westmale, and the next day as far as Mol; but such was the bad administration of the commissariat, that he could not for some days advance farther, from want of bread for his army.

Besides this obstacle, Jourdan informed General Pichegru, that the passage of the river Oust, with the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, offered *invincible* difficulties. This march on the Lower Meuse became therefore of no utility, and the project was given up.

Pichegru then intended to approach nearer to the English army, and without removing too far from Antwerp, to defeat it on the first occasion, knowing it to be greatly reduced by recent losses.

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The Duke of York, after having been compelled to retreat before the superior strength of the French, marched to the plains of Breda, establishing his head-quarters at Oosterhout on the 4th of August, and taking so strong a position, that he felt secure from an assault, till the Dutch should have had time to put the garrison in a state of defence, erected redoubts in the front of his camp, and had the satisfaction to see the town put in a formidable condition, and a large tract of the surrounding country inundated.

On the 24th of August, Pichegru took his position near Turnhout, and on the 28th, in the neighbourhood of Hoogstraten, behind the little river Merk, he drove in the British outposts, with an intent to turn the left of the army, and cut off the retreat to Bois-le-duc; but the British Commander, with great judgment and generalship, effected a timely retreat, and encamped on a large plain seven miles beyond Bois-le-duc, establishing his head-quarters at the village of Udden, and relinquishing the defence of Breda to its garrison.

In this interval Sluys had surrendered, after enduring a vigorous siege, in which the French were also subjected to great inconveniences, and a destructive mortality, both from the nature of
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their situation, from the height of the tide, and from the exhalation of the inundations, which, besides, made the approaches to the city exceedingly difficult. The besieging army, exhausted by fatigue and illness, could not immediately be employed; and as the battering artillery was not arrived, Pichegru, in sending orders to Jourdan to pass with the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, the river Meuse, and to attack the left wing of the Austrians, prosecuted his original plan of pursuing the Duke of York, and leaving Breda, till he should have made some impression on Holland: there was yet another reason for this conduct—if the Austrian army had defeated the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and Pichegru had been occupied with the siege of Breda, his retreat with the army of the North would have been impossible, if the Duke of York had received reinforcements to give him the superiority of numbers, which he, from the reports of his spies, had every reason to believe would be the case*. Pichegru made, however, a judicious feint of commencing the siege of that place, for the purpose of concealing the amount of his force, and on the 14th of September made a general at-

* Coup-d'œil, page 66, and the note page 69.

tack on all the outposts along the Dommel, forcing that of Boxtel, which was chiefly protected by the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt. In this affair the French behaved with extraordinary valour; all the bridges over the Dommel, as well as those across a neighbouring stream, had been broken down, which retarded the action, commencing at three o'clock, and continuing until six in the evening, when they effected a passage, partly by swimming and partly by raft, and killed, wounded, or made prisoners, upwards of fifteen hundred of the Allies.

As the loss of the Boxtel would oblige His Royal Highness to abandon the whole of his line of defence, it was determined to send Lieutenant-general Abercromby, at the head of the reserve, during the ensuing night, with orders, if possible, to retake it; but the enemy being found too strong, having already received a reinforcement from Pichegru, the English troops returned; and the commander in chief having learned by this time, that numerous columns, to the amount of 80,000 men, were advancing against him, and not being able to muster 20,000 men himself, it was deemed prudent to withdraw, more especially as an attack appeared to be meditated against his

left, which was the most vulnerable point. This portion of the allied troops accordingly retreated across the Meuse in good order, and encamped at Wichem, after some loss in men, horses, and artillery; while Bois-le-duc and Bergen-op-zoom, as well as Breda, being no longer protected by a covering army, were obliged to depend on their own internal strength and resources, which the long resistance and able retreat of the British Prince before a vastly superior enemy, had given the Dutch government time both to improve and augment.

The French of the army of the North, on the 19th of the same month, took a position behind the Aa, between Wechel and Bourdoux, and on the ensuing day proceeded to Denter.

Pichegru for a short time discontinued the pursuit of the Duke of York's army, as well on account of the fatigue of the French troops, as from want of good maps; but the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, agreeably to the orders of Pichegru, attacked and defeated the left wing of the Austrian Army, and, after a series of well-contested engagements, in which the numbers of the repub-

* See *Le Coup-d'œil*, page 55, and *London Gazette Extraordinary*, Sunday, Sept. 21, 1794.

Means gave them a constant advantage, the Imperialists were compelled to cross the Rhine at Cologne, with the loss of near ten thousand men. The last battle was peculiarly bloody: General Clairfayt had chosen his position near Ruremonde with so much judgment, that Jourdan appeared to be squandering lives with unavailing profusion; and his attack must have remained an everlasting monument of his rashness, had the two wings of the Austrian army exhibited as much courage and discipline as the centre; but at the moment Clairfayt flattered himself with the prospect of complete success, and of destroying immense numbers of the enemy, while his own troops sustained no injury, he was informed that his wings were forced; and he was obliged to make a hasty, though orderly retreat, to avoid being turned and overpowered. Jourdan was so doubtful of the courage of his men in this tremendous assault, that he ordered cannon to be placed, to fire on such as might fall back. In a week after this battle, Jourdan gained possession of Cologne and Bonne.

It cannot be denied, that the successes of the French army in Holland originated from the talents of General Pichegru; its superiority in point of numbers over the Allies; and to its secret adherents in the inner part of that country; because

because at this period, while the French were victorious in the field, their partisans in the Seven Provinces became additionally alert and insolent: their number daily increased. The States General authorized the Stadtholder to cut the dykes and inundate the country, should the enemy make further advances; but the people were thought to oppose and reprobate the plan, as destructive to their lands and properties. This argument, which inculcated a preference of temporary advantage to permanent freedom, would not perhaps have been popular even in Holland, but a large portion of the natives, uninstructed by the horrible rapine which devastated and oppressed the inhabitants of Brabant and Flanders*, looked

* This note is extracted from the work of David on Pichegru's Campaigns, pages 94 and 95: it relates to Brabant and Flanders only, but is applicable to all countries where French republicans have penetrated, either by force or fraud, either during a *peace*, as in Switzerland and Egypt, or during a war, as in Italy and Holland. "Ce n'étoit rien que d'avoir souffert tous les ravages qu'entraînent une guerre aussi terrible; d'avoir vu incendier ou demolir ses maisons; d'avoir vu détruire les plus belles esperances de colte; d'avoir vu prendre ses blés en gerbes, pour faire les cabanes de nos soldats; il, a fallu encore que ce malheureux peuple ait passé par tous les termes du malheur, de l'oppression et de la devastation. Ses villes ont été inondées d'une cohorte de proconsuls plus inhumains que Phalaris, qui n'ont rien oublié de ce qui peut exaspérer les hommes; des comités, des tribunaux revolutionnaires ont été organisés; les femmes

looked to the French as friends and deliverers, who would rescue them from tyranny and taxation, and permit the poor, under the notion of fraternity, to plunder the opulent. This explains some easy conquests, even to the astonishment of the victors themselves: treachery, corruption, and cowardice, went often hand in hand.

To pursue the English army to the other side of the Meuse, Pichegru judged it absolutely necessary to obtain possession of some strong place, whence his army might draw its subsistence: the

femmes ont été insultées les hommes incarcérés et les propriétés violées. Notre code révolutionnaire a paru trop doux pour ce peuple paisible; il a été revu par ces hommes cruels, et augmenté d'une foule d'arrestes qui tous portoient peine de mort, de sorte que pour un geste ou un mot, un pere de famille étoit envoyé à l'échafaud, et sa famille étoit livrée aux horreurs de la faim et de la misère ;" and page 97, he continues, " Indépendamment de tous ces mesures effrayantes, injustes et devastatrices, une nuë des requisiteurs et membres de cette *agence*, appelés si improprement de *commerce* fondoient comme des vautours sur les villes et sur les campagnes et ruinoient pour long-tems le commercant et l'agriculture. Jamais operation n'a été faite avec un arbitraire aussi marqué, et aussi revoltant, chaque requisateur mettoit l'embargo sur les marchandises, sur les quelles, sa cupidité avoit spéculé; ici c'étoit les *linons*, les *dentelles*, etc. qui étoient reçues pour les besoins de l'armée, la c'étoit les *verniss*, les *tableaux*, les *voitures*, de lue, etc. etc." Citizen David is a Frenchman, and a republican, and has therefore certainly not exaggerated the blessing of a French fraternity.

bread^v

bread for the army of the North came yet from Antwerp, a distance of twenty-five leagues, or seventy-five miles, through almost impracticable roads; and as both horses and waggons were wanted to have it transported, it never arrived in a regular manner, and often the troops had no bread at all.

Bois-le-duc was the most convenient place, both to ensure a favourable position for the army, and to establish magazines. It became, therefore, of great consequence to get hold of this city, before the passage of the Meuse was attempted, though the enterprize was not only difficult but perilous. The place was defended by several forts well supplied with artillery, and in good order, which were thought impregnable. The inundations, which extend themselves to upwards of three hundred fathoms, or 1800 feet, from its ramparts, make it an island in the middle of a great river; and, was it even possible to make a breach, all the fascines of France would not be sufficient to approach it.

Independently of all these difficulties, for want of horses, General Pichegru had yet his heavy artillery for a siege at a great distance; the season was far advanced, and by the usual rains of that time of the year, the inundations might have been

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augmented in such a manner as to make any trenches impracticable.

Notwithstanding all these obstacles, Pichegru determined to undertake the siege: the place was invested by the French cavalry on the 23d of September, and the next day the infantry was placed. Some batteries of howitzers were constructed to set fire to the city, and the trenches were opened, but became every day more difficult, because the waters increased. On the 24th of September the fort of Orlen was seized, being evacuated by the enemy; and on the 29th, the fort of Crevecœur capitulated, after a bombardment of two days. This fort defended the sluices over the Meuse, and was therefore of great importance.

By incessant rains, the floods and inundations round Bois-le-duc were so much increased, as to make a siege, if not impossible, at least long and destructive: the trenches were at too great a distance, and as it was not in the power of the French engineers to advance them nearer, they became useless; Pichegru, and all the other generals, were therefore doubtful of the success of this siege, when the commander, to their great surprize, terminated their suspense on the 11th of October, by a voluntary surrender, obtaining an advantageous, but not an honourable capitulation.

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The Dutch had also abandoned the fort of St. André, situated on a small island formed by the Meuse and Waal, eastward of Bommel; but it was bravely retaken from the French by Lieutenant-general Abercromby, and proved a material impediment to the further operations of the republicans.

On the 14th of October, General Pichégu marched towards Grave with the army under his command, which place had, during the short siege of Bois-le-duc, been partly invested by a division under the orders of General Bonneau.

General Pichégu having now a place of strength to support his motions, had on the 19th crossed the Lower Meuse in pursuit of the enemy, regulating his movements in exact conformity to the operations of Jourdan, and completed the investing of Grave. This place entered necessarily in the French line of fortifications on the Meuse, because the project being formed to capture Maestricht and Venloo, it would have been imprudent to leave behind a fort so near Bois-le-duc; besides, these measures were indispensable to support the left wing of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, by the right wing of the army of the North.

The Duke of York, who is allowed on this,

as well as on many other occasions, even by the enemy, to have conducted his retreat with great ability*, in the face of a superier army, waited for the invaders in a strong position in the neighbourhood of Pufflech, having his two wings supported by two rivers. On the 19th of October, the French, notwithstanding this, moved forward in four columns, and attacked the whole of the advanced posts on his right, particularly those of Douthin and Appelthern, the former of which was defeated by the 37th regiment, and the latter by the Prince of Rohan's light battalion. The troops conducted themselves with great gallantry; but a post on the left having been forced, Major Hope, after distinguishing

* Had the son of a sans-culotte acted with the same ability as the son of a king, and encountered nobly, and often victoriously, so many difficulties from the superior number of his foes, and from the treachery or cowardice of his friends and allies, a thousand voices would have proclaimed his great performances; but while the friends of loyalty are silent, a French Citizen, an avowed enemy to England and its Prince, writes thus: "*Un historien, impartial ne peut pas s'empêcher de convenir que dans cette occasion et dans beaucoup d'autres, les dispositions de l'ennemi pour la défensive, ont toujours été marquées au coin de la bonne tactique. On peut dire la même chose de toutes leurs retraites. Celle que les Anglais firent dans cette occasion mérite des éloges; elle exigeoit les plus grandes précautions, et on peut affirmer qu'il n'y en eut aucunes de négligées.*" See *Campagnes du General Pichegru*, par le Citoyen David, page 114.

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himself greatly, was obliged to retreat along the dyke of the Waal, where his regiment, being charged furiously by the enemy's horse, suffered considerably; Major-general Fox is said to have been nearly at the same time taken prisoner, and detained for a few minutes by some French hussars, while encouraging the troops to a strenuous opposition. On this occasion, too, the unfortunate emigrants in British pay, fighting bravely, suffered considerably.

After this engagement, the Duke of York immediately retired behind the Waal, while Pichegru with the invading army, notwithstanding the advanced season of the year, and the obstacles arising out of the nature of the country, prepared to besiege the neighbouring garrisons.

Venloo was accordingly invested by General Laurent, who is said, upon this occasion, to have had no more than 4000 men under his command, and to have been destitute of heavy artillery. He, however, commenced his operations within 100 fathoms of the covered way. The garrison, after a vigorous sally, in which it was repulsed, intimidated by the vigour of the French, and the proximity of their works, on the 27th of October assented to a capitulation, and was permitted to march out with the honours of war and ten pieces of cannon.

Pichegru's

Pichegru's first division of the army of the North, and one of the strongest in this army, never once made a retrograde motion. To this division, and to that under General Moreau, France is indebted for all its triumphs during the campaign in Flanders and in Holland. When the one besieged any place, the other protected its undertaking as an army of observation; neither the one nor the other miscarried in their enterprises; but such are the gratitude and justice of a republican government, that of the two generals who conducted them to victory, the one is proscribed and in exile, the other neglected, and in disgrace.

From the fatiguing course of one of the most active campaigns, and from the constant custom to sleep always full dressed, Pichegru contracted an inveterate cutaneous disease. He had now sat down before Nimeguen with the main body of the forces, but was obliged, from this complaint, to abandon the command to his friend and pupil Moreau, and to repair to Brussels to obtain medical advice and assistance. He continued, however, to direct the operations both of the army of the North, and of the Sambre and Meuse, by his councils and correspondence with Moreau and Jourdan.

During Pichegru's absence, General Kleber greatly facilitated the operations of the two grand armies, by the celerity with which he reduced Maestricht. This city was besieged and taken by Louis XIV. in thirteen, and by Louis XV. in twenty-one days; General Miranda in 1793, had during nine days attacked it in vain, but it now capitulated, although the trenches had been opened only eleven days: another proof of the want of courage and of character in the Dutch commanders.

The French, however, appeared for a while to be less fortunate in their attack upon Nimeguen, another city which was not only defended by a numerous garrison, but covered by the Duke of York, who from his camp at Arnheim, was enabled at any time to throw in supplies.

The enemy, after forcing the British outposts in front of the place, immediately attacked fort St. André; and Lieutenant-general Abercromby, and Lieutenant-colonel Clark, were slightly wounded in the skirmish that ensued, as was also Captain Picton in a sally from the place. At length the French broke ground, under the direction of General Souham, and began, on the 5th of November, to construct their batteries; on which Count Walmoden marched out suddenly with

with a body of British infantry and cavalry, consisting of the 8th, 27th, 28th, 55th, 63d, and 78th regiments of foot, and the 7th and 15th light-horse, two battalions of Dutch, the legion of Damas, and some Hanoverian horse, under Major-general De Burgh, who was wounded while leading on his men with great gallantry. On this occasion the infantry advanced under a severe fire, and jumping into the trenches without returning a shot, charged with the bayonet, and by this check greatly retarded the enemy's works.

As it now appeared evident, that the place could not be taken, until all intercourse with the English army was cut off, two strong batteries were constructed on the right and left of the lines of defence, and these were so effectually served, that they at length destroyed one of the boats which supported the bridge of communication. The damage sustained upon this occasion was immediately repaired by Capt. Popham, of the royal navy; but the Duke of York, being aware of the superiority of the enemy's fire, judiciously determined to withdraw every thing from the town, beyond what was barely necessary for its defence. All the artillery of the reserve, with the British, Hanoverian, and Hessian battalions, accordingly retired; but pikemen, to the amount of twenty-five hundred men,

were left under the command of Major-general De Burgh. The Dutch, on seeing themselves abandoned, became dispirited, and determined also to evacuate the place; but an unfortunate shot having carried away the top of the mast of the flying bridge, it swung round, and about four hundred of the garrison were taken prisoners, on which those that remained in the fortifications opened the gates to the besiegers. The same regicides who some months before, irritated by the bravery of Britons in Flanders, had decreed that no quarter should be given to British soldiers, exasperated at the gallant resistance of the English army in Holland, against superior forces, now revenged themselves, by publishing the most absurd reports, accusing the English of perfidy, and asserting that they fired on their allies, the Dutch, while attempting to escape by means of the flying bridge. This accusation of perfidy against England, from men who had betrayed and murdered their king, shot, drowned, or guillotined 900,000 of their countrymen*, is not surprizing; but that it should be copied or believed by foreigners shews the progress which revolutionary principles have made every where.

* See Prudhomme Tableau Generale, and Dictionnaire Biographique, tom. iii. page 60.

The Duke of York, desirous of avoiding an engagement which might have been attended with the most fatal effects in respect to Holland, retired immediately after the surrender of Nimeguen on the 8th of November, while Moreau and the other generals represented the state of the French army to be such as required repose. The British troops had now gone into cantonments along the Waal, and on the opposite side of the Lech: the weather was extremely severe, the troops sickly, and fatigued with the severe duty of maintaining a cordon of strong piquets along the Waal, from Bommel on the right, where they joined the Dutch, to Pameren on the left, where they communicated with the Austrians. The French were more fatigued, and had not fewer invalids in proportion than the Allies; but the French government was inexorable, and notwithstanding the rigour of the climate and the season, determined to prosecute offensive military operations during the whole winter. The passage of the Waal was accordingly resolved upon, and General Daendels, a Dutch traitor, formerly an attorney, was entrusted with the enterprise. Having collected a number of boats, he filled them with troops, and effected a landing near the port of Ghent during a thick fog, in consequence of which

which he was also enabled to surprize a battery. This attack, which extended to several posts in the line occupied by the Allies, particularly fort St. André, Donvert, Panderon, and the isle of Byland, did not, however, prove ultimately successful, for many of the assailants were killed upon this occasion by the fire of the batteries, and a multitude drowned, in consequence of which the project was at length entirely relinquished. Preparations, however, were made to facilitate the operations of the approaching campaign, and the Generals Bonneau and Le Maire received orders from General Pichegru to invest Breda by means of winter cantonments. Grave also was surrounded in a similar manner, and all the necessary dispositions were taken to ensure the conquest of Holland in the course of the ensuing spring.

The operations of the French had been now suspended upwards of a month, and an awful pause had taken place in the career of victory; it was even uncertain, whether, on the return of fine weather, it would be safe to venture further into a country, which might be so easily laid under water; and the genial winters that had occurred in Europe since 1788, prohibited the hope of that degree of congelation necessary for military enterprises.

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The season, however, soon assumed a menacing appearance for the Dutch, as the frost set in towards the latter end of the year, with an unexpected degree of rigour. On this, General Pichegru, for whom repose had no longer any charms, although his health was not yet entirely re-established, immediately left Brussels, and proceeded to head-quarters. This general had, the year before, made a winter campaign on the Upper Rhine, with the greatest success, but what he had effected in the cold season in that country, he might have done during the spring, whilst such a severe winter as that of 1795 was absolutely necessary to obtain any brilliant conquests in Holland. On resuming the command of the army of the North, he found that both the Meuse and the Waal were already able to bear troops; he determined therefore to take advantage of this opportunity to complete his projects.

Two brigades under the Generals Daendels and Osten, on the 27th December received orders to march across the ice to the isle of Bommel; a detachment was at the same time sent off against the fort St. André; and the reduction of those places, which at any other time would have been attended with great slaughter, was now achieved almost without bloodshed, at a
time

time when the mercury in the thermometer had fallen lower than at any former period during the last thirty years. Sixteen hundred prisoners, and an immense number of cannon, rewarded the toils of the invading army, while the Allies, unable to withstand their numbers, retired to the entrenchments between Gorcum and Cuylenberg. A successful attack was made at the same time on the lines of Breda, Oudebesch, and Sevenbergen; but what was infinitely more important, the town of Grave, considered as a master-piece of fortification, and which had already suffered a blockade of two months, being destitute of provisions and ammunition, was on the 29th December forced to surrender, in consequence of which, its garrison was made prisoners of war.

A few days after this, the weather continuing favourable to his enterprise, Pichegru determined to cross the Waal in the neighbourhood of Nimeguen, with his whole army; this was accordingly effected on the 11th of January 1795, and whole battalions of infantry, squadrons of cavalry, detachments of artillery, with an immense number of waggons, passed over this branch of the Rhine without the assistance of either bridges or boats. The whole of the troops had not, however,

ever, reached the place of destination, when on the 12th a sudden thaw, by cutting off the communication, seemed to hazard the success of the whole expedition; but the frost by the next day resuming its empire, enabled the French to form a junction; and Gorcum, the head-quarters of the Prince of Orange, was now threatened with an assault.

The Duke of York having, in the mean time, returned to England universally regretted, the command devolved upon General Walmoden, who achieved every thing that was possible to be performed by an army destined to contend against an enemy superior in point of numbers, inured to hardships, and accustomed to victory. But although Major-general David Dundas had succeeded in an expedition, in the course of which he boldly carried Tayl, and drove a body of the enemy across the ice, with the loss of a number of men, and four pieces of cannon, yet it was deemed necessary, in the course of a few days, to remove the head-quarters from Arnheim to Amerongen. An intense frost having converted the whole of the Low Country into one continued sheet of ice, the Allies were obliged to fall back during the night, first upon Beuren, and they soon after took refuge behind the Lech. They, however, at times
attacked

attacked the enemy, and proved successful in an affair at Gelder Malsel, on which occasion Major-general Lord Cathcart, with the 14th, 27th, and 28th Regiments, and the British hulans, distinguished himself greatly, and this too during a period when the troops, notwithstanding the inclemency of the season, were frequently obliged to pass the night in the open air.

Pichegru having completed his arrangements, crossed the Waal in still greater force, and attacked several points at the same time, on the whole line of the Allies; one column passed at Pameren, and another at the village of Ghent, but were repulsed; a third crossed near Nimeguen, and, in conjunction with two columns which had passed between Tiel and Dodewaert, attacked the British positions on that side. The Austrians had abandoned Heusden, and passed the Léch; and the Hanoverians, with General Coates's brigade, consisting of the 40th, 59th, and 79th regiments, were obliged to fall back on Lent: the French had all their troops on the opposite side of the river, and on a signal given, they crossed in great numbers, and attacked General Coates; the 40th and 79th regiments were placed about half a mile in the rear, close to a wood, and the 59th were left to engage, and try to draw them
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into the ambuscade, but a strong column of the enemy forced their way between the 59th and the main body: on their falling back on Lent, they found it in the possession of the enemy, and in consequence, retired across the Lingen, where they maintained themselves behind the river, near Elst.

The French obtained immediate possession of Buren and Culembourg, and prepared to besiege Goreum, which from the strength of the works and the facility of inundation, had been considered the key of Holland; it was the head-quarters of the Stadtholder, but the frost rendering resistance impossible, he quitted the untenable fortress, and finding from the ascendancy of his enemies, that his residence in the United States was no longer secure, abandoned that ungrateful country, which, forgetful of its great obligations to himself, his family and his ancestors, and its duty as an independent state, was plunging with blindfold confidence into the most despicable and hopeless bondage. The Stadtholder, and a great number of respectable natives of Holland, who preceded or accompanied him, found a safe refuge and cheering welcome in England, where His Serene Highness landed on the 20th of January, 1795.

While the Stadtholder was thus forced to fly
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from a country where his ancestors, by their intrepidity and patriotism, had established liberty and independence, a French officer with dispatches from General Pichegru entered Amsterdam, and repaired to the house of the burgomaster. In the evening of the same day, numbers of the rabble placed the three-coloured cockade in their hats, and made the streets resound with rebellious air. Next morning a detachment of hussars posted themselves before the town-house, where the tree of liberty * was planted with a ridiculous solemnity, and the command of the place conferred on Citizen Krayenhoff, one of the disaffected and insurgent Dutchmen, while De Winter, of the same party, but a general in the French service, with the French light horse, took possession of the fleet frozen up in the Texel.

At the time when Pichegru crossed the Waal, General Bonneau left the environs of Breda, and attacked Gertruydenburg: the British troops, finding themselves unable to maintain their position in the province of Utrecht, retreated towards

* Inundated with blood every where, the tree of liberty flourishes no where. In France they call it, *l'arbre de misere, decoré d'un bonnet et du gallere*; and, in fact, the liberty of galley slaves is the only fruit it produces.

Westphalia, after sustaining a severe attack all along their line, from Arnheim to Amorengon; and this province entered into a separate capitulation for itself, receiving the French with prostrate submission and eager welcome, while the retreating army of the British was treated with savage cruelty, the sick and wounded were insulted, plundered, and even murdered by these worthless and ungrateful Allies, in whose cause they had shed their blood and lost their health. The intense coldness of the winter increased the miseries of the retreating army, and produced scenes of distress which cannot be reflected on without horror and anguish.

On the very same day the Stadtholder landed in England, Pichegru, the conqueror of Holland, surrounded by the deputies of the States, repaired to Amsterdam, the chief city of the union, where he was received with transports of joy. The modesty of Pichegru, on this and all other occasions, when crowned by victory and obtaining applause, was a reproaching contrast with the insolence and pretensions of the French representatives, and their associates the Dutch patriots; and it required all Pichegru's firmness of character to prevent those scenes of plunder, vengeance, bloodshed, and proscription taking place in Holland, which so lately had dishonoured France.

After the French had gotten possession of Amsterdam, Pichegru ordered Bonneau's division to pass the lake Biesboch, and it occupied Dordrecht, Rotterdam, the Hague, Brille, and Helvoetsluys, and General Maedonald entered Naerden. The province of Zealand having also capitulated, the light troops, consisting chiefly of horse and artillery, had marched into North Holland, and added to the wonders of Pichegru's campaign the unprecedented circumstance of taking a fleet.

Overysse, Groningen, and Friesland, were still in possession of the British army; but diminished as they were in numbers, hostile as were the Dutch towards them, and immensely superior in force as were the French, their situation could not be long tenable, nor was it either politically or desirable, under such circumstances, to retain ground in such a country. A thaw having commenced, the depth of water rendered the passage by the usual route impracticable.

According to Pichegru's orders, the French under Maedonald, having taken a position between Campen, Zwoll, and Deventer, while Moreau occupied Zutcher, General Abercromby became apprehensive, that, in case of an attack, his retreat would be cut off; he therefore withdrew his troops from the advanced posts, and
marched

marched to Bentheim, by way of Eucchede and Velthuysen; and the British head-quarters were moved first to Osnaburgh, and afterwards to Diepholtz, the republicans being every where received by the decree of the new government of the United States as friends. At last the British forces marched to Bremen, and thence to Bremerleebc, where they embarked for England, after surmounting toils and difficulties seldom equalled, with a valour, perseverance and discipline, which were never surpassed.

Thus ended the campaign in Holland, during which Pichegru, aided by the rigours of an accidental frost, achieved conquests, that one of the greatest French monarchs had been unable to effect; for the Lech had proved an insurmountable barrier to Louis XIV. in 1672, amidst his career of glory; while Pichegru, with an army belonging to a country degraded by rebellion, without a chief, destitute of a government, and devoid of finances, after crossing both that river and the Yssel, carried his conquering arms to the borders of the Ems.

General Pichegru, by this brilliant campaign, has convinced military men that the former tactic, which began by making sieges, and squandering away by it the bravest troops, was not

the best. A place well fortified is impregnable, as long as it is defended by a brave army; but no fortress can hold out any length of time when the troops who should protect it are defeated. Had the Combined Powers in 1793 adopted and followed the same tactics which made Pichegru victorious in 1794, a regular government would probably have now existed in France, Frenchmen would have been happy and tranquil, and Europe free. This assertion is evident, from the manner in which France got possession of Valenciennes, Conde, Quesnoy, Luxembourg, &c.

Pichegru never laid siege to any fort or fortified place, which was not absolutely necessary to protect the position of his army; and with this method he in nine months conquered a greater extent of country, and forced more fortresses to surrender, than any French warriors who preceded him, in leading Frenchmen to victory, either under Henry IV. or the four Louises his successors.

Frenchmen are too ardent and too impatient, to perform well operations which demand a great deal of patience and constancy. In a battle, the decision of which cannot be long suspended, they fight bravely when they confide in their officers, but a long and difficult siege, discourages
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and often disheartens them; the troops over whom Pichegru took the command in the spring of 1794, were besides mostly new levies, without either experience, spirit or knowledge enough to undertake and endure a long siege; they had enthusiasm and courage, but no capacity, and in employing wisely the former, he taught them the latter.

If Pichegru had not known the French character better than the Committee of Public Safety; if he had implicitly followed its orders, and not adopted a new and unusual tactic, 50,000 men at least, would have perished before Valenciennes, Conde, and Quesnoy, without calculating upon those which probably would have been destroyed in defeat; had he even been victorious, from the time he necessarily must have spent in besieging those places according to the rules of war, he would have been unable to extend his conquest as far as he did. The late King of Prussia, from the beginning of the campaign, did Pichegru more justice than Carnot and the other republican tyrants of the Committee of Public Safety: he wrote a letter to the Emperor, inserted in the Belgic newspapers, in which he said, "It is impossible to save your country from an invasion; the French have armies always revived by fresh and numerous recruits, and do

do not deceive yourself; *their generals have adopted a good tactic, which confutes and baffles ours* *."

Success has perfectly justified Pichegru's plans, but although they had not been crowned by victory, they deserved both applause and admiration, because all impartial military men must acknowledge them not only to be good ones, but superior to all yet invented or introduced by former great generals. Had Pichegru, however, miscarried, such were the ignorance and cruelty of the republican rulers, that his head would have paid for his misfortunes. Pichegru left three strong fortresses for months behind him, without appearing to have been embarrassed about them, and they surrendered to France as if from themselves. When he crossed the Meuse, he left in the same manner behind him Sas de Gand, Hulst, and Axel, in Flanders, and Borgen op-zoom and Breda, in Dutch Brabant, and these places soon followed the example of those in Henault. These are facts which not only instruct but convince.

No sooner had Pichegru's victories effected a revolution in Holland, than the intrigues, plunder, and crimes of the representatives who accompanied him, lessened or tarnished the glory of his

* Coup-d'œil, page 84, and David's Campaign, page 32.

arms: Requisitions, forced loans, military executions, and contributions, were within the first six weeks enacted to the amount of twenty-five millions sterling. The property of the Stadtholder, as Chief of the United States, as well as his private and family property, were confiscated and disposed of in the name of the French republic. The Dutch patriots, protected by the French representatives, plundered the estates and possessions of the adherents of this Prince, and arrested and proscribed their persons and families. The bank of Amsterdam was inspected, robbed, and sealed with the French republican seal; the public treasures of each city, of the hospitals, of the orphan houses, and of the churches, French rapacity carried away or emptied; the magazines of the state, and its arsenals, were sequestered, and the warehouses and even shops of individuals were in perpetual requisition; most of the shops of goldsmiths and jewellers were cleared in twenty-four hours, and their value paid by the French Commissaries in assignats, which were of no value in Holland, and of but little value in France: under the appellation of patriotic donation, the plate, and even the trinkets of each person were, under pain of imprisonment and severe penalty, ordered

to be delivered up*. It is impossible to know to what length the French republicans and the Dutch patriots would have carried their extortions, vengeance and violence, had the French military commander acted as the French pro-consuls and civil commissaries. Jacobin clubs, revolutionary committees, prison, and the guillotine, would no doubt then have been as much the order of the day in Holland as it was in France; but Pichegru, as far as it laid in his power, opposed and prevented all such cruel, tyrannical, and revolutionary measures; and all good Dutchmen are indebted to his justice, moderation, and humanity, that their country was neither inundated with blood, nor disgraced nor ruined by anarchy; and that at a time when it was a crime amongst French republicans to be humane, moderate and just, and a fashionable virtue to be barbarous, unfeeling, and exaggerated.

In February 1795, the new created States General of the Batavian republic offered General Pichegru an annuity of twelve thousand florins, which, notwithstanding his poverty and his services, he declined: he said on this occasion to

* Le Coup-d'œil, page 86. Le Reconnoissance Batave, printed by Ahem, Amsterdam, 1795, page 6.

the members of the Dutch government, who waited upon him with this offer, and who declared " *they owed to him and to him alone the restoration of freedom* ; that the only reward agreeable to him, and *without which he ever should regret his victories*, would be, that the terrible example of the French might serve as a lesson and warning to them and their countrymen, and that under the name of liberty no slavery might be introduced and made permanent : " and although this offer was more than once repeated, Pichegru always continued inflexible, and during all the time he passed in Holland, he never accepted a single present, nor any thing besides his pay ; whilst the *worthy* representatives of the French people not only enriched themselves by their rapine, but exhausted the Batavian commonwealth by their extravagance ; destroyed the religious principles of its citizens by their writings and seductions, and perverted their moral notions by their scandalous and infamous examples *.

Under revolutionary governments, founded upon crime and wickedness, it is as unsafe to be virtuous and incorruptible, as under regular and

* The last mentioned Pamphlet, page 10.

moral governments it is dishonourable to be vicious and degrading to be corrupt. When Pichegru refused to share the plunder of Holland with the representatives of the French people, and rejected the annuity presented to him by the Batavians, he became suspected by the regicides, Sieyes and Rewbel, as a royalist, and by the Committee of Public Safety, as an enemy to the republic. As, however, both the army and the French nation at large did not partake in the opinions either of the committee or of its worthy delegates, instead of degrading, they ennobled him, expecting, by promoting him above all his fellow-citizens, to make him envied or hated in a republic where the principles of equality had made the most absurd as well as the most dangerous progress ; but the modesty and patriotism of Pichegru disappointed their expectations.

Since the Prussian ministers had dishonoured the Prussian monarchy by a peace with regicide France, and Austria had evacuated the countries on the Lower Rhine, Pichegru having no more enemies to combat with the army of the North, was nominated to direct the operations of the armies of the Rhine and of the Moselle, although he continued as a commander in chief over the armies of the North, and of the Sambre and Meuse,

Meuse, entrusted to the guidance of Moreau and Jourdan, he had therefore under his orders more troops than any republican general before him ever disposed of; and with the exception of General Washington, he is the only military chief of a commonwealth, possessing the love and confidence of his soldiers, and the esteem of his fellow-citizens, who did not usurp the government of his country at the expence of the liberty of his countrymen.

By an invitation from the National Convention, Pichegru went to Paris before he assumed his new appointment: since the death of Robespierre, his accomplices, or slaves of this Assembly had been divided amongst themselves; those who had grown rich by their revolutionary crimes, desired a more moderate government, to enjoy with safety the fruits of their spoils; whilst others, who were as guilty, but who from ignorance or prodigality, possessed nothing but the prospect of invading and sharing in their turn the property and riches of other people, plotted to continue the reign of anarchy and terror.

At his arrival in the capital, Pichegru was nominated the commandant and governor *ad interim*; and by his presence, and able dispositions, defeated on the 1st of April, 1795, the projects of

the terrorists, who intended to issue new lists of proscriptions; to fill again the prisons with victims, and to erect anew, scaffolds for innocence, honour, and virtue. Carnot, Barras, and their accomplices, never forgave Pichegru this avowed declaration against their former revolutionary deeds and future *patriotic* plans; and, disunited as they have been amongst themselves, they always agreed in injuring as much as it laid in their power, a citizen and a general, who was no friend to vice, and no tool of faction, without ambition as well as without guilt, and whom they could not but regard as their common enemy, knowing as they did, that at all times he had proved his abhorrence of conventional marauders and regicide assassins, although shielded under the great and terrible names of representatives of the people, of republican patriots, or jacobin sans-culottes.

The more Pichegru became acquainted with the Parisian republicans, the more their principles distressed him and their conduct disgusted him, because he found them dangerous as citizens, and despicable as men; abject to their superiors, haughty to their equals, and fierce and inhuman to their inferiors, having neither character, information, nor conscience; his stay at Paris was

was therefore short, and as soon as he had regulated the concerns of his armies, he set out for Strasburgh.

It was very probable that Pichegru, with the resources and talents he possessed, would make the campaign of 1795 as brilliant as that of the preceding year; but this was not the wish nor the interest of the jacobins, because it would have given him too great a popularity, and these envious foes, not being able to change his principles, or daring enough to deprive him of the command, calumniated the former, and by their intrigues *neutralized*, or rather made ineffectual, the latter, and his efforts to serve his country. At his arrival on the Rhine he found an undisciplined army, where political discussions occupied the time necessary for military exercise: the different parties of the National Convention had there each their adherents, who mutually detested, and would rather turn their arms against each other, than against the enemy of their country. Not a day passed but some citizens were killed in duels, or in private combats, in consequence of their political quarrels; and the representatives of the people, instead of concurring with Pichegru to put an end to these disorganizing transactions, which, in face of the Austri-

ans, even endangered the safety of the army, rather encouraged them, by promoting the most violent men, and who were the principal cause of those dishonourable disturbances.

Jourdan, who commanded the army of the Sambre and Meuse, is a man of no education, of doubtful abilities as a general, and unprincipled as a politician. During the American war he served as a common soldier, and from the beginning of the Revolution he made himself noted as one of the most violent orators of the jacobin club at Limoges, where he was born, and where, in 1792, he was by the jacobins chosen a commander of a battalion of national volunteers : by sacrificing unnecessarily, in the manner of Bonaparte, thousands of lives, he has sometimes been victorious, but oftener defeated ; and a defeated army under him became immediately a disorganized and a dispersed one, because he has no capacity to form a regular retreat, and in his attacks, his only tactic is to overpower an enemy by the number of his troops. To embroil such a man and known terrorist with Pichegru, was easily done, as even during the last campaign, Jourdan had more than once shewn his jealousy of Pichegru's victories, and his vexation at being obliged to act under his orders,

Pichegru

Pichegru had his instructions not to open the campaign before Jourdan could co-operate with him, and Luxemburgh, which was blockaded, had surrendered. This fortress capitulated on the 7th of June, 1795; but notwithstanding Pichegru's endeavours and entreaties, the summer had passed over before the army of the Sambre and Meuse, either from the incapacity or malevolence of Jourdan, had put itself into motion.

On the 18th September, Jourdan crossed the Rhine and attacked Dusseldorf. The city was instantly summoned, and having refused to surrender, was taken by assault, the Austrian garrison having previously retired towards the Lahn, where General Clairfayt, who commanded this division, was joined by a considerable force.

No sooner had Pichegru received intelligence of these exploits, than he also crossed the Rhine with the army of the Rhine, and the left wing of that of the Moselle. He advanced directly against Mannheim, and obtained possession of that important city with a degree of facility so disproportionate to the strength of the place, that it was evident he must have been favoured by the good wishes at least of the inhabitants, or by the opinion they had of his humanity and generosity. On this General Wurmser, the Austrian com-

mander on the Upper Rhine, who was advancing by rapid marches to its relief, endeavoured to form a junction with General Clairfayt, but he was overtaken by General Pichegru, and defeated by a detachment of the army under his command.

The effects of the intrigues of the disorganizing terrorists at Paris were now felt by Pichegru, who immediately after his late victory went to inspect and direct some new fortifications added to the city of Manheim. During his absence, the French dispersing themselves in quest of plunder, were surprized and overcome by the Austrians, and in consequence of one of those sudden reverses so common in all wars, but more especially during the last, the fortune of the campaign, from being highly disastrous, became at length eminently propitious to the Imperial arms.

Meanwhile, Jourdan, according to a plan previously arranged, had crossed the Mein, and invested Mentz, on the right side of the Rhine; but General Clairfayt fell suddenly on his rear, captured his artillery, and obliged him to raise the blockade, re-cross the Mein, and retreat to Dusseldorff; while his rear was constantly harassed by the victorious Austrians.

In consequence of Jourdan's defeat, Pichegru

was

was also obliged to retreat to the other side of the Rhine, leaving a strong garrison in Mannheim, and hoping to reinforce the French camp near Mentz sufficiently to resist the Austrians; but before he could arrive the attack had been made, the French completely routed, their artillery taken, and they, with difficulty, enabled to effect even a disorderly retreat. The victorious armies under Wurmser and Clairfayt having formed a junction, retook the Palatinate, and the greater part of the country between the Rhine and the Moselle. Pichegru, some time after, effected a junction with Jourdan; but in such confusion was the army of the Sambre and Meuse, that their greatest efforts could not prevent the recapture of Mannheim, though they impeded a project formed by the Imperialists for penetrating to Luxemburgh.

After receiving some reinforcements, Pichegru and Jourdan marched, on the 28th of November, to encounter the triumphant enemy. On the first of December, the former carried the town of Kreutznach twice by storm; but he was obliged at length to evacuate that place, because his colleague was repulsed soon after, in an ill-conducted attack upon Keyserlautern, in which he lost two thousand men. At last the severity of the season, and an unexpected armistice

armistice of three months, put an end to the campaign, the close of which was not only far different from its commencement, but also from what might have been augured from the relative forces of the contending powers.

This was the first armistice concluded between regicide France and Imperial Austria: the latter, victorious, obtained not an inch of ground for agreeing to a cessation of arms, which enabled the former to recruit its forces, to organize its armies and its newly-erected directorial government, and to prepare the decisive campaign of 1796; whilst, in 1800, when Austria was forced to sue for an armistice, none was granted but at the expence of fortresses, and countries given up or evacuated. Such has been the difference between the Imperial and the republican policy during the late contest, which proves that France is as much indebted to its Philips as to its Alexanders, for the fortunate issue.

In October 1795, the Directory had succeeded the Committee of Public Safety in the Executive Government of France: of its members, three were regicides and two were atheists, and of course the enemies of a general, whose loyalty and religion were known and respected all over France. The Director Carnot, in his writings, has acknowledged.

known, and even boasted of having, by a refusal of attending to Pichegru's complaints against Jourdan and the disorganizing deputies and emissaries in his army, forced him to resign* ; so situated, even the talents of a Pichegru could not bring about impossibilities ; and it can therefore excite no surprize, nor merit any reproach, if, finding all his labours rewarded with mistrust, ingratitude, and calumny, he threw up in disgust the command over the four French armies.

When Pichegru, in 1793, was made a commander in chief, the military men, as well as other citizens in France, had their persecutors, revolutionary tribunals, and executioners. Promotion always depended upon the caprice of the consuls, who often, to settle advantageously their relatives or friends, deposed or arrested officers occupying with honour and distinction command and places. Discretion, moderation, a decent cleanliness, or dress, and a polite language, were proscribed as indicating aristocracy, and occasioned the loss of his rank, liberty, and life, by a person noted for any of these agreeable qualities. The best recommendation to advancement was,

* Le Coup-d'œil, page 89. Dictionnaire Biographique, tom. iii. page 177.

not to do one's duty, but to make extravagant and incendiary motions at the jacobin clubs ; to speak of nothing but treason, aristocrats, and the guillotine ; and, if a soldier left his post to declaim or denounce in a club, any officer punishing this infraction of military discipline was certain to be shot or broken, as an emissary of Pitt and Cobourg.

The *physical* existence of military men was therefore as uncertain, and more exposed than that of other citizens, because they had to fear both the commissioners of death (as they were called), composed of the same elements as the revolutionary tribunals, and which were attached to and followed the armies, and the fire and sword of the enemy. Their *political* existence depended upon a nod, a word, or a calumniator, who envied them or wanted to succeed them, and the pro-consuls made a game and a gain of placing and re-placing generals and officers, or, which was the same, by disorganizing every thing.

Such was the critical situation of all persons serving in the army of the North, even when Pichegru arrived as its chief, and, except at Hunsdoeten and by Maubeuge, it had therefore been continually defeated. He had the good luck to be accompanied with the only irreproachable de-

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puty to the armies, Citizen Richard, who was as just, regular, and severe, as himself, but who in a short time, on that account, was recalled: all the other deputies were cruelly unjust and shockingly ignorant. As the greatest number of the officers and soldiers detested the conduct of these men, and of the generals who submitted to be their tools or accomplices, Pichegru, by uniting justice with severity, duty with regularity, and reward with impartiality, in a few weeks obtained their esteem and confidence. This was the principal reason why he was so soon able to establish a discipline which alone procured him victory*.

The modesty which appeared in all his reports, wears a striking contrast to those of a Dumourier, Custine, Jourdan, Bonaparte, and Mênou, and with those of the conventional deputies or commissaries, who often, ten leagues from the field of battle, killed enemies in their official dispatches, who continued fighting against France, and revived Frenchmen killed and buried by their enemies.

The political system of the members of the Committee of Public Safety was so dreadful, that all generals feared their fury. Some commanders

* Le Coup-d'œil, page 90; and David's Memoires, page 64.

thought to avoid it by exaggerating their success, others by leaving them in ignorance as to its extent. This last manner agreed best with the modest character of Pichegru, and he adopted it. He never once furnished any long relations concerning his victories and progress, but he contented himself with publishing their great consequence, without entering into any particulars.

Dumourier, Jourdan, and Bonaparte, seldom obtained advantages but by throwing away the lives of the soldiers under their command; by filling the trenches of the enemy with their killed men; by fatiguing their adversaries by attacks, twenty times repeated: such was, in a great measure, their military science, that is to say, that of brave but obstinate and unfeeling men. Pichegru, on the contrary, knew how to manoeuvre, how to deceive an enemy by his evolutions, marches and counter-marches, as well as how to attack him in an open field, or in a fortified camp. In all his different campaigns, Moreau has followed Pichegru's tactics and method in conducting his army.

Pichegru, Moreau, and Bonaparte, are accounted, both in France and in Europe, the three best republican generals, because they possess, to an eminent degree, besides the common talents
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absolutely necessary for a warrior, one of these qualities, which proclaims genius, and constitutes a great captain ; Buonaparte has that audacity of sentiment, that promptitude in execution, which repairs his faults, or elevates him above these faults ; Moreau, more wise, and more humane and prudent, has a mode of manœuvring, which foresees and prepares the result with less noise and less blood ; and Pichegru, in exhibiting often the audacity of the one, and the prudence of the other, has a vast conception, and that valuable science to judge rightly of all circumstances, to calculate his own resources and means, as well as those of his enemy, a science which does not give talents, but completes them, when they are found together in the same individual. The new manner in which he carried on a war, which procured him so many laurels, and his country such great advantages, are evident proofs of this assertion. Having to conduct young, brave, but undisciplined and impatient troops, against men inured to hardships, to patience and regularity, being besides accompanied by a numerous cavalry, he invented that continual war of aggression, the daily, almost hourly war of posts, the flying artillery, and the war of attacks always repeated, which confounded, fatigued, and rendered the

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enemy's cavalry almost useless; he *neutralized* the *ensemble*, and the German discipline, by exciting the self-love, employing the activity, gratifying the eagerness, and keeping up the spirit of the young French soldiers, and in disregarding the ancient military *routine*, customs of siege, and armies of observation.

After the death of Robespierre, all the other generals began more or less to follow Pichegru's example, and imitate his tactics; and all the French armies were organized, and had been conducted according to the plan delivered by him, with perhaps an indiscreet zeal of patriotism, to the Committee of Public Safety, during his stay at Paris in the spring 1795; and both Moreau, Buonaparte, Massena, and other generals, are therefore, in a great measure, indebted to him for their success, as much as France is for its victories and conquests*.

Having commanded the most numerous armies, and disposed of immense sums of money, and after the conquest of one of the richest countries in Europe, Pichegru returned to his family as poor as he had left it; and he found it not richer than himself: virtue was the only treasure both of himself and of his family.

* Recueil d'Anecdotes, tom. ii. page 33.

Many of those men, who, during the revolution, ascended to public notoriety, and became famous or remarked for their talents, powerful by intrigue, or dreaded for their crimes, either disowned and treated with cruelty their parents, relatives, and friends, or enriched them by places, and by procuring them opportunities to share in the plunder of their countrymen, and of foreigners. The name of Robespierre's own sister was upon his list of proscription, as *a fanatic*. Chénier sent his brother to the scaffold as an aristocrat; Danton imprisoned his own mother; the jacobin Philippe, of the *rue de Temple*, cut off the head of his father and mother, because they went to church. Barras caused two of his first cousins and three other relatives to be shot at Toulon, because they remained there during its occupation by the English. La Reveilliere transported his brother-in-law to Cayenne, and four other poor and troublesome members of his family.—Dubois Creance commanded the execution of one of his sons, shot as an emigrant. The Deputy Duquesnoy caused his own father to be guillotined, as insulting the national representation, by claiming him as his son. Herbert poisoned his first wife, to be enabled to marry a nun; and confined his brother, who was a priest, in the

convent of the Carmelites, where he was murdered with other prisoners in September 1792*. Such was the conduct of one class of the revolutionary characters. Rewbel, Merlin, Carnot, Sieyes, and Buonaparte, have acted differently, and in a manner as if all persons related to them were born with capacity to be ministers, generals, senators, ambassadors, and to fill other important offices, while the French national treasury, and those of Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and Holland, procured them means to live according to their high stations. Neither guilt degraded, nor ambition or cupidity dishonoured Pichegru, in his behaviour to those near and dear to him; the ties of blood and of nature were sacred to him, but he did not drag ignorance from obscurity, nor reward consanguinity at the expence of merit; none of his relatives had any place under him, or by his recommendation, and it was his glory to find them again as good, as poor, and as obscure as he had quitted them. On his coming back amongst them, they saw in his course of life, the former companion of their society, the brother, the cousin, the friend, and not the victor nor the hero; they could not, therefore, murmur

* Les Annales du Terrorisme, page 666.

as neglected, nor complain as if disregarded; the general partook of their scanty meals chearfully, and returned their embraces with the same cordiality as the adjutant had done; and in their company he was the person who oftenest forgot both what he had done for his country and what his country had done for him, and that a small farm was the only fortune of the saviour of his country, and of the conqueror of Alsace, Brabant, Flanders, and Holland.

Of the friars of the Miniones, who had been his early instructors, most had died in misery, or perished in prisons, or on the republican scaffolds. Five were yet alive, but in a situation which made life a burthen to themselves, of use to nobody, and a torment to all feeling men who knew them; they were old, decayed, sick, and destitute of fortune, and, of course, of friends; and, besides, proscribed as fanatics, because they had not renounced the religion of their ancestors, the religion of Christ. Pichegru sold his horses and camp equipage, and distributed the amount amongst them and two of his poorest relations, who had courage and humanity enough to harbour the houseless, and to shelter wretchedness from unjust prosecution. What is the gift of Buonaparte's kingdom of Etruria to such an action?

When once amongst his friends, Pichegru desired nothing but quiet and privacy; but his reputation was so great, and his character so much respected, that all loyal Frenchmen were indignant at knowing his penury, and the cause of his retirement; and as the French press, although not free, was not quite enslaved, the daily prints were filled with reproaches and accusations against the Directory. As an honourable exile, and more to get rid of a supposed enemy than to silence public clamour, the base and jealous Directors offered Pichegru the embassy to Sweden, a country which was at that time governed by a regent, who had pardoned most of the regicide assassins of his great and loyal brother, who had changed his alliance against revolutionary France into amicable connexions with the French regicides, and whose political principles, if he had any, were erroneous, if not dangerous to the cause of religion and monarchy.

It was on this occasion that the director Le Tourneur mentioned Pichegru, as "*a man whom the French nation could present either to its friends or its enemies*"; and that this was the case, and that there is no other person who has figured in the French Revolution, of whom this can be said, all Europe knows as well as citizen Le Tourneur.

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Perceiving the real motive of the offer of this embassy, Pichegru declined its acceptance, not, as Barras afterwards chose to say, because he found himself unfit to fill it with honour, but because he would have nothing to do with the Directors, men whose characters differed so widely from his own, and whom he could neither persuade himself to esteem, nor desire to serve. That this was the true reason, appears from the confession of Carnot, one of his greatest and most ungenerous enemies. He says in one of his writings, "that during a conversation of two hours with Pichegru, this general spoke with a *force d'esprit*, and with a diplomatical information, which surprized him, knowing him only for his military talents, which do not always suppose an universal genius, highly cultivated by a careful education." This praise is not flattery nor suspicious, when coming from such a man as Carnot; and all persons who have the honour to know General Pichegru, agree in describing his feelings, judgment, political information, and intelligence, as liberal and as amazing, as his skill as a warrior. But if he refused any employment under the Directory, when his fellow-citizens chose him, in March, 1797, one of their representatives in the Council of Five Hundred, for the department

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of Jura, it was his duty to accept, and he followed its dictates.

By the victories of Buonaparte, during 1796, and more so by his false and bombast descriptions of his battles, the jacobinical Directors hoped to diminish the popularity of Pichegru, and to make the inconsistent Frenchmen forget what they owed to this great general ; but in the middle of external successes, the interior of France, though not so forcibly convulsed, was little less agitated than at the most alarming periods of the Revolution. The Directory possessed neither the confidence nor the respect of the people ; their councils were divided by separate views, and by mutual distrust and contempt ; while the dread of new revolutions, and the immediate terror of military force, alone appeared to prevent some violent explosion. The Directors, fully sensible of the dangers to which they were exposed, saw with alarm the approach of the period when, by the new constitution, the people must meet in primary assemblies, to choose anew a third part of the representatives.

As a measure of security on this occasion, the Directors, by a decree, prohibited all persons inscribed on the list of emigrants, although never emigrated, from exercising any political rights ;
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and a new effort to prevent the sovereign people from enjoying too great a share of authority, was made by the Directory, in a message to the Council of Five Hundred ; wherein, after speaking *mysteriously* of conspirators, whose hopes were not yet annihilated, it insinuated the propriety of denying to all who had refused, or should refuse, to take the oath of hatred to royalty, the right of voting, *considering the people on that occasion as public functionaries.*

As most of the citizens chosen were of the same moderate principles with Pichegru, the elections to vacant seats in the Council of Five Hundred were not satisfactory to government ; but the committees of nine, formed to decide on the propriety of the returns, agreed on the eligibility of most of the members.

At the first meeting of the new Council of Five Hundred, Pichegru was called to the chair, as its first president, and his name being signed to two resolutions, the Council of the Ancients hailed his nomination with expressions of respect for his military talents and virtues ; but his abilities were envied by one part of the Directory, and his moderation suspected by another : his modesty was called a secret ambition ; his prudence a concealed vanity ; his loyalty hypocrisy, and his popularity

pularity conspiracy ; and after these liberal suppositions, they determined sooner or later to let him feel the effect of their envy and hatred.

Notwithstanding that Buonaparte had about this time concluded the Peace of Leoben, and his political and revolutionary principles were known to correspond with those of the jacobin Directors, Pichegru's popularity augmented, and he became and was regarded as the chief and hope of all moderate men, not only in the Council of Five Hundred, but in the armies, and all over France. The distraction of the executive government was therefore at the highest pitch: the new elections, by giving seats to some men of greater abilities than had before been chosen, and of characters comparatively unblemished, afforded foundation to a strong and popular opposition, who justly censured public proceedings with a freedom which upstart tyranny could ill endure, and a force which made oppression writhe in anguish, and meditate bloody revenge.

This new opposition laid open for all Frenchmen to be convinced, that frauds, ignorance, imprudence, negligence, folly, and speculation, reigned in all the offices under the Directory, and that, particularly in the finances, there existed neither order, foresight, nor economy ; and the public

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lic affairs were therefore in endless confusion; it was proved that they had obtained the disposal of ninety-seven millions of livres (about 4,300,000*l.*). besides at least twenty millions received in contributions, under pretence *that they would thus be enabled to make peace*, but no peace was thought of*.

In the military committee, of which Pichegru was a member, it was discovered that the army list contained *fifty thousand men to be paid, clothed, and accoutred, more than had ever been really enrolled*; and the military hospitals charged for patients *who had never entered their walls, or who had long been dead*: and this, said Dupont de Nemours, who was stating the facts, is *only a sinner lifted up of the curtain which conceals these enormities*. On the thrifless expenditure, he observed, that while large sums were issued for the opera, the conservatory of music, the riding-schools at Versailles, and lavished on manufactories of arms no longer wanting, and on buildings of mere ornament, the Directory had sent to the councils an alarming message on the state of the hospitals, affirming, *that out of three hun-*

* See *Le Rapport du Citoyen Gilbert Desmorlières*, le 25 Prairial, an 7.

*dred and fifty foundlings, three hundred had died for want of the first necessities.**

These and other debates produced no good effect, except information concerning the economical, moral and political conduct of the virtuous rulers of a modern and fashionable republic.

Religion also occupied a conspicuous share in the deliberations of the Legislative Bodies, but no law founded on just, wise, and honest principles was adopted. The horrors experienced by catholic priests, during the reign of terror, were exchanged only for a more tranquil, though not less systematic persecution, under the system of philosophy. None of the laws which imposed oaths and declarations on professors of all persuasions, even on those whose tenets did not allow them to take an oath, were repealed; but instead of drowning and the guillotine, the penalties of seclusion and deportation were applied.

Besides these domestic occurrences, the conduct of the French Government towards neutral nations was loudly censured by Pichegru and his party: the injustice, rapacity, and violence, which had irritated the people of America, and the con-

* See Le Rapport du Citoyen Depont de Nemours, Meaulé, an v.

doubt of Buonaparte towards the *neutral* republics of Venice and Genoa, were exposed by them to great animadversion.

These spirited contests formed part of a system of hostilities, in which it became obvious that the Government must either adhere to the constitution, make some just sacrifices of its ambition to its safety, or fall. The Directors hated each other, but Barras, Rewbell, and La Reveilliere were united by guilt and by fear; while Carnot and Barthelemy, concurring perhaps in nothing but a desire of peace, opposed the blood-thirsty, disorganizing, and tyrannical spirit of their colleagues. The opposition of Pichegru's party in the Council of Five Hundred, though generally successful, was not combined by any common principle, except hatred and contempt of the triumvirate; honour, ability, and popular favour was theirs, but some of them were infected with the desire of shewing their rhetoric; and declaimed in the tribune, while their adversaries, more expert in the conduct of revolutions, were preparing to derive the utmost advantage from their chief resources, the furious jacobins and the armies.

Reports of counter-revolutionary projects were circulated; and on the 20th of July the official

journal, or government gazette, then called *Le Rédacteur*, issued a virulent invective against the Council of Five Hundred, implicating them as conspirators. This audacious publication occasioned a message to the Directory; but it was answered by an impudent and laconic observation, that no existing law applied to the case.

On the same day, or the 20th of July, Pichegru made a long and able report concerning the necessity of a re-organization of the national guard, and on the manner to form this organization so as to ensure the safety of the state without too much trouble for the citizens of this guard, *who alone in France could be depended upon for assistance to oppose the daily usurpations of the executive power.* This and some other vigorous proposals and plans of the Council of Five Hundred, caused the Directory to take measures as for their own protection; they had almost entirely changed the ministry, and foreseeing that an opposition headed by Pichegru, Willot, and other experienced generals, would not easily be conquered, were preparing to violate the constitution, by drawing a large military force round Paris. This intention was not kept sufficiently secret to prevent the circulation of reports, and surmise was changed for certainty, when Aubry, in the
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name of the Committee of Inspectors of the Hall, declared that four regiments of chasseurs, with part of the staff of the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, were marching for Ferté-alois, a village about seven leagues from Paris, *while the constitution limited their approach to twelve leagues.* On the 26th of July Pichegru pronounced a most eloquent speech on the same subject, in which he clearly proved "*the plots of the Directory, its violation of the constitution, and its intention to again introduce the revolutionary government and the reign of terror; to exchange the constitutional code for the anarchical and bloody tyranny of the jacobins.*"

If the discovery of their projects was calculated to alarm the conspiring majority of the Directory, the feeble conduct of many of their opponents restored their courage. Instead of acting as Pichegru desired, and of proceeding with revolutionary vigour, such as they were sure would be used by the Directors, they formed decrees for abolishing two clubs, which had been opened under the name of constitutional circles, and in dispatching a message to ascertain the age of Barras *; they decreed besides, a law for establishing on all public roads, at a certain distance from Paris,

* By the Constitution, a Director should be above forty years of age; Barras was supposed to be only thirty-eight.

columns inscribed with articles from the constitution, and an order forbidding the advance of armies beyond them ; a most ridiculous, feeble, and shallow attempt, in a period so critical *. Timidity, hesitation, variety of views, and want of mutual confidence, prevented the adoption of the only mode of conduct, *the impeachment of some of the Directors*, which could, in the present state of affairs, tend to the advantage of opposition, and save France from republican oppression.

The Directory relied on the attachment of the army, and were highly gratified by the conduct of the jacobin Buonaparte. Divisions of the army under his command in Italy, contrary to the constitution, sent addresses to the troops of the interior, most of which were distinguished for violence ; but particularly one from the division under Augereau, which rivalled in virulence, abuse and threats, the productions of the most licentious days of the Revolution. The atrocity of these proceedings, so repugnant to the constitution, and to every principle of social order, was rendered com-

* One division of troops, to shew their great respect for the laws and for the constitution of their country, before they began their march towards Paris, dug up the constitutional column which they were forbid to pass ; they put it upon a waggon, carrying it before them, and respectfully followed, without passing it, until they were at the gates of Paris !!!

plete by an address from the staff of Buonaparte's army, avowing all the sentiments contained in the various missives already circulated, threatening death to those who should shew themselves royalists; a term which they had previously shewn they meant to apply to all the opponents of the Directory, and of their friends the regicide jacobins.

Whilst the Legislative Body had such an incontestible evidence of the criminal intentions of the three Directors, a message was received from the Executive Government, in which some facts were denied, others palliated, and accusations of conspiracy retorted in a vague and insidious manner, upon some members of the two councils. This message was by both councils referred to a committee; and on the 20th of August, in the Ancients, the report was made by Tronçon Ducoudray, who was selected for this task, on account of his acknowledged moderation and talents. He gave a full detail of the conduct of the Directory and armies; shewing, in many instances, their inconsistency with the letter and spirit of the constitution, though he was not hasty in imputing evil-intentions. Thibaudeau on the same day, in the Council of Five Hundred, made a report equally argumentative, though more warm, and concluded by recommending two laws; one

charging the public accuser to prosecute all plots, machinations, and generally all offences against the Legislative Body, the Executive Directory, and each of their component members; the other, declaring penalties against the military who should deliberate as a body, or sign addresses collectively.

Before any decision could take place with respect to these propositions, the three Directors had resolved to overturn by force all the impediments raised by the constitution against arbitrary power. Hoche was first fixed on to carry the design of the Directory into execution; but they having been obliged to disavow some of his proceedings, he had retired, full of rage and disappointment, to his army, while the confidence intended was reposed in Angereau, whom Buonaparte had sent to Paris from the army of Italy *. Besides the re-

* Angereau is the son of a fruit-woman at Paris, and has served most of the powers in Europe as a common soldier, and been flogged in Austria and Prussia for desertion. He was a fencing-master at Neuchatel, in Switzerland, in 1789, and robbed a watch-maker, Courvoisier, of a horse and two watches, and then enlisted as a soldier in the Neapolitan service, where he gave lessons as a fencing-master; he again deserted, and became first a French spy, and afterwards a French general. At Verona and Venice he plundered upwards of six millions of livres; he is in private remarkable for his presumption and vanity; his boasts deprive all other commanders of their merit, and the ostentatious display of his person with rings and jewels, form a ridiculous contrast with his ignorance in conversation, and the gross vulgarity of his manners. *Recueil d'Anecdotes*, page 360.

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gular troops at the disposal of this general, great numbers of jacobins and terrorists, who had served Robespierre and his faction, were in Paris, soliciting employ or promotion, and were encouraged to remain in the city, although motions had been made in the Council of Five Hundred for their removal.

It appears almost inconceivable, that with so many evidences of a conspiracy against them, and so many proofs of the determination of the triumvirate, not to regard the restrictions of the constitution, Pichegru and the other leading men in opposition should not be bound by some common tie, or animated by some general spirit. But the fact is, that in troublesome times, courage, frankness, patriotism, and talents, are seldom sufficient to defeat the plots of intriguers. Pichegru was surrounded by orators, who did not think of any thing but making brilliant speeches in the tribune, rounding periods, and framing motions, without any spirit to act with vigour or judgment enough to see the absolute necessity of doing so. Notwithstanding all his endeavours, he could not inspire the timorous with valour, the idle with activity, and unite the opinion of twenty different societies and parties, who constituted the opposition of which he was regarded as the principal chief. he

he was unable to subdue the circumspection of some, the scruples of others, and the dread, the cowardice of most of them, and to prevent the crimes of the directorial faction, by being beforehand in the attack, and to inflict on its guilty members a well-deserved punishment.

Pichegru had not been six weeks a member of the Council of Five Hundred, before he rightly judged the persons who pretended to share his sentiments, and to be conducted by his opinions; he therefore always doubted of success, and might, as well as many other of his colleagues, have escaped proscription by retirement; but he had been the first to propose the organization of the national guards, and although many thousands of the Parisians had made him offers and promises to resist the attempts of the Directory, he knew perfectly well those cowardly citizens, not to foresee that in the moment of danger not one would stir or interfere; he thought it, however, his duty to remain on the spot, and to be the martyr of his loyalty, rather than to give his enemies and calumniators reason to say that he had deserted men who required nothing but a chief to become victorious.

While, therefore, his and their adversaries were drawing round him and them the net of destruction,

tion, the sitting of the two councils, on the 3d of September, terminated in perfect tranquillity; and in the Council of Five Hundred, the motion on Thibaudeau's report was adjourned to the next day, a day in which the existing legislature was doomed to undergo a total alteration in its constitution and members. Pichegru, and many others of the opposition party, made by him sensible of the perils which awaited, had proposed bringing forward a decree of accusation against the three Directors; while others, judging the period too far advanced for such a measure, proposed marching to the directorial palace, arresting or putting them to death, and then publishing to the people of France a statement of their motive; but these proceedings of vigour were over-ruled by the timid, the treacherous, and the indolent.

In the nights of the 3d and 4th September, the conspiring Directors threw off the mask of patriotism for that of rebellion, and began to effect another revolution, by ordering two of their colleagues, Carnot and Barthelemy, to be taken into custody; the first, however, secured his retreat, but the other was arrested by Barras himself. Having thus partially executed the first portion of their project, Barras, Rewbell, and La Reveilliere,

here*, the triumvirate, proceeded to other operations. A committee called inspectors, appointed to prevent the approach of troops to the place of sitting of the Councils, and to direct their internal police, was composed of General Pichegru, Vaublanc, Thibaudeau, Emery, and Delarue †, who were divided in opinions respecting the conspiracy, till General Ramel, commander of the Legislative Body guard, announced an order he had

* Barras was before the revolution an infamous degraded nobleman; he voted for the death of his king, and with the assistance of Buonaparte, executed en masse, thousands of his countrymen at Toulon and at Paris. Rewbell, formerly an attorney, another regicide, has since the revolution plundered millions; and, as a Director, caused thousands to be shot or transported. La Reveilliere Lepaux, a deformed stigmatic, formerly an intriguer under the appellation of a man of letters, disbelieved the existence of a God, and passed his life in tormenting mankind and the consciences of christians, by pretending to be the pope of the theophilanthropists, or revolutionary philosophers. Those three vile intriguers defeated a general who had defeated the united forces of Austria, England, Prussia, Hanover, Holland, and Hesse. So little does it depend upon talents or virtue to be victorious in plots and revolutions!

† Of the five Inspectors, Pichegru and Delarue were for vigorous measures, Vaublanc and Thibaudeau were, from cowardice, for temporizing proceedings, and Emery was the spy of the Directory, who betrayed all the discussions of his colleagues, and was, therefore, with Thibaudeau, whose conduct was suspicious to many, excepted from deportation, whilst Pichegru, Delarue, and Vaublanc were treated with all possible indignity and cruelty, both in the temple and on their way to Cayenne.

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received at one o'clock in the morning to attend the Minister at War, and that several columns of troops were entering the city. He was a few hours afterwards summoned, in the name of the Directory, to allow fifteen hundred soldiers to pass the Pont Tournant (the entrance to the Tuilleries gardens from the place of Louis XV.), but bravely refused, though assured that his corps of eight hundred grenadiers was surrounded by twelve thousand men, with four pieces of cannon. In this emergency he sent to Lafond-Ladobat and Simeon, the presidents of the two Councils, for instructions, and gave notice of what was passing to several members. Pichogru had already ascertained that the halls were completely invested, and Ramel was consulting with the Committee of Inspectors, when news arrived that the Pont Tournant was forced, the garden filled with troops, and a battery forming to bear on the hall of the Council of Ancients. The post of the Council of Five Hundred, defended by a brave lieutenant named Blot, alone remained, and Ramel had vainly solicited leave to call out the reserve of grenadiers, and attempt repelling force by force, when the troops of the Directory, headed by Augereau, rushed in, and after a considerable struggle, secured all the inspectors, and several other members

bers of the Councils who had come to share their deliberations.

A considerable number of members of both Councils having assembled at private houses, sallied forth in their scarfs, and attempted to gain the entrance of their own halls, but were thrice repulsed by the military, while the minority of each Legislative Body met at a play-house in the neighbourhood of the Directory, called Odeon, and in the amphitheatre of the medical college, and made laws suited to the views of the triumvirate.

This party had, previously to the explosion of their mines, prepared proclamations to deceive the people of Paris, declaring the existence of a plot to re-establish royalty, and in the evening of the same day, the mock assembly at the Odeon received a message from the Directory, equally false and absurd with the proclamations in the morning, affirming the halls of the councils to have been fixed on as the scene of a conspiracy to restore royalty, and that Pichegru, in a correspondence with the Prince de Condé, had formed a plot, which would have been executed, but that the Prince himself refused to afford his sanction. These accusations were supported by a pretended correspondence said to be intercepted, but

but which, from the strongest internal evidence, appeared to be forged; and some absurd extorted confessions of D'averne de Presle, one of the royalist conspirators arrested at the commencement of the year*. Reports were then presented by several members, who read drafts of laws, annulling the elections in forty-nine departments, and ordering the deportation of Generals Pichegru and Willot, with thirty-eight other members of the Council of Five Hundred, and eleven of the Council of Ancients; and the Directors Carnot and Barthelemy, with a number of other citizens, generals, ministers, priests, and editors of newspapers. The fate of all these victims, condemned without a trial, was rendered additionally cruel by the sequestration of their property, till accounts should be received of their arrival at the place of deportation: the remainder of the Council of Five Hundred passed this sentence without hesitation, in which the Ancients concurred, while they boasted of this proceeding as an act of mercy, though it prevented the unjudged

* Pichegru was at the same time accused and denounced by Moreau and Buonaparte, the former being the dupe of the latter, who, as long as Pichegru remained in France, could have no prospect to usurp power over Frenchmen; but neither of them produced a single line of Pichegru's hand-writing.

prisoners from procuring even the most common necessities for their comfort and accommodation in the voyage they were afterwards doomed to make. Laws of the greatest severity were enacted against emigrants and their relations ; a new oath was imposed, of hatred to royalty and anarchy, and attachment and fidelity to the Republic and constitution of the year three, a constitution they at the same time violated in the most scandalous manner. All journals, periodical papers; and the presses for printing them, were put under the inspection of the police ; the late laws, decreed after the motion of Pichegru, for re-organizing the national guard, were abrogated, and the Directory were invested with power of declaring any commune in a state of siege. These, and some other regulations equally tyrannical and vengeful, gave to the executive power a complete dictatorial authority, and terminated the glimmering prospect which some still affected to view, of liberty restored by the exertions of the French philosophers *.

Pichegru

* The Author of this was at Paris when the Revolution was effected, and what he then observed, confirmed his opinion of the base and cowardly character of the Parisians. The 3d September was a Sunday, and the Tivoli, and all other public places, were crowded with elegant and fashionable people, who all cursed the Directory.

Pichegru and the other arrested Deputies had been conducted to the Temple *basille*, and during the ensuing days, the private vengeance of the Directors added considerable numbers to the list of sacrifices: their tool, the infamous Augereau, was well adapted to carry into execution their orders of cruelty, by himself, or by instruments worthy of him. He had appointed General Dutertre, commandant of the Temple, and of the escort destined to accompany the imprisoned Deputies to their place of embarkation. This *republican* general had a month before come out of the galleys at Toulon, where he had been confined, under sentence of a court martial, for robbery, assassination, and setting fire to houses in La Vendée *.

At two in the morning of the 8th of September, Pichegru and the other proscribed persons were removed from the Temple in carriages, placed upon four-wheeled waggons, nearly resembling gun-carriages. They were a kind of

Directory, and praised the two Councils. In the night the Revolution took place, and the next day all the gardens, squares, and streets, were filled with the same Parisians, dressed as *sans-culottes*, and crying out every where, "Long live the Directory, down with the Councils!"

* Ramel's Narrative, page 12.

cage, secured on all sides with bars of iron, breast high, nearly resembling such as are used in England for the conveyance of wild beasts, and every shake or jolt bruised them in the most terrible manner: a padlock fastened the iron grating by which they entered; they had neither time nor means to make the slightest preparation for their removal. The triumvirate, anxious to enjoy the brutal and cowardly pleasure of contemplating their fallen adversaries, caused the cars to pass before their palace of Luxemburgh; where the walls, already rendered by its inhabitants the inclosure of every imaginable crime, re-echoed with the mirthful plaudits of a ruffian band, whose savage exultation would have disgraced the untutored aborigines of America.

During the journey from Paris to Rochefort, there were no sufferings, or indignities, which Pichegru and his companions of misfortune were not obliged to endure, and no danger to which they were not exposed: they were hooted at, cursed, threatened, and covered with mud, by the jacobins, at every place they passed or halted at: water was their only drink, and black bread their only food, during the day, and a prison, a dungeon, or the damp pavement in some deserted church, their place of repose at night. The officers

officers under Dutertre, Adjutant-general Colin, and his second, Guillet, were, in September 1792, amongst Septembrisers, or assassins, of the prisoners at Paris, and owed to it their military rank. At Blois they had prepared the same destruction for the deported Deputies, had not the courage and humanity of a municipal officer prevented it, and whom, enraged at their disappointment, they lodged the same night amongst the galley-slaves, in irons, at Tour, in Tourain. At Chatellrault, Dutertre ordered them to be shut up in so infectious a dungeon, that Pichegru and several others swooned, and they would all have been stifled, had not the door, at which sentinels were placed to watch them closely, been speedily opened. Even Pichegru, though still young, and hardened by the fatigues of war, suffered so much from the badness of the roads, and the jolts of the waggons, that he demanded as a favour to walk on foot in the midst of the escort, but he was refused with brutality; for "when once the prisoners had entered the carriages, or rather the cages, in the morning, and the iron grating was locked, they were not opened again till night, if illness or natural wants ever so much required it." Such were the orders of Dutertre.

At last, on the 21st of September, they arrived

at Rochefort, where the most ill-omened presages surrounded them. The garrison of this city lined the hedge upon the road, and a crowd of sailors made the air re-echo with the ill-boding cry of "*to the water, to the water! drown them, drown them!!!*" Here they were embarked on board a small brig, and by some ill-looking soldiers rudely forced down between decks, pushing and crowding them towards the forecastle, whilst they were nearly suffocated with the smoke of the kitchen.

They were suffering extremely from hunger and thirst; for they had neither eaten nor drank during the thirty-six preceding hours. A pail of water was let down in the midst of them, and a couple of the crew's loaves were thrown down beside it, with a gesture of the utmost contempt. They were, however, unable to eat, on account of the smoke and their very uneasy situation. In the meanwhile, the sentinels, who pressed them more and more, held the most horrid language. Pichegru having resented the insolence of one who was in the midst of them, the latter replied to the general, "*Thou hadst better be silent, for thou art not yet out of our power.*" This was a boy of fifteen or sixteen years of age.

They had every reason to believe that the
place

place of their deportation was no other than the bed of the river Charante, where they were now at anchor, and that they were already on board one of those horrid instruments of execution, *a vessel with a trap-door*, invented to quench the thirst of *republican* tyrants for human blood, and to murder in the dark as rapidly as possible, as many victims as their thoughts or their caprice could desire; and during one, to them, dreadful night, they were listening in anxious suspense, and silent horror and resignation, constantly expecting the fatal moment to arrive. At last they were sent on board a cutter, where Pichegru and three others were separated from their companions by the captain, who himself ordered them to go down into the boatswain's store-room, saying, "as for you four gentlemen, this is to be your lodging," and thus they remained for fifty-two days, in the profoundest darkness, in that horrid dungeon, infected by the exhalations of the hold, and by the cables, without hammocks or covering, or any thing on which to lay their heads, though unable to hold themselves upright. At noon every day a biscuit to each was brought, and a bucket full of gourgoncs, or large beans boiled, filled with vermin, filth, and hair, and without any seasoning, was set down for them.

This

This was their daily allowance, and the only food that was given them during the whole voyage.

The detachments which had been put on board the cutter to guard them, consisted of men selected from among the revolutionary bands of the Committee of Nantes, so famous in the annals of terror, for the massacres and the drownings of the priests who were sentenced to deportation. They were heard to relate to each other their various and infamous exploits. One boasted of having, during a march, assassinated his captain in the back, and thrown him into a ditch, because he suspected him of aristocracy; another coolly enumerated how many priests he had drowned in the Loire; a third explained to his comrades how the drownings were performed, and the grimaces of the unfortunate wretches at the moment of submersion: several of them boasted of having killed with their oars those who, after passing through the trap-door in the drowning vessels, endeavoured to save their lives by swimming; and if these monsters suspended for a moment their horrid conversation, it was to sing disgusting songs. They chose the time of their prisoners' resting, to place themselves by the hatchway, and howl out their obscenities, their blasphemies, and their songs of cannibals.

OF

Of the transported, Pichegru was the only one who was not sea-sick, but he suffered so much the more from hunger. It produced paroxysms of rage; and the coarse food, which he eat in too small quantities, only excited his ravenous appetite. One day the hunger and impatience of this general furnished the captain of the cutter, *La Porte*, with a pretext to add to the vexations he inflicted on the four prisoners of the store-room. The cabin boy, who waited on them, persisted, notwithstanding their prayers and menaces, in always bringing them their bucket of beans so filthy, that they could not touch them: Pichegru therefore pushed the boy once, when he brought a bucket almost covered with hairs. The boy fell into the bucket, and being scalded, cried aloud, and called for help. Pichegru accused himself of the fact, but his fellow prisoners would not allow that he alone was culpable, and the captain ordered *them all four to be put in irons*, in which condition they suffered severely for six days; nor was the captain then disposed to relieve them, had not fear, from the murmurs of some of the sailors, who compassionated the fate of their enchained four fellow citizens, *of whom three had been republican generals*, compelled him to that measure.

At

At length they landed in Cayenne, and hoped, having escaped from the presence of their tyrants, to range there at liberty. They were, however, mistaken; wherever a French republican commands, tyranny and oppression are felt, and their companions, wretchedness and misery, must be expected. Instead of enjoying even the shadow of liberty in the deserts of this unhealthy country, they were sent to the fort of Sinamary, on the pestilential banks of the river of that name. Even in this miserable abode, their persecutors harassed them by a refinement of cruelty; they were closely confined in dungeons, used as prisons for fugitive negroes and criminals, containing neither beds, tables, nor chairs, nor any one piece of furniture. No European, perhaps, had ever before been thrown into such a den, in such a climate, there to be given as a prey to scorpions, millepedes, gnats, musquitos, and many other species of insects, equally numerous, dangerous, and disgusting! they were not even secure from serpents that frequently crept into the fort. Pichegru found one of an uncommon size, which he killed; it was thicker than his arm, and lay concealed in the folds of his cloak, which served him for a pillow in his hammock. They were, besides, totally destitute of clothes.

Linen.

linen, and money, and their victuals were worse than those given to the negroes.

Pichegru still retained his accustomed firmness, and shewed that confidence, that presentiment, as it were, of future amelioration, which naturally communicates itself to others. His principal occupation was inspiring courage and constancy in his fellow-sufferers: his only amusement was learning English. He preserved, amidst all his pursuits, his military tone and manners, by which he endeavoured to overcome the tedious monotony of imprisonment. He was often singing, especially such fragments as were applicable to his situation; not plaintive or romantic effusions, but such as abounded in the energy of vehement expression and awakened military ardour. He supported with fortitude, and without complaint, his present evils, and contemplated the vile instruments of his misfortunes with contempt. The only day he seemed afflicted was, when an American vessel brought the news "that the usurpation over his country was completed, all good citizens oppressed, the revolutionary laws rigorously enforced, and the tribunals of blood re-established under the name of Military Commissions." He then deplored with the other prisoners, the fate of their wretched and degraded country. If an honest

nest man, struggling with misfortunes, is the noblest work of God, a hero and a patriot in fetters is an angel upon earth.

After eight months endurance of all the sufferings of captivity and of wants, of insults and of torments, Pichegru, with seven other prisoners, at last escaped his oppressors, the dangers of the waves, and the horrors of famine, having at the moment when he was arrested, and during the voyage to his place of deportation and his imprisonment at Cayenne, conducted himself with that noble fortitude which elevates misfortune, and commands respect even from republican despots. He first landed in the Dutch colony of Surinam, and afterwards, on the 28th of September, 1798, he disembarked in England, where royalty received the republican exile, generosity rewarded talents, and hospitality smoothed misfortunes*.

It is hoped, that the particulars of Pichegru proscribed, are to loyal men as interesting as those of Pichegru victorious, as they truly paint the cruelties of republican rulers, the ingratitude

* The particular facts mentioned concerning the revolution of the 4th September, 1797, and Pichegru's deportation, are derived from *Dictionnaire Biographique*, Carnot's Reply, Job Aime's Narrative, *Secret Anecdotes of the 18th Fructidor* by De la Rue, *Ramuel's Narrative*, and *Recueil d'Anecdotes*.

of republican citizens, and the injustice of republican governments ; they exhibit the immoral, barbarous, and infamous conduct of most men, of inferiors, as well as of superiors, who have engaged or are employed in keeping up the cause of the French rebellion ; and if it has surprized foreigners, that some Frenchmen, in the name of liberty, have usurped power to become tyrants, it is no less astonishing, that those upstart tyrants have found slaves base enough to obey their dictates, and cruel enough to execute, and often aggravate their commands ; and that the same great nation contains such a number of various, vicious, and vile men, that Robespierre's guillotine, the Directorial deportation, and the Consular shooting and poisoning, have never wanted fit subjects to carry into effect their inhuman and merciless decrees.

Of Pichegru's talents as a general, even Buonaparte, or his military sycophants, have not dared to throw out any doubts ; of his principles as a politician, nothing is known but what does honour to the commander as well as to the senator, and inspires admiration of the patriot. The conquest of Alsace, Brabant, Flanders, and Holland, convince every body of the former ; whilst vague accusations, invented by envy or forged by jealousy,

lousy, without proofs as without facts, are unable to diminish known patriotism and irreproachable opinions; and whatever calumny or fiction have proclaimed, exaggeration propagated, treason discovered, or fear disclosed, all moderate and just men, even in France, acknowledge that Pichegru is really and more sincerely attached to the honour and happiness of his country, than Buonaparte, or any other republican ruler or general; and though he does not agree with the Corsican, and approve an unjust and perhaps impolitic aggrandizement, at the expence of good faith and of the tranquillity of Europe; his moral and political notions, "that it is not the extent of a country, or the number of its inhabitants, which constitute the greatness and prosperity of a nation," has as many, if not more, adherents, than the Machiavelism and extravagant ambition of his unprincipled antagonist; and all loyal Frenchmen prefer, with Pichegru, "rather to enjoy liberty with twenty millions of freemen, than, under the artificial and oppressive grandeur of an adventurer, to suffer bondage with thirty millions of slaves."

In a work attributed to a person who was not a friend, or partial to Pichegru, is the following phrase: "Pichegru's only occupation is his country,

try, and he is always disposed to answer those who speak to him in favour of such men or of such faction—*make the happiness of France, and you may depend upon me as one of your party.*" This was written some few days before the 4th of September, 1797, when Buonaparte denounced, and Barras and the Directory condemned, and Frenchmen transported, Pichegru, as a traitor and as a conspirator*.

Egotism is the chief passion of French republicans; it has caused them to commit murders, and to issue proscriptions; to plunder and enslave France and Europe; to sacrifice parents, relatives, and friends; to betray and butcher their king; to desert and deny their God; to adore Marat, to worship Robespierre, to praise Barras, and to prostrate themselves before a Buonaparte. According to this true definition of Gallican republicanism, Pichegru is certainly no republican; and he had, besides, the honour and courage to continue poor in a commonwealth, where, amongst rapacious upstarts, it was suspicious and ridiculous, a folly and a crime, not to be rich.

Pichegru is stout, athletic, near six feet high,

* Secret Anecdotes of the 18th Fructidor, by De la Rue, and Recueil d'Anecdotes.

and of a strong constitution, well fitted by nature to encounter and endure the fatigues of war. Upon a first interview, there is something severe about him, but his austerity wears off after a little intercourse, and he soon inspires the greatest confidence. His politeness is without affectation, and not a formal *etiquette*, often signifying nothing but duplicity and imposture. He is frankly condescending, liberally obliging, and naturally good and benevolent; but he possesses not the agreeable littleness and the trifling meanness which makes the fortune of republican courtiers as much and as often as those of a monarch. His moral character is excellent, frank, candid, humane, and polite, cordial to his friends, and pleasing with his acquaintances. To his officers he was always complaisant, and with his soldiers, strict, but just and generous. With a sanguine disposition, he is cool and deliberate in his conduct, and the extent and versatility of his talents have obtained the same approbation and success in the senate as in the field.

There are some striking resemblances between Fichégru and Moreau, two republican generals as much above the petty Buonaparte by their external form and internal worth, as by their talents and merit: they are both about the same age, and
of

of the same size ; and both have natural genius and a cultivated education ; but their characters, without being quite opposite, are very different. Moreau is more insinuating, his manners more agreeable, and his person more graceful. Nobody is an hour in Pichegru's company without placing confidence in him, and judging him a man of honour, of probity, and of generosity : at first sight, Moreau infuses the same sentiments ; every day's intercourse with Pichegru increases our esteem for him ; with Moreau it does not augment, it does not even always continue the same. If exception is made of the Corsican courtiers and satellites, Pichegru is universally honoured and beloved in France : Moreau's admirers are more numerous than those of Buonaparte, but not so numerous as those of Pichegru.

In 1796, when Buonaparte was promoted to the command of the army of the Alps, this army, as well as those commanded by Moreau on the Upper Rhine, and by Jourdan on the Lower Rhine, consisted chiefly of officers instructed, and soldiers disciplined by Pichegru : that Buonaparte, with such an army, accustomed to success, and elevated by victory, should defeat the less numerous, dispirited, divided and betrayed Austrians and Sardinians, was not surprizing ; but that the

general, to whom all those advantages might be ascribed, should experience from the base jealousy of the base Buonaparte, envy, hatred, and persecution, instead of praise, amity and gratitude, is surprizing, even in the abominable annals of the French rebellion. Buonaparte's *extorted addresses* from this very army, and his *forged accusations*, were the *only facts* the infamous Barras and his accomplices condescended to publish, in vindication of their revolutionary proscription of Pichegru, and they are the nominal reasons why Buonaparte yet maintains Pichegru upon *the list of the true legion of honour—the list of the emigrants*.*.

Notwithstanding what Buonaparte has done to injure Pichegru, and to undermine his reputation, he is yet regretted and beloved by the French army, and pitied, praised, and esteemed by the French nation, as the *only* republican general who has not sullied his victories either with rapine or murder, by plunder or confiscations. These are unpardonable crimes in the opinion of the guilty

* A friend of France, and of Pichegru, asked Buonaparte, in May 1802, to recall Pichegru; and received for an answer, "France is not great enough to contain us both."—*Les Nouvelles de la Maine*, Prairial an x. No viii.

Corſican, who fears the unfortunate Pichegru in exile, more than the fortunate Moreau in the neighbourhood of his uſurped throne ; becauſe Buonaparte knows, that eſteem founded upon merit is more to be apprehended than fortune founded upon chance : he knows that even the *parſe* Moreau has hurt his credit, by falſely denouncing his friend and benefactor Pichegru, to whom he is indebted for his firſt military inſtruction and promotion, and by continuing to ſerve the republican aſſaſſins of his loyal father.

Whiſt in 1794, Pichegru commanded the army of the North, and the National Convention ordered no quarter to be given to Engliſhmen, at the riſk of his own life Pichegru ſpared the lives of Britons. The murder of the Turkiſh priſoners at Jaffa in 1799, tells the world how Buonaparte would have acted with Engliſhmen in 1794. All the conqueſts of Pichegru did not coſt the lives of ſo many Frenchmen as Buonaparte's two battles of Lodi and of Arcole. Pichegru was the father and friend of his ſoldiers ; Buonaparte is their oppreſſor, deſtroyer, and poiſoner : Pichegru was more careful of the life of a ſoldier than of his own ; Buonaparte willingly ſacrifices all the ſoldiers of France to advance his outrageous ambition : Pichegru ſerved his countrymen
from

from the love of his country ; the Corsican Buonaparte has served France to be enabled to enslave Frenchmen : Pichegru owed his promotion to his own merit ; Buonaparte to his own crimes and to the intrigues of Barras : to the victories of Pichegru, France is indebted for Brabant, Flanders, and the new provinces on this side of the Rhine ; to Buonaparte, or rather to his intrigues and breach of treaties, France owes Piedmont, and *nothing* but Piedmont : poverty and proscription are the rewards of the great nation for Pichegru's virtue and services : with an usurped throne and an unlimited power has Buonaparte recompensed himself, his plots and crimes, at the expence of the honour and freedom of the great nation : to all good and virtuous men, however, the honourable exile of Pichegru is preferable to the guilty usurpation of Buonaparte. In few words, between Pichegru and Buonaparte every thing is opposite ; nothing is common between them ; the distance is as great as between virtue and vice.

Buonaparte falsely accuses Pichegru of having carried arms against his own country ; when Pichegru has not even carried arms against *the foreigner* tyrannizing over his countrymen : Buonaparte says Pichegru is a royalist ; *Pichegru loves his country and mankind, and wishes therefore rather*
for

for a monarchy under a legal sovereign, than a monarchical republic and republican tyranny under a Corsican usurper.

If brilliant talents, employed bravely, nobly, and successfully; if modesty in prosperity, and fortitude in adversity; if a genuine love of liberty, a real spirit of patriotism, a tender affection for his kindred and his countrymen, a regard for their lives, a solicitude for their safety, and a feeling which advances from private to public life, until it expands into universal philanthropy, constitute true greatness, General Pichegru is a great man.

THE CONSULAR TRIBUNE RIOUFFE.

IT has been justly observed before, and deserves to be repeated again, that no good man can see and read without indignation, on what names both of ancient and modern times, the utmost exuberance of praise has been lavished, and by what hands it has been bestowed. Particularly in France since the Revolution, it has never yet been found that the tyrant, the plunderer, the poisoner, the murderer, the oppressor, the most cruel of the cruel, the most hateful of the hateful, the most profligate of the profligate, have been denied any celebrations, which they were willing to purchase, or that wickedness and folly have not found correspondent flatterers through all their subordinations.

Amongst the thousands of degraded French citizens who have thus dishonoured themselves, the Consular Tribune Honoré Riouffe stands foremost.

most. He was formerly a man of letters, fawning, flattering, complimenting and bowing to every man in power, in hope of getting a place or a pension.

In 1786, he complimented M. de Calonne, as a *modern* Sully; in 1787, his successor, Cardinal de Brienne, as the *modern* Richelieu; and in 1788, Cardinal de Brienne's successor, M. Neckar, as the *modern* Colbert: in 1789, he called La Fayette the French Washington, and Mirabeau the French Franklin; in 1790, he addressed himself to Abbé Maury, as the French Demosthenes; in 1791, he called Brissot the French Cato, and Roland the French Aristides; in 1792, he complimented Marat as the French Brutus, Danton as the French Tullius, and Santerre as the French Marlborough; in 1793, he flattered Robespierre as a French Gracchus, and Henriot as the French Eugene; in 1794, he styled Tallien the Republican Christ; and in 1795, Barras the Republican Solomon; in 1796, he made La Reveilliere the Republican Moses, Rewbell the French Solon, and Carnot the *modern* Vauban; during 1797 and 1798, Buonaparte was regularly complimented once in the month, either as an Alexander, Scipio, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, or Charles XII.; in 1799, he addressed him, after his usurpation, as the

the French Lycurgus, and the Henry IV. revived. In return, Buonaparte made him, in December 1799, one of his Tribune; but from the beginning of this Tribunate, at every time he spoke he was called to order by Daunon, or some other member, on account of his continual, disgusting, unskilful, and exaggerated praise of the Corsican; and on one occasion Daunon told him, that Buonaparte did not want defence when nobody attacked him, neither praise, because nobody abused or calumniated him; and that as a morsel of bread would ever silence the barking of a hungry dog, so he hoped and begged Citizen Riouffe to be silent and satisfied with his morsel of 15,000 livres (the salary of a Tribune), and not by his absurd, impertinent, and stupid praise, indirectly throw out hints that any person in the Tribunate differed with him in opinion, and was inimical to the First Consul. In 1800 appeared a small pamphlet, called "The Art how to flatter men in place, without taste, sense, or shame, dedicated to Citizen Riouffe." It was supposed to come from the pen of Daunon. This pamphlet contains the particulars mentioned above, with a just remark, that as Citizen Riouffe had, from 1786 to 1799, continued to flatter and to starve, to starve and to flatter, without notice or reward, it was to be

be supposed, that none of those to whom he had before addressed the productions of his base genius, wanted or regarded his base flattery; it was, therefore, great good luck for him, that the greatest man of all great men would swallow and pay for drugs so tasteless and nauseous, that they could not force themselves down the throats even of a Marat or a Robespierre, who otherwise were not over nice.

In 1802, Daunon lost his place as a Tribune, and Riouffe is in daily expectation of being nominated a Prefect.

Riouffe has written two comedies, hissed by the audience, and one tragedy, refused by all the theatres at Paris. He is the author of a novel which nobody would read, and of an elegy which no printer would publish.

The only work from Riouffe's pen which has received public approbation, was *La Memoire d'un Detenue*, written during some months imprisonment by the terrorists in 1794. It contains, however, a good dose of flattery to the popular criminals of those days of infamy and horror. In the above-mentioned pamphlet Daunon observes, that the loss of liberty is more conformable with the *physical, political, and literary* constitution of Citizen Riouffe than the use of freedom; that at

large he is *always* a slave, and when confined *sometimes* a freeman ; but *that twenty years detention is absolutely necessary to make him a good, respectable, and independent author and citizen.*

At the return (August 1803) of the Corsican from his journey to Brabant, Riouffe, as the President of the Tribunal, in a sacrilegious and shameful manner, hailed the arrival of the *Providence of Europe*, Napoleone Buonaparte in *his capital !!!*

DAVID,

MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE.

D'un Citoyen Francois tel est le Caractere !

THE painter David, who is now occupied in painting Buonaparte as the God of War, driving his chariot over a prostrate figure of Neptune, whose trident is broken, is the same person who, on the 25th of September, 1790, did homage to the National Assembly, of a picture representing the entrance of the virtuous Louis XVI. in that Assembly on the 4th of the preceding February, and who, in May 1794, painted the famous feast, ordered by Robespierre, acknowledging a Supreme Being, and in his picture drew *the Almighty with the face of this blood-thirsty republican tyrant.*

It is a fact not honouring the arts, that most of the first French artists have, since the Revolution, figured in the revolutionary massacres, in the revolutionary tribunals, and in the revolutionary committees. David, Hennequin, Topino, Le Brun, Gauthereau, and many other republican

painters, have committed crimes, which, under moral governments, would long ago have sent them to the scaffold; but in republican France, the scene of their cruelties, though all their atrocities are known, their persons are protected, and their principles and conduct extenuated, honoured and respected. *David is a member of the French National Institute, and was in 1800 nominated by Buonaparte, the painter of the republican government!!!*

David was educated at Rome, in the French Academy of Painting, at the expence of the King of France, by the recommendation of the unfortunate Queen Maria Antoinette. In return for this generosity of his benevolent Sovereign, he from the beginning of the Revolution joined the standard of rebellion, and became one of the most violent of the revolutionary fanatics. He was called the pillar of the Jacobin Club; where, in November 1791, he proposed to draw the likeness of two thousand of the principal aristocrats, that is to say, loyal subjects, and to send copies to the forty thousand municipalities in France, with order to hang on the *lantern, without a trial*, the originals wherever they appear. At the head of these aristocrats were the King's brothers, sister, and the other members of the royal family.

On the 2d of September, 1792, when republican

can assassins were butchering the prisoners at the prison called La Force, the National Deputy Re-boul observed David calmly drawing a picture of the dying as they were heaped up on the pile of the already murdered, and when asked what he was doing there, coldly answered, "*I am catching the last emotion of Nature in those scoundrels ;*" and when reproached for his barbarity, he said with a laughing indifference, "*If I love blood, it is no doubt because Nature has given me this disposition.*" In his cabinet David has, and shews to his friends, drawings of thirty-two mutilated heads, and mangled and disfigured countenances of persons who perished that day !

With Marat and Robespierre he was elected a representative of the Parisians in the National Convention, where he voted for the death of his King, who some years before had made him his painter. When Robespierre had destroyed his rival rebels of the Brissot faction, David was chosen a member of the Committee of Public Security, where he practised all the tyranny of a French republican upstart, and all the abominations of an atheistical demagogue : he publicly glorified himself for having signed the orders for imprisonment of twelve thousand of his fellow-citizens, of whom, he said, five thousand had

been guillotined at Paris, drowned, or shot in the departments.

He was the constant friend, admirer, and accomplice of Marat and Robespierre, and for them deserted even his old connexions with Danton, and Camille Desmoulins, whose countenances upon the scaffold he went to draw, when Robespierre's tribunal condemned them to die. Another trait will give some just idea of this monster. A pregnant woman, with seven children, threw herself at his feet, demanding the release of her husband, crying out, "he is innocent, and he alone nourishes our wretched family." David ordered her to remain in the same position, and coolly took out his pencil and designed this pregnant woman in her kneeling attitude, with her afflicted head hanging on one shoulder: when he had finished, he shewed her the paper, saying—"look! this is my only answer;"—the next day her husband was ordered to be guillotined, and when he was ascending the scaffold, David asked him to stop a moment, because he wanted a supplement to a drawing, by painting his dying looks, and comparing them with those of his petitioning and fainting wife. The same night David himself brought to the widow his performance, who, in looking at it, miscarried and died;
and

and her assassin made this new scene of horror another subject for his pencil.

He hastened the execution of the Queen, in 1793, and that of Madame Elizabeth, in April 1794. As baseness is always the companion of cruelty, David went in March 1794 to insult this virtuous Princess, with his presence in the Temple bastille. The Princess, asking him for a pinch of snuff, this cowardly regicide answered with brutality—"You are not worthy to put your fingers into my snuff-box," and he emptied some snuff on the back of his hand, saying—*this is good enough for thee, thou d—d aristocratic b—h, whom the republican scaffold is waiting for.*

When Robespierre made his last speech in the hall of the jacobins, complaining of his associates in the Committee of Public Safety, and alluding to the Republican case of Socrates, saying, "*I shall drink the hemlock,*" David advanced to the tribune, and exclaimed—"I also will drink it with thee." He did not, however, keep his word; and, instead of joining Robespierre on the day of his proscription, he concealed himself, to wait the issue of the contest between him and the National Convention; and when dragged from his hiding place, and carried to the prison of the Luxemburg, he behaved in the most abject manner,

ner, cried and prayed for his life; but no sooner had he obtained the assurance of forgiveness from the National Convention, than he insulted all his fellow prisoners by his scandalous and sacrilegious conduct and conversation, telling them how many mandates of arrest and of death he had issued, how many churches he had plundered, and how many priests, women, and children, he had caused to be murdered. He glorified himself with a ferocious exultation, that although he had signed so many mandates for arrests and death, he had never yet put his name under an order for a release or for an acquittal, and that was he ever in power again, he should most undoubtedly pursue the same line of conduct. He exhibited from his *patriotic* portfolio, so many evidences of his shocking and cruel activity, both as a republican painter and as a French patriot, that it was impossible to judge who deserved the greatest aversion and punishment, the artist or the citizen.

After three months imprisonment he was released, and in 1795, and in 1799, in an attempt to re-establish jacobin clubs, he joined all other terrorists to organize them.

The motion of Barrere to encourage French and other artists by their pencils and talents, to present and preserve for future ages some of the
most

most brilliant and memorable events of the French Revolution, David opposed, accusing all artists of being aristocrats; and he added, "that if the republican cannons, loaded with grape shot, fired upon all the artists of the world collected together, he was persuaded they would not kill one single true patriot jacobin or republican."

David is the first painter of the present French school; his admirable pieces of the Horatii and of the Sabines do his pencil honour; but talents ever so brilliant are incapable even to palliate his most enormous guilt; and foreigners, who dishonour themselves by visiting and applauding the painter, approve or diminish accordingly, the crimes of the regicide and the cruelties of the rebel.

Disease, the consequence of debauchery, has disfigured this man, whose face, looks, and voice, bespeak the image of his soul. A frightful tumefied cheek distorts his disgustful features, and disqualifies the organ of speech from uttering ten words in the same tone of voice. When he speaks, one often thinks he hears, at the same time, the sighs of the unfortunate; the complaints of the suffering; the agonies of the expiring, and the cannibal laughter and joy of an American savage tormenting his devoted victims.

David is past fifty years of age, and although a great painter, is a very ignorant man and politician ; he has, however, the presumption of wishing to be considered as one of the first revolutionary statesmen, and not long ago he intrigued for the place of a minister for the home department*.

* See *Les Annales du Terrorisme, Recueil d'Anecdotes, Les Crimes des Jacobins, and Les Memoires sur les Prisons dans le tems du Terreur* ; all works or pamphlets published in France.

CHARLES M. TALLEYRAND, DE PEREGORD.

TALLEYRAND is descended from the ancient Sovereigns of the province of Peregord, in the South of France. His father, a younger brother, with a small fortune, destined his son, early in life, for the church ; before twenty he possessed several rich abbeys, and before thirty was made bishop of Autun, much against the inclination of the virtuous Louis XVI. who had heard that the Abbé de Peregord was one of the most immoral, but insinuating *Reues* and libertines in France.

When at college, Talleyrand shewed an early genius for intrigues, and a strong propensity to vice, and but for the defect of being lame, he would, according to the wish of his governors, have disgraced the army, instead of scandalizing the church ; because he always was as great a coward in his private quarrels, as daring when supported in his public plots ; in fact, all his transactions since a minister, exhibit an ungenerous poltroon, backed by power.

The Revolution found him a gamester, a *debauchee*, and a bankrupt, without honour, principles or probity. He openly intrigued with a married lady; and *her son by this catholic bishop* was lately an aid-de-camp to Louis Buonaparte.

In 1789, when a member of the National Assembly, the gown of the bishop did not long conceal the modern philosopher and the fashionable atheist; he was *one of the first traitors to his king* and the *first apostate to his religion*; he soon alike attacked the majesty of heaven and the majesty of the throne.

The 2d of November, 1789, upon the motion of Talleyrand, the confiscation of the church property in France was decreed; and such is the incomprehensible will of Providence, that after years of wars, murders and crimes, this same man has been lately the disposer of all the church property both in Germany and in Italy. This motion to dispose of the property of others, by a *person who had no property* but debts, may be considered as the cruel foundation in France of all the consequent confiscations and plunders, as well as the proscriptions of owners of estates, lands, or of money. It has caused the ruin and wretchedness of millions, but it has enriched Talleyrand and his accomplices.

In

In May 1790, he was one of the members of the Diplomatic Committee, headed by Mirabeau, upon whose report it was decreed by the National Assembly, and sanctioned by the king, *that France renounced for ever all conquests*. Since he has become a revolutionary minister, he has never concluded a treaty, or entered into any negotiations without aggrandizing the territory, and augmenting the power of France.

In the same year, when a member of the Ecclesiastical Committee, he planned the intolerant and impolitic decree, which made a distinction between a constitutional and a nonjuring clergy, which has caused so many torments, dissensions, and civil wars, and which still continues to divide the Gallican church.

Talleyrand was always the worthy friend of Mirabeau, who, in April 1791, resigned his guilty soul in the arms of this his guilty accomplice.

In June, the same year, he was in the secret of La Fayette to betray his king into that improvident state (the journey to Varennes) which produced so many insults, humiliations, suspicions, and accusations; and which was the principal cause of all the subsequent sufferings of the king and his family.

In the spring 1792, Talleyrand accompanied
 the

the French Minister Chauvelin to England.— After the late constitution, he could not, for some years, occupy any public employment ; but Chauvelin was only the *nominal*, and Talleyrand the *real* minister, and the inventor, author, promoter, and instigator of all the plots, intrigues, and conspiracies, in and against England that year.

In 1793, Robespierre's faction caused a decree of outlawry to pass against Talleyrand ; proscribed every where else, he enjoyed hospitality and protection in England ; but in return he meditated new plots, and invented new projects to embroil or ruin this country, which was the cause of the order he received from government to leave it.

In 1794, he went to America, because no state in Europe would receive him. In 1795, the National Convention annulled its decree of outlawry, and in 1796 he arrived at Hamburgh, where he resided some time before he returned to France. Gratitude was never amongst the virtues of this man : Hamburgh, for its hospitality, has since, by his orders, been several times laid under contributions, and he detests alike America and England ; and their ruin is his incessant and daily contrivance and study.

By his intrigues with his old accomplices, the Directors, Barras, Rewbel, and La Reveille,
 lea,

Here, he was, in 1797, promoted to the ministry of the foreign department in France. His negotiations this year, and in 1798, at Rastadt, proved his abilities to intrigue, to embroil, to divide, and to profit by his nefarious deeds.

To tranquillize the jealousy of the Directory, and at the same time to employ and gratify the ambition of Buonaparte, he brought forward, in the autumn 1797, the old scheme of former French ministers—the conquest of Egypt; and his emissaries prepared the treason that delivered up Malta to Buonaparte, in June 1798.

After the victory of Lord Nelson, at Aboukir, Talleyrand became unpopular; and the issue, in 1799, of the Congress at Rastadt, and the unsuccessful campaign which followed, augmented the hatred of the jacobin faction against him, and he was obliged to resign: such was, however, still his influence with the Directory, that he chose Rheinhard for his successor, a person whom he governed as much in 1799, as he had done Chauvelin in 1792, to whom this Rheinhard was then Secretary.

When Buonaparte with such treachery had deserted his army in Egypt, Talleyrand and Sieyès prepared the revolution which seated him upon the throne of the Bourbons. No sooner

was

was the Corsican proclaimed First Consul, that he reinstated Talleyrand in his former place as minister.

In the beginning of 1800, by promises, bribes, and negotiations, Talleyrand pacified the Royalists of La Vendée, and afterwards, by treachery, delivered them up to arrest, transportation, and death.

The treaties of Luneville, of Amiens, and of Ratisbon, Talleyrand calls his *political chef d'œuvres*, or master-pieces: time will soon discover if these two treaties will not follow the fate of the third, already made impracticable by French encroachment, intrigues, pretensions, and insolence.

When a bishop, Talleyrand was a jobber: since he possesses the key to all the political transactions which so much influence the finances of all countries, his speculations in different funds have procured him a fortune greater than he *dares to acknowledge*, or *Buonaparte suspects*. This fortune has been considerably augmented by his many negotiations, in particular those about the throne in Tuscany*, the indemnities in Germany, and Louisiana in America.

* An idea may be formed of his fortune, when, for that transaction alone, he received ONE MILLION LIVRES.

Because

Because the former kings of France, Louis XIII. Louis XIV. and Louis XV. made their ministers, Richelieu, Mazarine, and Fleury, cardinals; Buonaparte proposed to Talleyrand, in 1802, to procure him the same dignity. Talleyrand had, however, given his promise to marry his former mistress, the divorced wife of a Mr. Grand; when, therefore, this proposal was made, he cunningly answered, that those *cardinals* were *prime ministers*, that *the great* Henry IV. had *no cardinal* for a minister, but *a friend* in his minister Sully. The same day he obtained the consular permission to marry Madame Grand.

From debauchery, intemperance, and gluttony, Talleyrand's constitution is entirely broken, and his health destroyed; and the invalid suffers daily for the excesses and the vices of which he has been guilty.

Talleyrand's inveteracy against England is proverbial; but it does not originate from the love of his own country, but from envy to the prosperity of England. He would willingly sign the ruin of France, was he certain that of England should follow.

Of Talleyrand's hatred towards this country, and of the plans and plots of Buonaparte, during a peace, to prepare the ruin of the British empire,

pire, if any proofs are required, the following extract from a memorial presented to the Chief Consul by Talleyrand, on the 13th Frimaire, year xi, or December 4th, 1802, must remove the doubts, even of the most prejudiced, in favour of the republican ruler and his republican minister :

Talleyrand begins by telling the Chief Consul, that the present memorial is merely a copy of one presented to the ministers of Louis XV. after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to dissuade them from that fatal and dishonourable war to France which ended in 1762. He says, "by the ignorance of the ministers, the bribes of Austria, the intrigues of Berpis, the influence of Pompadour, and the weakness of Louis XV. those strong reasons for peace were not listened to ; the consequence is known, but it is not known that this impolitic war alone prevented the total ruin of England during the following, or American war, and preserved that country from being what, if we are prudent, *it sooner or later must be, an invaluable Naval and Military Station of France*, and which shall secure us the empire of the world."

Talleyrand then enters into the particulars of the many and *irresistible* means France, during the peace,

peace, possesses "to foment troubles, to spread discontent, to tarnish the honour, to undermine the resources, to weaken the strength, to lull asleep the public spirit, and to cool the patriotism of the inhabitants of the British empire; and by a gradual train of intrigues, insults, demands, insurrections, vexations, murmurs, alarms, and bankruptcy, prepare even the warmest English patriot to see with indifference, if not with approbation, *an union with France*, which will put an end to all difficulties, and procure Englishmen the same tranquillity, honour, and happiness Frenchmen enjoy under the mild, but firm government of the Chief Consul.

"But," says he, "powerful as France is upon the Continent by its conquests, by its influence, by the vigour of its Government, and by the victories of its armies; in regard to England it is not in a better position of strength than in 1755, because, with the knowledge of our means, and with the great abilities of our ruler, we are unable *directly* to injure England, our navy being more reduced, and our naval officers more ignorant than in 1755, but *indirectly*, and in a time of peace, to lay the *infallible* foundation for the future subjection of England, France at no former period had so many certain and undoubted under-
hand

hand methods. A war at present may lessen, if not destroy them, but every year's continuance of peace will preserve, augment, and fix them.

“Ought we not to wait, at least ten years, before we renew the war with England? till we are in a condition effectually to support our claims, our views, and our plans? The English will do our business, if we permit them. Their religion is pleasure, and their pleasure debauchery. They have plunged themselves into an excess of luxury and intemperance. *They have begun to neglect their navy, and to disband their artificers, who go to France, Spain, and Holland for maintenance.*

“While their individuals squander their riches, *the State grows parsimonious, and begins to save in those articles on which it cannot be too profuse.*

“They are even near reducing their trivial army, and their patriots speak of entrusting, what they call their liberty and property, to the valour of a militia. What a field is this for our policy? Is it our business to awaken or arouse them from their lethargy? If we do, the consequence is obvious—We teach them to believe *a real truth*, ‘That they cannot strengthen themselves too much by sea or land.’ Then an army ceases to be the object of public complaint, of
public

public dislike—and the people begin to think that, as they must have one, it is better to have an army of English than of Frenchmen. Then their young nobility will continue to apply themselves to the military profession, and think themselves honoured by that profession, in which alone consist the defence and security of their country.

“ This may be fatal to us, for the sooner we go to war, the sooner their effeminacy will wear off, and their ancient spirit and courage revive. They will not then become more wealthy, but they will get more wisdom, which is better. The military virtues and the manly exercises may become fashionable, and the nation which now seems immersed in debauchery and corruption, may yet think seriously, and be once more what it has often been, the terror of Europe.—This is not an unnatural supposition—they easily glide from one extreme to another—it is their natural temper, and their whole history is one continued proof of it.

“ The ashes of La Vendee still smoulder—it requires only a spark to kindle a civil war in the bosom of our country. The returned emigrants are as yet quiet, but they have not forgot their former principles, and the wrongs they have suf-

ferred from the Revolution. Let not a new war give the Bourbons an opportunity to remind them of it. The most dangerous of the Bourbons reside in England; let not the renewal of a war permit England to use them, their name and influence, to trouble and invade France.

“ We command at present all the Continental Powers; but we know they wear with disgust and complaint, the fetters we have imposed. Let not a war with England give them occasion to shake them off, and to command us in their turn.

“ The general weakness and supineness that for ever attend immoderate wealth and luxury, hide from the English the knowledge of their own strength, real power, and true interest. Suffer them not to relapse into virtue and understanding. Plunge them not too deep into difficulties, and they will never emerge from folly into real wisdom.

“ We have already insulated them from the Continental politics—*Leave them in peace*—and the insulation of their trade shall soon follow. We have already made them feared, envied, and hated every where on the Continent—*Leave them in peace*, and they shall soon be despised, neglected, and unpitied.

“ *Leave*

“ Leave them in peace, and they will soon return to their amusements of elections, races, party, and faction—Leave them in peace, and their ministers must be directed by popular clamour, which we can always excite and encourage.—Leave them in peace, and their navy will once more be laid up to rot, and their seamen and artificers once more turned over to us, to Spain, and to Holland!—Leave them in peace, and the greatest part of their army will soon be reduced, and the small remains will soon become a mere militia in pay.—Leave them in peace, and we shall not fear the defection of Russia or Prussia, or any of our present Allies, which otherwise would much hurt, and, perhaps, ruin our present system. Leave them in peace, and they will never think of schemes for increasing their population, or for making every part of their dominions of real use to every other.—Leave them in peace, and most of their nobility and gentry will continue to squander away amongst us their great riches, and augment our resources, to enslave their country.—Leave them in peace, and before the year 25, France shall command the departments of the Thames, and of the Tweed, as it already does the departments of the Rhine and of the Po.

“Pursue, Citizen Consul, this plan steadily, for ten or fifteen years, constantly directing the riches of the country to the raising a navy, equal or superior to England, and then, and *not till then*, shall we be able to strike the blow we have for above one hundred and fifty years been meditating, *the Conquest of the British Islands.*”

(Signed) C. M. TALLEYRAND.

This memorial the author received from a friend at Paris, within three weeks of its presentation to Buonáparte; and though the *Moniteur* has mentioned it after its insertion in some of the English papers, its authenticity was never contradicted; on the contrary, one of Talleyrand's chief des bureaux, in the cabinet of Secret State Papers, was dismissed on the totally unfounded suspicion of having transmitted it to somebody in this country.*

Talleyrand has talents, and the Revolution, fortune, and circumstances, have procured him opportunities to exhibit them to the greatest advantage; under a *regular government* he would have been but an indifferent minister; under a *revolutionary tyranny* he is a great statesman and a political oracle; and those very vices which would have injured him under the one, are the prin-

principal cause of his great success under the other. But an impartial posterity, without our passions and our interest, will place him in his true rank, in that of a **TRAITOR**, a **REBEL**, and an **APOSTATE**.

END OF VOL. I.

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
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